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DECISION MAKING THEORIES OF RETALIATION
Katlyn S. Farnum, Ph.D.
University of Nebraska, 2016
Advisor: Richard L. Wiener
In 2013, the Supreme Court decided, in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center
v Nassar, that Title VII retaliation claims should be interpreted under the stricter but-for
causality instructions. This requires claims of retaliation to show that the plaintiff’s
discrimination complaint (or involvement in a discrimination claim) is the direct cause of the
adverse action, as compared to a motivating factor that is required under the less strict motivating
factor causal instructions. The current research examines the role of regulatory focus (promotion
v. prevention), causal instructions, employment action (promotion v. dismissal), and number of
claims considered on both juror (Study 1 and Study 2) and employer (Study 3) decision making.
In line with previous research, jurors in Study 1 and 2 found for the plaintiff more often under
mixed motive instructions but for the defendant more often under but-for instructions for
retaliation claims. Study 3 did not find effects of causal instructions but did support previous
research that people are more likely to take harsher actions for acts of omission (denying a
promotion) than acts of commission (dismissing from a job). Implications for psychological
theory, policy, law, and future research are discussed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Retaliation, as defined in §2000e-3a of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, is any
discriminatory act against an employee or applicant “because [the employee] has opposed
any practice made an unlawful practice by this subchapter, or because [the employee] had
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding or hearing.” That is, if an employee participates in any claim or investigation
concerning a discriminatory practice and the employer treats the employee adversely
because of his or her involvement, then the company may be liable for retaliation.
Individuals protected under the anti-retaliation provision include those who have filed a
complaint (or been involved with the investigation of a complaint) based on race, color,
national origin, religion, and sex. The inclusion of an anti-retaliation provision is
necessary for the enforcement of Title VII because legally protecting individuals who
wish to file a complaint will encourage individuals to make the initial complaint.
Specifically, if an employee is unprotected from adverse treatment that results from a
complaint, she or he will likely be disinclined to file the initial complaint (Naquin, 2013).
Developing an understanding of how jurors and employers perceive acts of retaliation is
becoming increasingly important with recent court cases (University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 2014). Additionally, claims of retaliation filed
under Title VII are on the rise. In 2014, 34.7% of the 88,778 total claims made to the
EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) were Title VII retaliation actions.
Though this is down 3% from 2013 (potentially as a result of Nassar), the proportion of
retaliation claims within the larger EEOC pool has steadily increased in the last 14 years
from 24.7% in 2000 to 36% in 2013).
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Despite the rise in retaliation claims and the changing case law, very few
empirical researchers have investigated the issue. In order to fully understand how to
approach the study of retaliation, it is important to understand the legal underpinnings of
retaliation in the workplace. The first section of this paper will explore the lengthy and
complicated case history and legal doctrine of Title VII retaliation. Then I will introduce
social psychological theories of motivation and decision making as possible explanations
for the way in which people interpret and consider retaliation both from the perspective
of a juror and an employer.
Legal Theory and Doctrine of Title VII Retaliation
Plaintiffs bring discriminatory actions under Title VII under two broad definitions:
disparate impact and disparate treatment. Disparate impact is any facially neutral
employment practice that has a disproportionate adverse impact on a specific protected
class (Seiner, 2006; Griggs v. Duke Power, 1971). Griggs v. Duke Power (1971) was the
first case to expand Title VII to encompass disparate impact. William Griggs filed a class
action lawsuit on behalf of himself and several African American employees working at
Duke Power Company alleging that the company’s inside transfer policy discriminated
against African American employees because it required minimum scores on two
aptitude tests in addition to a high school diploma. The Supreme Court, in an 8-0
decision, determined that even though the test was facially neutral, the company intended
to use it to keep less educated African American employees from advancing. Chief
Justice Burger stated: “good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.” The Supreme Court
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further extended the prohibition of disparate impact in their decision in Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust (1988) where Watson alleged disparate impact after she had applied
four times for a promotion within the bank and was denied each time. The company did
not have any clear requirements for determination of promotion so that the Supreme
Court decided to scrutinize the company’s discretionary decision making under a
disparate impact theory.
Disparate treatment is an action taken against an individual because of the
individual’s membership in a protected class (Seiner, 2006; Teamsters v. United States,
1977; Slack v. Havens, 1975). Unlike disparate impact, disparate treatment requires
proof of discriminatory intent or motivation on the part of the employer (Teamsters v.
United States, 1977). Slack v. Havens (1973) illuminates the process that gives rise to an
inference of intent. The black plaintiffs worked in the bonding and coating department of
a plant alongside a white co-worker. At the end of their workday, the crew chief informed
the plaintiffs that they would have to complete a deep and thorough cleaning of the
department, a task that their job description did not outline. Organizational officials
excused a white co-worker moving her to another department the day of the cleaning and
brought in a different worker, who was black, to replace her for the cleaning. During the
trial it came to light that one of the supervisors had commented to a plaintiff “colored
folks were hired to clean because they clean better” and “colored folks should stay in
their place.” The 9th Circuit Court found that the company, through the supervisor,
intended to discriminate based on race by making their black employees perform more
unpleasant and degrading tasks than their white employees. Ultimately, the Supreme
Court distinguished between disparate impact and treatment in Teamsters when they
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wrote that “Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in
mind when it enacted Title VII” and went on to stress that proof of discriminatory motive
is not required for disparate impact but is the cornerstone of disparate treatment. An
employee must be able to show that the defendant had intended to discriminate against
him or her because the plaintiff was a member of a protected class. The project focuses
on cases of disparate treatment.
Burden Shifting Models of Discrimination
Before discussing the case law of Title VII retaliation, an overview of the burdenshifting model of discrimination claims is essential. One of the leading cases for Title VII
disparate treatment also set forth the first model of burden shifting. In McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), the plaintiff, an African American worker, suspected
that McDonnell Douglas laid him off due to his longtime involvement with the Civil
Rights Movement. In response to this perceived unfair treatment he, and other activists,
planned a protest at the leading plant for the company. Green filed a complaint with the
EEOC claiming that McDonnell Douglas refused to rehire him due to his race and
involvement with the Civil Rights Movement. The District Court found in favor of the
company, agreeing that Green’s involvement with the protests, which involved blocking
traffic entering the plant, constituted an illegal activity and went well beyond his
legitimate civil rights activities. The Court of Appeals, affirmed that illegal activities are
not protected, but also remanded the case back to trial to investigate the racially
discriminatory hiring practices. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals ruling
and stated that the lower court should allow Green a fair opportunity to prove McDonnell
Douglas’ discriminatory intent.
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In McDonnell Douglas the Supreme Court set the groundwork for the first
burden-shifting model first requiring a plaintiff to prove a prima facie case that provides
evidence that the plaintiff was qualified for the position but was not hired due to his or
her protected class. The plaintiff must also show that, the company continued to look for
other employees for the job. After proving a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their actions. If an
employer can provide a legitimate reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to
show this reason is pretext (i.e., not the real reason). Defendants commonly prove pretext
by showing that the employer treated an employee, not in the protected class (a White
employee in a case of discrimination against a Black employee), differently despite that
employee having similar qualities and experience as the plaintiff. For example, in
McDonnell Douglas, if the company had hired a White employee who participated in the
same protest, then their argument that the plaintiff was not hired due to illegal activities
would be pretext.
The courts followed the McDonnell Douglas scheme for all Title VII cases until
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989) in which the defendants denied Hopkins, a female
employee partnership in the company despite her being qualified for the position. The
Supreme Court adopted a mixed motive model for determining liability. Here, the
plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case through direct evidence that his or her
protected class (e.g., sex) was a substantial factor in the decision. The burden then shifts
to the employer who must establish that the same action would have occurred absent the
protected class status of the employee. Thus the company must show that a legitimate
reason, and not the plaintiff’s membership in the protected class, was the driving force of
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its aversive action. If the company can show that it would have made the same decision
absent the protected class then it faces no liability. However, if the protected class
remains a substantial factor in the decision, even if there are other legitimate reasons for
the decision, the employer may still be liable for damages.
Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1991 codified the mixed
motive model via additional language in §2000e-2m: “Except as otherwise provided in
this title, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice”
(emphasis added). Under the amended Title VII a plaintiff must show that their protected
class motivated the decision. The employer may proffer a partial affirmative defense by
showing they would have “taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible
motivating factor” (§706g2B). This affirmative defense limits the amount of damages
that a court can award to the plaintiff to injunctive relief (i.e., the employer must desist
discriminatory action) and court costs. The Supreme Court further defined the issue of
causality in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) by extending the application of the
mixed motive model to be applicable in all cases under Title VII.
Following the amendments to Title VII and the holdings in Price Waterhouse and
St. Mary’s, many lower courts extended the mixed motive model to cases of age
discrimination brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) (e.g.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products Inc., 2000; Rose v. New York City Bd. of Educ.,
2001; Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 2004; E.E.O.C. v. Warfield-Rohr Casket Co., Inc.,
2004). However, in Gross v. FBL Financial Services (2009), the Supreme Court
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reexamined the language of the ADEA to determine if there existed evidence of
Congressional intent to apply the mixed motive model to the ADEA. The discussion in
the case hinged upon the language of §623a1 which states: “It shall be unlawful for an
employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment because of such an individual’s age” (emphasis added). The Supreme
Court determined that the inclusion of the “because of’ clause indicates that age must be
the determinative factor in the case, and not merely a motivating factor. The justices
reasoned that because Congress did not amend the ADEA when it amended Title VII that
it did not intend to extend the mixed motive model to age discrimination cases. Thus,
lower courts must try cases under the ADEA using the but-for model of causality, which
requires the plaintiff to carry the burden of showing the adverse treatment was due
directly to the plaintiff’s age. That is, even if the employer used age in the decision there
can be no liability, if a legitimate factor played an equal or greater role. The decision in
Gross, brought into play the issue of whether the courts should use the mixed motive or
but-for model of causality for Title VII Retaliation, because the statutory language in
Title VII is retaliation similar to the age discrimination language in the ADEA. The
following section will examine the case law leading up to University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, which determined the correct causal model for
Title VII retaliation.
Title VII Retaliation
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act protects against discrimination due to terms,
conditions, compensation, or privileges of employment based on sex, race, color,
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religion, and national origin (§2000e-2). The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII,
§2000e-3a, prohibits adverse action against employees “because [the employee] has
opposed any practice made an unlawful practice by this subchapter, or because [the
employee] had made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding or hearing.”. The anti-retaliation provision includes two clauses
prohibiting two types of actions: the opposition clause and the participation clause. The
opposition clause bans retaliation because an employee “has opposed any practice”
within the company. For example, in Womack v. Munson (1980), the Black plaintiff,
Womack, worked in various positions for the county sheriff before being discharged.
After his discharge he filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging abuses of black prisoners
by the sheriff department. Two years after the complaint, the state prosecutor hired
Womack as an investigator. During his time with the prosecutor he filed a lawsuit based
upon the previous EEOC claim against the sheriff. After learning about the lawsuit, the
prosecutor discharged Womack. Though the prosecutor contended to have discharged
Womack for his own involvement in the potential abuse, the 8th Circuit Court ruled that
the prosecutor had retaliated against Womack for his opposition to the treatment of black
prisoners.
The participation clause prohibits retaliation if an employee has “made a charge,
testified, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this title.” Activities covered by the participation clause include any type of
participation, or refusal to participate in an investigation. For example, in Smith v.
Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority (1977), the plaintiff, Smith, worked for the
defendant for twenty years without incident. Then, in 1974 the defendant discharged
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three black male employees (not including Smith) who later filed a charge with the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission alleging racial discrimination under Title VII. At a weekly
staff meeting, the supervisor asked the staff, including plaintiff Smith, to sign an affidavit
confirming the defendant’s reasons for discharging the employees. After Smith returned
the affidavit unsigned the defendant demoted her because of her refusal. Even though
Smith did not directly participate in the investigation, the court considered her refusal to
participate on behalf of her employer to be an action that the participation clause protects.
An important and timely issue in both opposition and participation cases is the manner in
which the courts have determined which actions the anti-retaliation close covers.
“Employees” protected under anti-retaliation provision. In §2000e-3a of
Title VII, prohibits an employer from discriminating “against any of his employees or
applicants for employment.” Does Title VII reach to only current employees and
applicants covered? In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. (1997) the Supreme Court considered
whether or not Title VII protected a former employee. After Shell Oil fired Robinson, he
filed a complaint of discrimination. While the charge was pending, Robinson applied for
another job and the prospective employer contacted Shell Oil for a reference. Robinson
did not receive the job and claimed that Shell Oil had given him a negative reference due
to his pending EEOC complaint. The Supreme Court, in a 9-0 decision, determined that
former employees are protected under Title VII because failing to protect them would
offer a “perverse incentive for employers to fire employees who might bring . . . claims”
against the company.
Most recently, in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP (2011) the courts
considered whether Title VII protects third parties from retaliation. Thompson and his
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then-fiancé-now wife worked for North American Stainless. His wife filed a complaint
with the EEOC alleging gender discrimination under Title VII and three weeks after the
EEOC informed the company of the charge, North American Stainless fired Thompson.
Thompson then filed a claim for retaliation, stating that the defendant fired him because
of his wife’s complaint. The 6th Circuit upheld the lower court’s ruling in favor of North
American Stainless, saying that third parties are not protected under Title VII. The
Supreme Court overturned this holding and remanded the case back to the lower court.
Justice Scalia, writing the majority opinion, instructed the lower courts to interpret the
anti-retaliation provision to cover a broad range of employees, including third parties.
While some cases have limited the reach of Title VII (see the following discussion of
Clark County School District v. Breeden, 2001and Laughlin v. Metropolitan Washington
Airports Authority, 1998), more generally federal jurisprudence has extended the reach of
Title VII to encompass a greater diversity of actions and plaintiffs under the antiretaliation provisions. The following section outlines the current status of retaliation law
under Title VII.
Actions protected under anti-retaliation provision. In order for a retaliation
complaint to go forward, the complainant must reasonably believe that an illegal activity
occurred (Clark County School District v. Breeden, 2001), there must be a temporal
causal path from the complaint to the adverse action (Clark County School District v.
Breeden, 2001), the employee must act reasonably in their actions against the company
(Laughlin v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, 1998), the action must be
adverse enough to dissuade a reasonable employee from filing a complaint (Burlington
Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 2006), and the opposition to the illegal
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activity is enough to warrant a retaliation complaint (Crawford v. Metropolitan
Government of Nashville & Davidson County, 2009).
The reasonable belief that an illegal activity occurred and the temporal causality
serve gatekeeping functions in establishing a prima facie case. In order to determine
whether a claim of retaliation resulting from allegations of discrimination is a frivolous
action, the 9th Circuit applied the reasonable belief test in Clark County School District v.
Breeden, 2001 to determine whether a reasonable employee would find the action
discriminatory. At a meeting, with the plaintiff present, her supervisor read aloud a
sexually explicit remark that one applicant had made during the interview process. The
supervisor stated that he didn’t understand what the comment meant and a male coworker replied “Well, I’ll tell you later” and both men laughed. The plaintiff complained
to another supervisor about the comment and filed a claim with the EEOC. Twenty
months after filing the claim, the plaintiff was transferred to a different department and
states this was directly related to her complaint. The Court found that the plaintiff’s
claim did not fall under the opposition clause because no reasonable employee would
have thought that one sexually charged comment was harassment. Further, the Court
determined that the plaintiff did not show temporal causation between her claim and the
alleged retaliation, because the retaliation came about when she transferred to a different
department 20 months after the alleged discriminatory action.
Even if a reasonable belief exists, certain actions remain outside the reach of the
anti-retaliation provision. For example, in Laughlin v. Metropolitan Washington Airports
Authority- MWAA (1998), the 4th Circuit had to determine whether the plaintiff’s actions
fell under the participation or opposition clause. LaSauce, a co-worker of the plaintiff,

12
had filed an informal complaint with the EEO officer at MWAA for retaliation. One of
the managers worked to settle the complaint informally and drafted a written warning to
the supervisor who had allegedly retaliated against LaSauce, but never formally sent the
warning because the supervisor had recently accepted a new position at another airport.
Laughlin, one of the secretaries at MWAA, found the warning on the manager’s desk.
Believing that her manager was taking part in a cover-up, Laughlin made copies of the
warning and sent it to LaSauce. MWAA terminated Laughlin for copying and releasing
confidential documents, after which Laughlin filed a retaliation complaint with the
EEOC, alleging retaliation under the participation clause. The District Court found in
favor of MWAA and on appeal the 4th Circuit sought to determine if Laughlin had
enough evidence for a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. The 4th Circuit
stated that Laughlin’s actions did not fall under the participation clause, as there was no
ongoing investigation and LaSauce never asked for assistance with the investigation. The
Court then had to determine if Laughlin’s actions might fall under the opposition clause
and developed a balancing test. The 4th Circuit reasoned that the purpose of Title VII was
to protect employees who are reasonably engaging in opposition to discrimination and
that the lower courts must balance that principle against an employer’s “objective
selection and control of personnel.” In the case of Laughlin, taking confidential
documents and sending it to an outside party was not a reasonable action and could be
detrimental to a company’s security of sensitive documents. Thus, the 4th Circuit test
provided a way to determine when an action is too unreasonable to be protected under
Title VII.
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Though both Clark County and Laughlin limit the types of actions covered under
Title VII, the Supreme Court, in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White
(2006), recently determined that Title VII does prohibit both employment related
retaliations and actions that are not directly related to employment but might negatively
impact an employee’s willingness to report discrimination. White alleged that Burlington
Northern retaliated against her because she filed a complaint of gender discrimination.
The retaliation surfaced when Burlington Northern reassigned her to a position with less
prestige and more arduous activities as well as when it later suspended her without pay
for 37 days. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court addressed 1) the type of adverse action that
falls under Title VII and 2) how harmful the action must be to fall within the scope of the
anti-retaliation provision. Prior to this case, courts had interpreted an adverse action in
different ways with some (e.g., the 7th Circuit) holding that any action that was
materially adverse to change the conditions or terms of employment, while other courts
used a more restrictive approach and required that the adverse action had to affect an
ultimate employment decision (such as hiring, granting leave, discharge, promoting, and
compensation). In Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court adopted the 7th Circuit’s
interpretation that a “reasonable employee would have found the challenged action
materially adverse.” The law now requires that the action in question would dissuade a
reasonable employee from filing a complaint or participating in an investigation. Thus,
the anti-retaliation provision does not protect against “petty slights and minor
annoyances” but actions that would be so negative as to stop an employee from
complaining. The courts must decide the issue from the perspective of an objective,
reasonable person.
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A final consideration on the types of actions that Title VII retaliation covers
concerns whether or not the anti-retaliation provision protects an employee who
participated in an employer’s internal investigation of a sexual harassment complaint
(Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, 2009). Though
this case seems to fall under the participation clause, the Supreme Court decided that the
opposition clause protected a plaintiff making a sexual harassment claim. The human
resources department within the company interviewed Crawford about the several sexual
harassment complaints that coworkers had brought against a new employee. During the
interview, Crawford described several instances that she had either experienced or
witnessed that one could reasonably interpret as sexual harassment. Following the
investigation, the company dismissed Crawford and two other co-workers. The 6th Circuit
found in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff, saying that Crawford had not played
an active role in opposing the conduct involved. The Supreme Court reversed this
holding, because such a rule would have undermined the effectiveness of the antiretaliation provision greatly reducing the law’s effectiveness in protecting employees
who are oppose, regardless of how actively, an illegal action in the workplace.
The issue of burden-shifting. It is generally agreed upon that the typical
retaliation case requires a plaintiff to prove three elements: 1. There was a complaint or
investigation of protected conduct, 2. There was an adverse action, and 3. That the
protected conducted caused the adverse action (Moberly, 2011). Though this seems
straight forward, courts have struggled with the type of causation needed to prove
retaliation. Since Price Waterhouse (1989), courts have applied the mixed motive
burden-shifting model even though there is some doubt as to whether the language of the
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anti-retaliation provision provides for this model. For example, in Woodson v. Scott
Paper Co. (1997) the 3rd Circuit called for the use of the but-for model of causation for
retaliation cases and questioned whether or not the plaintiff could prove the but-for causal
link between his complaint and the adverse action. In another case, Hillig v. Rumsfeld
(2004) the 10th Circuit determined that the McDonnell Douglas framework is sufficient
for retaliation claims. Recall that this would put the burden first on the plaintiff to
produce the prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate reason for the action, and finally the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show
that this reason is merely pretext. To further complicate matters, the 5th Circuit decided
that mixed motive instructions should apply in Title VII retaliation cases (Smith v. Xerox
Co., 2010) by referring to the fact that in Gross (2009) the Supreme Court interpreted
Title VII and the ADEA independently of each other and so even though the but-for
language existed in the Title VII anti-retaliation provision, it was independent of the
ADEA. In 2013, the Supreme Court resolved the issue of which model of causality to
use in Title VII retaliation cases in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.
Nassar.
Nassar and the Future of Retaliation
In 2013 the Supreme Court agreed to hear University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar to determine the appropriate model of causality to use in Title
VII retaliation cases. Dr. Naiel Nassar was a physician, of Middle Eastern descent,
working at the University Texas Southwestern Medical Center and at the Parkland
Memorial Hospital. The University had arranged an agreement with Parkland Hospital so
that the hospital offered physician positions to all medical faculty members in the
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Department of Medicine. During his time at the Medical Center, Nassar believed Dr.
Levine, the Chair of Infectious Disease Medicine, singled him out due to his Middle
Eastern heritage for unfavorable treatment. He alleged that Levine questioned his billing
practices, productivity and work ethic due to his national origin. In 2005, Levine
opposed hiring another Middle Eastern physician and commented to Dr. Keiser (Nassar’s
primary supervisor) “Middle Easterners are lazy.” After the hospital hired the second
Middle Eastern physician, Levine commented that the Hospital had “hired another one.”
Nassar met with the University’s Chair of Internal Medicine, Dr. Fitz, numerous times to
complain about the way Levine had treated him. In the end, Nassar arranged to continue
working at Parkland Hospital without continuing as a faculty member for the University
allowing Nassar to remove himself from Levine’s supervision. The University and
Hospital negotiated with Nassar to reach this compromise solution. Shortly after
reaching the agreement, Nassar wrote to Dr. Fitz (University Chair of Internal Medicine)
resigning his position stating the reason was that Dr. Levine had harassed him. Nassar
sent copies of this letter to other supervisors as well. Outraged by the letter, Fitz told
Nassar’s supervisor that the action had publically humiliated Levine and that some action
was needed to exonerate her. Fitz opposed the arrangement made for Nassar and the
Hospital withdrew the offer. Nassar then filed a complaint of retaliation with the EEOC
and finally district court.
At trial, the district court instructed the jury to use mixed motive instructions for
both the discrimination and retaliation claims, which led to the jury finding in favor of
Nassar for both claims and awarded him $438,167.66 in back pay and over $3 million in
compensatory damages. Upon appeal the 5th Circuit vacated the discrimination
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complaint for constructive discharge but affirmed the retaliation claim, saying that the
University’s motivation to withdraw Nassar’s offer was, in part, Fitz’s desire to retaliate
for Nassar’s complaints against Levine. When the Supreme Court ultimately took up the
case, the justices found, in a 5-4 decision, that Title VII retaliation requires a but-for
causality model. The Supreme Court finding hinged on two arguments: the finding in
Gross for causal language and the Congressional intent involved in the amendments of
Title VII.
Causal Language. The Supreme Court began its discussion of the case by
elaborating on the difference between a status-based discrimination claim and employer
retaliation. The Court argued that under Title VII a status-based claim (discrimination
based on race, color, national origin, religion, and sex) prohibited employers from using
protected class membership as “… a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors motivated the practice” (§2000e-2m). Thus status-based
discrimination falls under the mixed-motive model of causality, as the Court first decided
in Price Waterhouse (1989). However, when examining the language of the antiretaliation provision Justice Kennedy quoted, “It shall be unlawful…for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment…because he has
opposed any practice…or because he has made a charge, testified assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII” (§2000e-3a).
As in Gross v. FBL (2009) the language of the statute specifically uses the word
“because.” Therefore, as in Gross, where the court held that ADEA required but-for
causality, it held in Nasser that retaliation claim also required a but-for causality model.
Thus, plaintiffs in retaliation claims must show that “the harm would not have occurred”
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absent the opposition or participation in a discrimination claim. Even though the
Supreme Court said in Gross that the ADEA and Title VII should be considered
independently, they held in Nasser that Gross was persuasive in the interpretation of the
anti-retaliation provision.
Congressional Intent. To interpret the Congressional intent of Title VII, the
Supreme Court considered the structure and language of the statute. The Court argued
that since Congress wrote the anti-retaliation provision as a separate section from statusbased discrimination that Congress intended the two to be considered as separate entities.
Further, the amendments to Title VII in 1991 specifically added the provision for
motivating factors for status-based discrimination but such a change was absent for the
anti-retaliation provision. The majority concluded that, given this clear language,
Congress had intended to limit retaliation claims to stricter liability than status-based
claims, therefore, applying the mixed motive model to Title VII retaliation would be
inconsistent with the intent of Congress.
The Court also warned that lowering the standard of causation for retaliation
claims would have serious repercussions. Specifically, since the number of Title VII
retaliation claims with the EEOC had doubled in the past 15 years, lessening the causal
standard could lead to more frivolous claims of retaliation. By applying the but-for
model, courts could impose a structural barrier to limit the number of baseless claims
filed with the EEOC. Some may argue that this last argument is superfluous because the
EEOC has already included many safeguards and protections against frivolous claims.
For example, in Ledbetter v. Goodyear (2007), the lower level court dismissed the claim
because the plaintiff filed outside of the timeline required by the EEOC (180 days).
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Future of retaliation post-Nassar. Legal commentators argue that the
effectiveness of the anti-retaliation provision is essential to the enforcement of Title VII
anti-discrimination provisions (Naquin, 2013). Specifically, if the law does not protect
employees from retaliation then they will be unlikely to file the initial discrimination
complaints or participate in discrimination complaint investigations for fear of reprisal
from their employers. In fact, research on victims of retaliation reveals that filing a
complaint of retaliation can lead to ostracism in the workplace, open the employee up to
more retaliation, and lead to higher levels of anxiety and sadness (Cortina & Magley,
2007). Additionally, workers who fear retaliation report being less likely to complain
about the initial discrimination than those who do not (Mitchell & Ambrose, 2012).
Finally, anti-retaliation provisions benefit society as a whole as well as individual
employees. Arguably, employees possess unique knowledge about unlawful actions in
the workplace so that when they report discriminatory actions they help to assure that
companies will comply with the law improving the level of justice available in society as
a whole (Moberly, 2011). Despite the reasons for ensuring an effective the antiretaliation provision, the decision in Nassar could limit the protections by narrowing the
availability of relief in retaliation claims.
For example, under the Nassar facts with a mixed motive model of causality the
plaintiff might have been able to prove a legitimate case of retaliation. However, under
the but-for standard, the University only had to point to its own policy to argue that the
reason it terminated the contract was that it was following its own internal rules and not
Nassar’s letter accusing Levine of discrimination. As a result, Nassar lost his claim (Lin,
2014). Most important for understanding the impact of Nassar (2013) is the distinction
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that the Supreme Court drew between discrimination and retaliation claims, each with
different causal requirements. The differences between the causal models underlying
each type of claim are subtle so that it might be difficult for a jury to clearly differentiate
the two causal theories. Jurors may be confused by the two sets of instructions for the
claims, especially when the court instructs them to treat the claims as separate entities
that are unrelated (Lin, 2014), each with a different causality requirement. Under such
conditions, jurors may inadvertently adopt the higher but-for standard for all
discrimination cases regardless of whether they are status or retaliation claims.
Therefore, Nassar (2013) may result in a type of juror confusion, which may ultimately
result in lowered protection in the workplace.
On the other hand, it is possible that people are quite able to see clear differences
between retaliation and status discrimination. Sherwyn, Heise, and Eigen (2014) argued
that employees alleging retaliation actually fair better at trial than those alleging
discrimination. The researchers showed undergraduate mock jurors videotaped
reenactments of a retaliation case in which an employee alleged he was denied a
promotion due to complaining about racial discrimination and sexual harassment. After
watching the case, participants received mixed motive instructions (note: none used butfor comparison instructions) and deliberated the case in groups six to reach their verdicts.
Participants filled out individual verdict forms after deliberation. Fifty-nine percent of
participants found in favor of the plaintiff. Sherwyn and colleagues compared these
results to a previous study that had undergraduate mock jurors watch and deliberate a
national origin discrimination case. In that study, 40.1% of mock jurors found in favor of
the plaintiff. Based upon these two studies Sherwyn et al. (2014) argued that jurors might
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be more likely to find for the plaintiff under retaliation than discrimination. However, a
comparison between studies without directly varying the type of causality instructions
using an identical fact pattern falls very far short of the rigorous experimental evidence
that would support this conclusion. Specifically, Sherwyn and colleagues did not
consider the difference between mixed motive and but-for causality instructions in their
retaliation study and did not consider other confounding differences (e.g., differences
between the fact patterns, participants, and the law under consideration) when coming to
their conclusions.
Nonetheless, this preliminary investigation raises the empirical issue of whether
or not instructions for two related claims – discrimination and retaliation – each with a
different causality requirement results in different trial processes and verdicts. First,
there might be different verdict outcomes for the same retaliation case depending on
whether jurors use mixed motive or but-for instructions. In fact, previous research has
revealed that but-for instructions in age discrimination claims are more likely to lead to
pro-defendant verdicts, regardless of strength of evidence, while mixed motive
instructions are more likely to lead to pro-plaintiff verdicts (Wiener & Farnum, 2013;
Farnum & Wiener, under review). Extending this program of research to retaliation
claims might find similar results. Furthermore, jurors who decide both discrimination and
retaliation claims may have difficulty in parsing out and correctly interpreting the facts
that could support different causal judgments under the two different sets of instructions.
Psychological theories about judgment and decision making hold the promise to help us
better understand the way in which jurors will react to retaliation claims in a case that
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requires them to render a verdict for separate claims using different causality instructions.
I take up the role of psychological models of decision making in the sections to follow.
Perhaps, even more importantly, the decision in Nasser likely will have
repercussions in the everyday life of the workplace by influencing the way in which
employers treat employees. Employers may be more willing to retaliate against an
employee if they know they can escape liability by finding another legitimate factor to
dilute the retaliating action. Imagine a situation in which an employer faces a
discrimination charge from an employee who shows up late for work two days in a row.
The employer may be more willing to risk legal action by retaliating against the
employee (e.g., firing her) under a but-for model than under the mixed motive theory.
Interestingly, psychological research suggests that observers may perceive
differences in the level of legitimacy depending upon the type of retaliatory action. In a
study on employee retaliation against a supervisor, participants read one of two
situations: 1)A manager, who sexually harassed a friend of theirs, has asked them to find
a missing file or 2)A manager, who unfairly passed the participant over for a promotion,
asked for help in choosing a marketing plan. Within each scenario participants were then
given several options for what they did in the situation. For the missing file scenario these
included denying knowing where the file is located, not telling where the file is located,
and hiding the file. Participants then rated the acceptableness of the action from the
scenario. Participants viewed acts of omission (e.g. not telling where the important file is
located) as more acceptable than acts of commission (e.g. hiding an important file)
(Charness & Levine, 2010). More generally, it is possible that employers may be more
likely to retaliate against an employee via an act of omission, such as failing to promote

23
or engaging in third-party retaliation, than an act of commission, such as firing or
demoting the complainant. Social psychological theories of motivation and decision
making provide some guidance on understanding this issue as well as the overall reaction
that jurors may have to different forms of causality instructions.
Psychological Theories
Regulatory Focus
Regulatory Focus Theory (RFT) proposes that people are motivated in one of two
ways: promotion or prevention (Higgins, 1997; 1998; 2000; 2002). Promotion focused
individuals tend to focus on their ideal self, or the person they would ideally like to be
with the attributes that make up this ideal. In order to reach this ideal self, promotion
focused people tend to seek achievement and advancement through taking risks to attain
their goal. People take risks in order to avoid errors of omission, or not acting when they
should have acted. In comparison, prevention focused individuals tend to focus on their
ought self, or the person they should be in society. To achieve this self-goal, prevention
focused people tend to seek safety and security by avoiding risks and therefore
mismatches to desired outcomes to attain their goal. By avoiding risks, they seek to avoid
acts of commission, or acting when they should not have acted (Higgins, 1997; 1998;
2000; 2002). These different pathways and goals have been well documented in the
research literature (e.g. Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 2003; Crowe & Higgins, 1997;
Higgins, 2002; Higgins, Friedman, et al, 2001; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997;
Polman, 2012; Righetti, Finkenauer, & Rusbult, 2011; Santelli, Struthers, & Eaton, 2009;
Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010; Woltin & Jonas, 2012; Zaal, Laar,
Stahl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2012; Zhang, Higgins, & Chen, 2011). There is little doubt that
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differences in regulatory focus style exists and a myriad of research documents how and
when regulatory focus plays a role in motivation, decision making and the assignment of
value to outcomes. Promotion and prevention (effects will be listed in this order) are
predictive of several factors such as distant or proximal goals (Pennington & Roese,
2003), abstract or concrete mental representations (Aaker & Lee, 2006), additive and
subtractive counterfactual thinking (Roese, Hur, & Pennington, 1999), creativity versus
self-control (Freitas, Liberman, & Higgins, 2002; Friedman & Förster, 2001), affective
reactions of dejection or agitation (Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000; Sassenberg & Hansen,
2007; Shah, Brazy, & Higgins, 2004), reactions to change or stability (Liberman, Idson,
Camacho, & Higgins, 1999), and emergence of approach or avoidance behaviors
(Förster, Higgins, & Idson, 1999).
For example, Roese, Hur, & Pennington (1999) found that prevention focused
individuals were more likely to generate subtractive counterfactuals (I should never have
raised my hand) while promotion focused individuals were more likely to generate
additive counterfactuals (I should have raised my hand). In a second study, they
prompted participants to generate either additive or subtractive counterfactual thoughts
and this, in turn, led to participants adopting either promotion or prevention focused
responses. Pennington and Roese (2003) also found that regulatory focus is related to
temporal aspects of goals. Participants rated the importance of either promotion goals or
prevention goals for an exam at two time points. Some forecasted 2 weeks before the
exam and others responded only a few minutes before the exam. When the exam was
more distant, participants had more promotion focused goals, but prevention focused
goals remained constant across both temporal points. In another study (Study 4),
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participants completed a measure of their chronic regulatory focus and were then asked to
rate the perceived temporal distance of their future goals. Specifically, participants who
are chronically promotion focused believed their goals to be temporally farther away than
did chronic prevention focused participants.
Promotion and prevention regulatory focus can result from either
dispositional/chronic traits or situational inducements (Higgins, 1997; 1999; Shah,
Higgins, & Friedman, 1998). A person with a chronic promotion focus will be gainfocused and more willing to take risks, while a chronic prevention focused person will be
loss-focused and be more likely to avoid risks. Higgins (2000) also suggests that certain
situations may also lead someone to act in either a promotion or prevention focused way.
For example, if a teacher tells a student of a gain concern that includes positive outcomes,
such as receiving extra credit for going to a talk, the situation will put the student into a
promotion frame. He or she will work harder at finding a way to go to the talk. On the
other hand, if a teacher tells a student of a loss concern that includes negative outcomes,
such as loosing points on a test, the situation will put the student into a prevention frame.
She or he will avoid going out to a movie to have more time to study for the exam.
A typical measure of regulatory focus chronicity consists of measuring
participants’ reaction times when they list attributes of their ideal self (promotion) or
their ought self (prevention) (Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998). If a participant lists the
attributes of his or her ideal self faster than the attributes of the ideal self, that implies that
that promotion focus attributes are more readily accessible so that the individual is more
chronically promotion focused, whereas listing attributes of the ought self more quickly
is indicative of a chronic prevention focus. Individuals with chronic promotion focus
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approach most tasks with eagerness while those with chronic prevention focus approach
the same tasks with vigilance. The former worry more about making errors of omission
(missing an opportunity to succeed) and the latter, more about making errors of
commission (mistakenly making a response that was wrong) (Higgins, 1997; 1999; Shah,
Higgins, & Friedman, 1998).
On the other hand, researchers can also manipulate promotion or prevention focus
from the demands of the situations in which they place people. From an experimental
research perspective, this allows researchers to manipulate type of regulatory focus
(promotion vs. prevention) that participants experience through situational inducements.
A common method of inducing regulatory focus is through an open-ended writing prompt
that asks participants to write about or list attributes concerning either promotion or
prevention goals (Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, & Mussweiler, 2005; Roese, Hur, &
Pennington, 1999). Galinsky and colleagues used this technique to induce regulatory
focus in negotiation situations and found that those participants who wrote about
promotion attributes were more likely to negotiate a higher dollar amount than those who
wrote about prevention attributes.
Regulatory fit. Whether a person is prevention or promotion focused predicts a
number of internal and external response and experience factors, but research also shows
that the regulatory fit between a person’s motivational state and the situation determines
perceptions of value and outcome expectations (Aaker & Lee, 2006; Avnet & Higgins,
2003; Avnet & Higgins, 2006; Gallagher & Updegraff, 2011; Higgins, Idson, Freitas,
Spiegel, & Molden, 2003). Regulatory fit occurs when the regulatory focus of the
individual matches the regulatory focus of the situation. That is, when a promotion-

27
focused individual is in a situation, which induces a psychological state that emphasizes
gains, eagerness, and achieving objectives, they will experience regulatory fit.
Alternatively, if a prevention-focused individual is in a situation, which induces a
psychological state that emphasizes safety, avoiding losses, and vigilance, they will
experience regulatory fit. People in a state of regulatory fit are more likely to exhibit
stronger emotions and behaviors in line with their regulatory focus. Regulatory fit
produces motivational properties such that people who are promotion focused and in a
state of regulatory fit are more sensitive to the presence and absence of positive outcomes
while those in a state of regulatory fit and prevention focused people are more sensitive
to the presence and absence of negative outcomes. When chronic regulatory focus fits
with the outcome available in a situation, people are more likely to choose the outcome
that fits best. This occurs because regulatory fit “feels right”, intensifies peoples’ beliefs,
and the extent to which they value outcomes (Lee & Aaker, 2004). Specifically, when
people’s decision strategy, promotion or prevention focused, is reinforced instead of
discouraged, their motivation to continue a task in a manner consistent with regulatory
focus intensifies because they feel it will work best for them (Avnet & Higgins, 2006).
Higgins and colleagues (2003) demonstrated the influence of regulatory fit on
subsequent evaluations of an object. They measured chronic regulatory focus by having
participants list attributes that are descriptive of the ideal self and the ought self
(participants listed these attributes separately). The researchers combined the
participants’ selection of the traits that best describe them, as well as their reaction times
in listing the traits to determine their regulatory focus. That is, those who selected more
ideal (ought) traits more quickly were chronically promotion (prevention) focused. Next,
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participants selected a gift of their choosing, either a Columbia University coffee mug or
an inexpensive disposable pen (the mug was more desirable). Half of the participants
(those in the promotion condition) considered what they would gain by choosing the pen
or the mug, while the other half considered what they would lose by not choosing the pen
or the mug (prevention condition). For participants who chose the mug (almost all
participants) they viewed a new, expensive pen worth $3 and estimated the cost of the
mug. When regulatory fit was achieved (chronically promotion participants who
considered gain – or – chronically prevention participants who considered loss),
participants were more likely to overestimate the cost of the mug than when they were in
a regulatory misfit condition (chronically promotion/loss situation -- or chronically
prevention/gain situation). Higgins and colleagues (2003) replicated this finding in a
study using the same procedures but this time participants paid for the mug with their
own money. Those in a regulatory fit state paid more for the mug than those in a
regulatory misfit state.
Avnet and Higgins (2006) tested the role of regulatory fit in participant decision
making by showing participants two types of correction fluid, a newer type and an old
fashioned type. The two fluids were shown simultaneously with a short description. The
researchers placed half of the participants into a feeling-based strategy (promotion) such
that those respondents rated how strongly they felt each emotion for each product, while
the other half, those in the reason-based strategy (prevention) gave their overall
evaluation for each product. All participants were then told to choose a product. After
choosing which product they preferred, participants completed a measure of chronic
regulatory focus. Results revealed that participants who experienced regulatory fit (i.e.,
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their chronic focus matched the situational focus) felt more confident in their choice,
were willing to pay more money, and rated their reactions as more important.
Regulatory fit as compared to regulatory misfit can also lead to greater
performances as illustrated on an anagram tasks (Shah, Higgins, and Friedman, 1998) and
in exercise habits (Gallagher & Updegraff, 2011). Specifically, Gallagher and Updegraff
had participants, all of whom indicated they do not regularly exercise, complete a chronic
regulatory focus measure and then asked them to read one of four versions of an article
advocating excercise: gain-framed/intrinsic outcomes (“Exercise now and feel better
later!), gain-framed/extrinsic outcomes (“Exercise now and look better later!”), lossframed/intrinsic outcomes (“Lack of exercise will make you feel miserable!”), lossframed/extrinsic outcomes (“Lack of exercise will make you look miserable!”). Over the
next week, participants completed a daily log of their activities. Participants who
experienced regulatory fit (promotion focus/intrinsic outcomes and prevention
focus/extrinsic outcomes), as compared to misfit, were more likely to increase their
exercise habits throughout the week (Gallagher & Updegraff, 2011).
Regulatory focus and fit may also play a role regardless of whether the mental
states are integral or incidental to the decision at hand. Integral regulatory focus
manipulations are those that are part of the task at hand, while incidental manipulations
of regulatory focus are independent of the task at hand and occur before the participant
makes a decision (Cesario et al., 2008). The majority of regulatory focus studies use a
measure or manipulation of incidental regulatory focus. For example, many researchers
ask participants to either list their current hopes and aspirations (promotion focus) or list
their current duties and obligations (prevention focus) to manipulate regulatory fit in an
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incidental manner. Cesario, Grant, and Higgins (2004) used this manipulation and then
either induced regulatory fit or misfit, again incidentally, by having participants either
write about how they could achieve their goals through either eager strategies
(promotion) or vigilant strategies (prevention). Participants who experienced regulatory
fit were more likely to rate a neutral article about an after school program more positively
and were more likely to want to volunteer for the program, as compared to participants in
a state of misfit.
More recently, Cesario, Corker, and Jelinek (2013) also considered the “hedonic
consequences of decisions” that is, the pleasures associated with accepting an argument
and the pains of not accepting the argument as a potentially important factor in decision
making. People might be motivated by the knowledge of the pleasure of accepting the
argument or avoiding the pain of not accepting the arguments. Here, pleasure is not
simply the presence or absence of positive and negative information, but instead, could
result from either a positive outcome or the absence of a negative outcome—each
motivating a similar decision. For example, in study 4, Cesario and colleagues (2013)
used an incidental framing prime (prevention vs. promotion) and an integral outcome
manipulation (obtaining gains or avoiding losses) to examine the potential importance of
both types of manipulations as a source of motivation in decision making. Specifically,
participants first completed the incidental framing prime in which they completed a set of
anagrams framed as either promotion (can earn 5 extra raffle tickets for getting 70%
correct) or prevention (can lose 5 raffle tickets for getting 30% wrong). Following the
incidental prime, participants received an integral manipulation in which they read a
description about the importance of dental hygiene that was either promotion focused
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(how buying mouthwash would advance their hygiene) or prevention focused (how
buying the mouthwash would maintain their hygiene and prevent poor hygiene).
Participants who were in a state of regulatory fit were willing to pay more money for
mouthwash, namely, those in the positive integral outcome condition were willing to pay
more if they were also in the promotion incidental condition, and those in the negative
integral outcome condition were willing to pay more if they had been in the prevention
incidental condition. This implies that regulatory fit between hedonic outcomes and
focus using incidental and integral manipulations produces strong effects of motivation in
decision making.
Regulatory focus and policy decisions. Experimental lab studies have
consistently shown consistent and strong effects of regulatory focus and regulatory fit on
attitudes and perceptions of item value, but does regulatory focus shape decisions and
behaviors outside the lab? Boldero and Higgins (2011) examined the role of regulatory
focus on support for economic reform. Participants completed a measure of chronic
regulatory focus and then read one of three economic reports that described the current
economy as poor, average, or good. After reading about the economy, participants were
presented with a statement concerning a new economic policy legislators were looking to
implement. To measure the influence of regulatory fit, participants completed items
assessing their support for the bill when considering their enthusiasm for maximizing the
economic future (promotion strategy) or carefully considering how the bill could prevent
an economic downturn (prevention strategy). Participants who scored high on promotion
focus were more likely to endorse the new bill when asked to consider it from a
promotion strategy; whereas prevention focused participants demonstrated higher support
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under the prevention strategy. This important finding shows that regulatory fit can play a
role in persuasion about policy decisions.
Other research in the context of real world decisions demonstrated that regulatory
focus can influence the actual behaviors of home owners living in flood plains with
regard to whether they are willing to purchase flood insurance (Botzen, de Boer, &
Terpstra, 2013). While, any form of risk framed communication concerning protecting
their homes from flooding increased participants’ willingness to buy insurance, riskframed communications influenced those who were chronically prevention focused more
as measured through the duration of the policy they purchased as compared to those who
were chronically promotion focused. Similarly, Ellemers, Scheepers, & Popa (2010)
examined the role of regulatory fit and support for affirmative action laws. They assessed
participant regulatory focus at the beginning of the study and then asked participants to
consider either what their in-group had to gain from affirmative action (promotion frame)
or what their in-group had to lose from affirmative action (prevention frame). Participants
who experienced promotion regulatory fit were significantly more likely to support
affirmative action laws than those in a misfit. Prevention focused participants were more
likely to support affirmative action laws when they experienced regulatory fit than when
they experienced a misfit. Other studies have shown regulatory fit influenced support for
a tax increase to help an after school programs (Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 2003).
Specifically, chronically promotion focused participants were more likely to support the
tax increase when it was likely to advance children’s education and likelihood of success
(promotion frame) than when the program was likely to prevent children from failing in
school and undermining future success (prevention frame). Prevention focused
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participants were more likely to support the tax increase when they read the prevention
frame as opposed to the promotion frame (Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 2003).
These studies demonstrate that regulatory focus may be influential in decisions
about law and policy and that the regulatory fit may lead to greater support for a law
based upon participant’s “feeling right”. These factors may also play a role in juror
decision-making. It is possible that jurors who are high in promotion focus may approach
a case differently than those high in prevention focus. Wiener and Farnum (2013)
examined the role of regulatory focus on the use of but-for and mixed motive causality
instructions on judgments of age discrimination. They measured chronic regulatory focus
using the Composite Regulatory Focus Scale (study 1) and the Lockwood Scale (study 2)
and found that strong promotion and prevention focus led to more verdicts in favor of the
plaintiff, but only under the but-for causality instructions. Though both types of
regulatory focus led to more pro-plaintiff verdicts, the pathways leading to this decision
were different. Wiener and Farnum argued that promotion focused jurors are more likely
to accept the plaintiff’s evidence and dismissing the defendant’s evidence, thereby risking
that they are falsely finding for the plaintiff. Prevention focused jurors may focus more
strongly on the defendant’s evidence so that they do not risk finding for the defendant
when they should find for the plaintiff. It must be pointed out that, Wiener and Farnum
(2013) did not manipulate regulatory focus so that additional research that manipulates
either incidental or integral regulatory focus (or both) may aid in parsing out the
influence of regulatory fit on use of instructions in discrimination cases. The research
proposed in this dissertation with regard to retaliation cases will help isolate the effect of
regulatory fit on decision making in cases of discrimination.
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There are no studies that have examined the role of regulatory focus in retaliation
cases and, in fact, no psychological studies that have examined retaliation decisions in
discrimination law. However, Brebels, de Cremer, and Sedikides (2008) did conduct a
series of five studies to determine when people who perceive a procedure as unfair are
most likely to retaliate. Participants in the study completed a packet of information
measuring their personality structures as part of a cover story. Procedural fairness was
manipulated through the feedback participants received in which the “manager” wrote a
note to the participants that said either he reviewed and graded all 5 measures from the
information packet to place the participant in a group (procedurally fair) or that he had
reviewed only 1 measure to place the participant in a group (unfair). After completing the
packet, participants read that a “manager” would review their information and then they
completed a regulatory focus “filler” task in which participants either described three
accomplishments, hopes, or aspirations and strategies for attaining these goals (promotion
focused) or described three responsibilities, duties, or obligations and strategies to attain
these goals. At the end of the study Brebels et al. (2008) told participants that they would
help decide how much to pay the manager for the study by either subtracting up to $3
(study 1) or allocating a percentage of the total wage (study 2) to the manager. The
researchers defined retaliation as participants taking money away from the manager. In
the procedurally unfair condition promotion focus participants were significantly more
likely to retaliate than were prevention-focused participants.
Supporting the role of regulatory focus and fit, Gino & Margolis (2011) examined
the role of regulatory focus in ethical decision making in a series of four studies. Study 1
and Study 2 used chronic regulatory focus to predict how often participants would
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overestimate their number of correct answers on an anagram task. The paradigm allowed
overestimation of correct answers only if participants cheated while grading their
anagrams. Promotion focused participants were significantly more likely to overestimate
their performance than prevention focused individuals. This overestimation then
mediated (Study 2) whether or not participants donated money to a charity at the end of
the study. Thus, promotion focused participants were more likely to donate to the charity,
but only if they had cheated in the study. Study 3 and Study 4 examined how incidentally
manipulated regulatory focus may influence ethical behaviors on the same anagram task.
The results replicated the first two studies showing that participants induced to be
promotion-focused were more likely to act unethically than prevention focused
participants. These studies applied to retaliation in the workplace, suggest that employers
who are more promotion focused will be more willing to retaliate against an employee
than employers who are prevention focused.
Regulatory focus and fit in groups. Almost all studies concerning regulatory
focus examine the behavior of single individuals. However, group decision making is an
extremely influential process with a strong impact in day-to-day life. For example, juries
are integral to the legal system and thus it is important to understand the way in which
regulatory focus and regulatory fit might influence their deliberations and decisions.
Along these lines group goals are one way in which regulatory focus and fit might
determine the outcome of the jury decision process. In one study, researchers gave groups
of four people a 60 minute training during which they manipulated regulatory focus by
either framing the task as one involving safety and security (prevention) or growth and
advancement (promotion). Researchers also manipulated whether the goal was group-
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based or individual based by telling groups that either the top 3 performing groups
(group-based goal) or the top 12 performing individuals (individual based goal) would
receive a monetary reward. When working towards a group-based goal, as compared to
an individual oriented goal, prevention focused groups, as compared to promotion
focused groups, demonstrate higher worker engagement, lower levels of intolerance,
more effective coordination, and higher performance (Beersma, Homan, van Kleef, & de
Dreu, 2013). Type of goal did not influence promotion focused teams. Sassenberg,
Landkammer, and Jacoby (2014), found that when a prevention focus group performed
an individually focused task they were more likely to discount information from other
group members, but when they experienced regulatory fit and were given a group based
goal, they did not discount other group members. Conversely, the promotion groups
thrived when given individually focused goals.
Burtscher and Meyer (2014) showed that the type of task interacts with the
group’s regulatory focus to determine performance. Groups performed the “stranded in
the desert” task in which they role played being the lone survivors of a plane crash in the
desert and in order to survive they had to complete five decision-making tasks. Each task
had six multiple choice options with one correct answer and two partly correct answers.
Participants in a promotion focus were able to gain money by correctly solving the task
while those in a prevention focus were able to avoid losing money by correctly solving
the task. Finally, the researchers measured information processing by coding the sources
of information the groups referred to during the task. Sources of information included
strategy, items given in the scenario, the cover story, and the six multiple choice
solutions. Promotion focused groups, as compared to prevention focused groups,
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performed better on the reasoning task, but the style of group information processing
moderated this effect. Specifically, promotion focused groups relied more on global and
innovative information whereas the prevention focused groups used more of the finite
information. Similarly, others have shown that promotion focused groups outperform
prevention focused groups in a disjunctive task, one in which high performance by a
single individual is enough to complete the task (Faddegon, Ellemers, & Scheepers,
2009). Finally, in line with regulatory focus for individuals, prevention focused groups
focus more on losses and make less risky choices, while promotion focused groups focus
more on the gains and make more risky choices (Florack & Hartman, 2007).
Making the situation even more complicated group dynamics and not just the type
of task, influences the way in which promotion and prevention focused groups perform.
For example, when an individual assumes power he or she is more likely to make
promotion focused decisions when the group is low status, but when the group is high
status the high powered individual is more likely to make prevention focused decisions
(Scheepers, Ellemers, & Sassenberg, 2011). The collective regulatory focus of a group
can shift individual regulatory focus states, so that individuals either became more
promotion or prevention focused in a signal detection task to align with the collective
regulatory focus of their group (Faddegon, Scheepers, & Ellemers, 2008).
Furthermore, regulatory focus seems to play a role in attitudinal change in a group
setting. Chung & Han (2013) examined the moderating role of regulatory focus in group
deliberations with a 2 (regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) x 2 (deliberation
content consistency: consistent vs. inconsistent) x 2 (information type: hedonic v.
utilitarian) between participants study. The researchers manipulated participant
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regulatory focus through an anagram task where participants either gained (promotion) or
lost (prevention) points based on their correct or incorrect answers. Deliberation content
included both information type and consistency with information. Information type was
either a news story based on utilitarian topics (such as economic news articles) or hedonic
topics (such as entertainment gossip), and then deliberation was consistent if the other
group members commented in line with the news article or inconsistent if they diverted
from the news article. Finally, the researchers gathered participant attitudes towards the
topics before deliberation and after deliberation. They found that regulatory focus
moderated the influence of information type on attitude change. Specifically, when
working with hedonic information, participants were more likely to experience attitude
change when they were promotion focused, but when working with utilitarian
information they were more likely to show attitude change when they were prevention
focused.
Given the research findings on regulatory focus and groups, it is possible that the
regulatory focus of both the individuals within a group and the collective regulatory focus
of the group may influence jury deliberations. The way in which the court and attorneys
present information to jurors, the framing of the goal of jury deliberation, and perhaps the
distribution of power within the group may lead to different verdicts based on regulatory
focus predictions. Further, jurors and juries with regulatory fit may be more likely to
reach a unanimous verdict, show higher confidence in their verdicts, and higher
satisfaction with the process than those jurors and juries that lack regulatory fit. It is also
possible that regulatory fit between the jury and the framing of jury instructions may
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increase comprehension and application of the instructions to the case facts, leading to
verdicts that are more in line with the law than with personal bias.
Prospect Theory
The notion of risk taking and decisions is also a central idea in prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kahneman & Tversky, 1983; Tversky & Kahneman,
1992), which posits that when making a decision people derive utility for their decisions
by considering the potential gains and losses based on the reference point from which
they begin. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) expanded the initial version of prospect
theory which explained only two outcome decisions to include multiple outcome domains
in cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). All other aspects of
prospect theory remained the same. This paper will focus on prospect theory with two
outcomes because that fits most closely with retaliation cases where the primary
judgment is liable vs. not liable.
Within prospect theory there are four main tenets: reference dependence, loss
aversion, diminishing sensitivity, and probability weighting (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979; Kahneman & Tversky, 1983; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Reference dependence
refers to the notion that we base our decisions on a reference point rather than absolute
values of gains and losses. While there has been much debate over whether there is a
constant reference point, most researchers accept that the reference point is based on the
expectations or beliefs from past outcomes (Köszegi & Rabin, 2006; 2007; 2009). Thus,
the reference point could be different for each decision and each person making a
decision. Loss aversion refers to the phenomenon that people are more sensitive to
losses, even small losses, than they are to gains of the same magnitude (Tversky &
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Kahneman, 1992; Barberis, 2013). If a person faces either losing $5 or gaining $10, they
will be more likely, under prospect theory, to focus on the loss of $5 and make their
decision based on the possibility of this loss. Loss aversion is the basis for the tenet of
diminishing sensitivity, which states that people are risk averse over moderate gains but
risk seeking over moderate losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Barberis, 2013). In the
same decision as before, a person faced with losing $5 will be more likely to make a risky
decision to avoid the loss, while the person faced with gaining $10 will avoid risk even
though they have more to gain. In other words, people will go a long way in accepting
risky choices to avoid a possible loss but will be much more conservative when facing
even larger gains. Finally, prospect theory also posits that people do not weight outcomes
objectively and are more likely to overweight extreme gains and losses, known as
probability weighting (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Barberis, 2013). As Barberis (2013)
states, the four tenets of prospect theory in combination determine when people are risk
averse, risk neutral, and risk seeking.
Recent research has sought to clarify and expand the influence of prospect theory.
Caruso, Gilbert, & Wilson (2008) considered the role of temporal value symmetry, which
is whether or not gains and losses are more influential given their temporal distance from
the present. They had participants, across 7 studies with 6 different scenarios,
contemplate completing a task in either in the past or in the equidistant future.
Participants then rated how much compensation (Study 1) they should receive, and found
that, when contemplating the future, participants wanted significantly more compensation
than if they completed the task in the past. Participants’ affective response to the task
mediated this effect, specifically they rated a future event as having more negative affect
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and because of this negative affect they felt they should be compensated more. It is thus
important to consider not just the gains and losses involved in a task, but also the
temporal distance involved. Supporting this conclusion, Hertwig, Barron, Weber, and
Erev (2004) demonstrated the importance of source of information in risky decisions.
Half of the participants (decision-relevant group) completed a decision-relevant task in
which they read six problems on the computer screen while the other half (experience
group) were shown two buttons on the computer screen and were told that each button
represented a choice, but were not given any other information. When participants based
their decisions on decision-relevant information (typical in a prospect theory task) they
were more likely to follow the pattern of probability weighting by overweighting the
probability of a rare event. In contrast, participants who were forced to rely solely on
their experience underweighted the probability of rare events. Providing feedback to
participants reduces the influence of experience on probability weighting in line with
prospect theory (Jessup, Bishara, & Busemeyer, 2008).
The richest research area of prospect theory, the study of framing effects has
important implications for decision making in cases of retaliation (Tversky & Kahneman,
1991). Framing involves describing gains and losses in terms of certainty/uncertainty or
positive/negative outcomes. The certainty effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986) occurs
when participants prefer a certain gain over a probabilistic gain of equal or more value.
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) use the example of presenting someone with either a sure
gain of $30 or an 80% chance to win $45 and 20% chance of winning nothing. Even
though you would have a very good chance of winning the $45 and the expected value of
the second bet ($36) is greater than the expected value of the first bet ($30), more often
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than not people prefer the certain gain so that they can avoid the risk of losing. The
majority of research applying prospect theory to real world decisions relies on the
positive/gain and negative/loss frame findings (e.g. Detweiler, Bedell, Salovey, Pronin, &
Rothman, 1999; Gallagher & Updegraff, 2012; Latimer et al., 2008; Rivers, Salovey,
Pizzaro, Pizzaro, & Schneider, 2005; Rothman & Salovey, 1997).
Research in the area of health behavior has found that gain/loss framing can help
predict when people choose to take preventive action, though some of the findings is
contradictory to prospect theory. Latimer and colleagues (2008) gave sedentary
participants either gain framed messages (i.e., emphasizing the benefits of physical
activity in reducing risks of diseases), unframed messages, or loss framed messages (i.e.,
emphasizing the risks of inactivity and the desirable outcomes that would be missed due
to a lack of activity). Participants received the messages throughout their 9-week program
and completed measures of physical activity, social cognition, and valuation of exercise
at week 2 and 9. Participants who were in the gain-framed condition showed consistent
increases in valuation of exercise, self-efficacy, and physical activity, as compared to
both the mixed and loss-framed conditions over the course of the 9 weeks. This result has
been found consistently with prevention of potentially less risky health concerns
including smoking cessation (Steward, Schneider, Pizzaro, & Salovey, 2003), dental
hygiene (Rothman, Martino, Bedell, Detweiler, & Salovey, 1999), and sunscreen use
(Detweiler, Bedell, Salovey, Pronin, & Rothman, 1999). However, when the health
concern carries more risk of more serious health outcomes, especially cancer, loss-framed
messages as compared to gain framing influence participants to seek preventive measures
including mammography (Schneider et al., 2001), HIV testing (Apanovitch McCarthy, &
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Salovey, 2003), and pap testing (Rivers, Salovey, Pizzaro, Pizzaro, & Schneider, 2005).
These findings confirm some tenets of prospect theory but also challenge other ones.
Prevention based on gain-framed messages is in line with diminishing sensitivity in that
people are more risk averse over moderate gains (such as using sunscreen). Though
seeking prevention based on loss-framed measures for more serious medical conditions is
not in line with diminishing sensitivity, it may confirm that these medical conditions are
subject to probability weighting, and that emphasizing the loss involved with a rare
occurrence is more persuasive than emphasizing the gain.
Framing effects have also been found to influence decisions that occur under high
need as well as the propensity of someone to switch their choice. Mishra and Fiddick
(2012) examined the role of gain/loss framing under differing levels of need by using
classic Tversky and Kahneman scenarios (1982). Specifically, the researchers randomly
assigned participants to one of four conditions: gain/low need, gain/high need, loss/low
need, and low/high need. Participants played the role of the current health minister of a
country in which a fatal and contagious disease had infected 600 people. Serving as the
health minister, the participant had to decide between two plans. In the gain/high need
condition participants read gain-framed options (“If plan A is adopted, 200 people will be
saved” and “If Plan B is adopted, there is a one third probability that none of them will
die and a two thirds probability that all of the people will die”) as well as a high need
statement in which they had to save at least 300 people (low need only required saving at
least 100 people). Participants chose riskier options under high need more than under
low need, an effect that occurred across frame type. This suggests that the certainty effect
and diminishing sensitivity are reversible under conditions of high need. Other
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researchers have found that loss framing can influence the decision to switch choices
(Yechiam, Zahavi, & Arditi, 2014). Specifically, loss framing can lead to restlessness in
decision-making that results in participants switching choices more often than those who
receive gain-frames.
Prospect theory and policy decisions. Little research has extended prospect
theory to policy decision making and those studies that have shown mixed results.
Boettcher (2004) asked participants to place themselves in the role of an advisor to a
fictitious president (Study 1). They read a scenario that described a terroristic hostage
situation for which they were to advise the president on a course of action that was either
gain-framed (number of people that could be rescued) or loss-framed (number of people
that will die). Participants were more likely to be risk averse under the gain-framed
condition and more risk seeking under the loss framed condition, a finding in line with
prospect theory. Another study manipulated gain- and loss-framed information for
participants determining whether or not they would support a new climate change policy
(Wiest, Raymond, & Clawson, 2012). Although the frame did not change endorsement of
the new policy, those in the loss-frame condition reported greater feelings of being
threatened by climate change. Finally, Belton, Thomson, and Dhami (2014) gave a
hypothetical civil litigation case to lawyers and non-lawyer participants and asked them
to put themselves in the position of the claimant in a dispute over how much they should
receive for a totaled car due to an accident. The researchers framed damage outcomes as
either a loss or a gain and asked participants to determine the appropriate settlement for
the case. In the gain framed condition, participants were told their totaled car was worth
$14,000 and the settlement was set at $19,000, thus they would gain from taking the
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settlement. In the loss framed condition, participants were told their totaled car was worth
$24,000 which meant taking the $19,000 settlement would be a loss of value. Regardless
of profession (lawyer vs. non-lawyer) all participants showed effects of framing.
Specifically, participants were more likely to settle their claim in the gain condition than
the loss condition. Belton and colleagues also coded qualitative data of the decision
making process and found that participants in the gain-frame condition were more likely
to make risk-averse comments (“money in the bank is better than a chance or more or less
money”) while those in the loss-frame condition were more likely to make risk-seeking
comments (“I would feel that given that National Mutual had offered a settlement they
were not confident in their position”). Lawyers made similar levels of risk-averse
comments across conditions while non-lawyers made more risk-averse comments in the
gain condition.
Given the limited research concerning prospect theory and policy it is difficult to
predict the influence framing may have on a juror. It is possible that a gain-framed
instruction may lead to more risk-aversion, which would manifest as pro-plaintiff verdict
under the assumption that jurors tend to be more sympathetic to a plaintiff in a
discrimination or retaliation case. If the court provides loss-framed instructions this may
elicit risk-seeking behaviors that could manifest in either more pro-plaintiff or defendant
verdicts depending upon the jurors initial propensity. The role of prospect theory
probably depends upon the strength of evidence in the case. Perhaps risk-averse jurors
would be more likely to focus only on the strongest facts, while risk seeking would
consider all case facts. Another possibility is that but-for and mixed motive instructions
are inherently framed. That is, but-for instructions, due to the limited amount of
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information considered and the burden resting on the plaintiff, may be loss-framed,
whereas mixed motive is gain-framed with its greater allowance of additional decision
factors. This could explain why jurors are, regardless of evidence strength, more likely to
find for the plaintiff under mixed motive instructions but more likely to find for the
defendant under but-for instructions (Wiener & Farnum, 2013).
Prospect theory and group decisions. There also exists a paucity of research on
the way in which prospect theory tenets might influence group decision making.
Boettcher (2004) found that for participants who participated in group deliberation
concerning a hostage situation, the few framing effects for individual participants
disappeared for the group. It is possible that the type of group interaction may predict the
influence of prospect theory tenets. When groups engaged in a face-to-fact interaction,
framing effects occurred in line with prospect theory but not under a computer-mediated
discussion. That is, when participants were discussing face-to-face they were more likely
to exhibit risk-aversion for gain-framed decisions and risk seeking for loss-framed
decisions (McGuire, Kiesler, & Siegel, 1987). In other work, Whyte (1993) found that
members of groups gave in to prospect theory pressures more easily. Participants role
played a scenario in which they were in charge of a company that was dealing with a
failing investment. They faced either a neutral or loss-framed option for dealing with the
failing investment. Finally, participants either made the decision individually or in a
group. Both individuals and groups were more likely to escalate their commitment to a
failing investment with the loss-frame condition, but this escalation was quicker and
more dramatic for the group.
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The results of this research offer some suggestions for how prospect theory tenets
might influence juries. Jurors acting as individuals are likely to give in to risk-aversion
with gain and risk seeking with losses. This may depend on the method of deliberation
(McGuire, Kiesler, & Siegel, 1987). If deliberation occurs in person, the effects may be
more pronounced. But if a study uses an online deliberation, the usual risk aversion may
not manifest. It is also possible that the tenets of prospect theory are more influential in
jury deliberation than in individual juror decisions (Whyte, 1993). However, other studies
suggest that the effect of prospect theory could disappear with deliberation (Boettcher,
2004).
Other Psychological Theories.
Although they are not central to this process, other social psychological theories
including group decision-making, the theory of planned behavior, general emotion
theories, and general decision making theories might also influence decision making in
allegations of illegal retaliation. I consider each of these briefly as alternative
approaches.
Group decision-making. Although the jury is an essential and invaluable aspect
of the legal system, little research makes use of jury deliberations due to lack of
resources. Jury deliberation studies are costly in terms of both time and money. Yet, it is
possible that individual juror judgments could be substantially different from judgments
made during or after deliberation (Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994; Kerr, Niedermeier, &
Kaplan, 1999). Deliberation may help jurors approach the evidence of the case in a novel
way and involve self-corrective measures for individual juror held bias or misinformation
(Gastil, Burkhalter, & Black, 2007). In fact, groups operate as their own information
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processing systems (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; De Dreu, Nijstad, & van
Knippenberg, 2008). Although groups do have better collaborative recall of facts than
individuals (Maki, Weigold, & Arellano, 2008), research also suggests that collaborative
recall is greater when a group interacts less (Thorley & Dewhurst, 2009). This may seem
counterintuitive, but individuals in groups with higher levels of interaction are more
susceptible to adopting the incorrect responses and facts that fellow group members
present (Salerno & Diamond, 2010). This is especially true under certain circumstances:
unmemorable stimulus (Walther et al., 2002), smaller group size (Thorley & Dewhurst,
2007), higher pressure to perform (Reyson, 2003), and the absence of dissenters (Walther
et al., 2002). There are ways to increase group productivity and interaction, such as
developing a more cohesive group that shares a normative goal of productivity (Kerr &
Tinsdale, 2004) and whose members are committed to perform to obtain the best result
(Mullen & Cooper, 1994). This is in line with research on regulatory focus and groups.
Specifically, when a group’s regulatory focus fits the regulatory focus of a task, which
could be considered cohesion, they are better able to perform the task, as compared to
when the task does not fit the regulatory focus (Sassenberg, Landkammer, and Jacoby,
2014).
There is little argument that jury deliberation involves stress, which may decrease
group performance. More specifically, stress may increase the quantity but reduce the
quality of the group’s product because it forces groups to focus only on the most vital
tasks (Brown & Miller, 2000; Kelly & Karau, 1993). Increasing time pressure in groups
has an even greater effect on group focus (Brown & Miller, 2000; Volpe et al., 1996);
however, if groups experience more stress than they can reasonably handle then their
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overall performance decreases (Adelman et al., 2003). Stressful conditions also increase
a “need for closure” among individuals within the group, which may be a mechanism that
actually increases group information exchange and information utilization (Kruglanski,
Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2002).
Theory of planned behavior. The theory of planned behavior (TPB) seeks to
explain the predictors of behavioral intentions (Ajzen & Madden, 1985; Ajzen, 1991).
The theory posits that intentions result from attitudes, subjective norms, and the
perception of behavioral control. Central to TPB is the notion that a person’s intention to
perform a behavior predicts whether or not they actually perform the behavior.
Generally, the stronger the intention, the more likely it is that a person will actually
perform the behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Simply having the intention to perform a behavior is
not enough to always follow through; in fact, TPB suggests that attitudes, subjective
norms, and perception of behavioral control limit intention to behave. A person may have
the intention to steal a candy bar from the store, but given the shared subjective norm that
this is illegal, the behavior is less likely to happen and ultimately reduces the intention to
act. Similarly, if a person does not perceive that he or she can control the behavior then
the person is less likely to perform the act. Perceived control can include beliefs about
opportunities and resources; for example, having the intention to run a marathon
tomorrow may not be realized if a person has never run before. Here, perceived
behavioral control is quite low. A meta-analysis of 185 studies found that all three
components of TPB predict behavioral intentions (Armitage & Conner, 2001). Successful
examples of TPB factors predicting behavioral intentions with a variety of behaviors
include, among others, source reduction activity for environmental managers (Cordano &
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Frieze, 2000), pharmacists’ intention to provide medication therapy (Herbert, Urmie,
Newland, & Farris, 2006), and online shopping behavior (Hsu, Yen, Chiu, & Chang,
2006). More importantly for the current project, researchers have applied TPB to predict
a variety of ethical and legally relevant intentions and behaviors.
Corporate managers often face situations in which they must either report or
ignore a potentially fraudulent behavior. Carpenter and Reimers (2006), gave MBA
students one of six scenarios that manipulated the positive or negative acceptance of
attitudes concerning fraudulent charges, personal control over reporting, and subjective
norms of accepting or rejecting ethical violations. When participants read about a
workplace that had positive attitudes towards unethical behavior, high amounts of
personal control, and positive subjective norms of participating in unethical activities,
they were more likely to not report a potentially fraudulent action. However, when
participants read about a workplace that viewed fraudulent activities negatively on all
aspects they were more likely to indicate that they would report the behavior. These
results supported previous studies in which researchers used TBP to explain whether or
not accountants would participate in unethical behavior (Buchan, 2005), intentions of
nurses to report inadequate patient care (Randall & Gibson, 1991), and intentions of
illegally downloading music (Wang & McClung, 2010).
Researchers have also applied the theory of planned behavior to study how laws
and regulations influence intentions to behave. For example, Macy, Middlestadt, Seo,
Kolbe, and Jay, (2012) used TPB to show how and why smoke free air laws influence
intentions to cease smoking by decreasing attitudes towards smoking and increasing the
normative pressure to quit. Additional TPB studies demonstrated that attitudes,
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subjective norms and personal control predicted compliance with speed limit laws
(Elliott, Armitage, & Baughan, 2003) and prohibitions against other driving violations
(Parker, Manstead, Stradling, & Reason, 1992). More specifically, if attitudes were more
lenient towards breaking the law, subjective norms indicated that others break the law,
and individuals scored higher on the perception of higher personal control people
intended to break the law and to actually did so. One study looked at the role of TPB in
whistleblowing behaviors within the Greek system at a university (Richardson, Wang, &
Hall. 2007). Participants read one of three scenarios that described minor hazing (making
a pledge get napkins for dinner), moderate hazing (throwing water balloons at pledges
who were dressed up for an event) and severe hazing (forcing pledges to drink alcoholic
beverages and complete a number of physical activities). Richardson and colleagues
(2007) found that attitudes, subjective norms, and behavioral control predicted intentions
to report the hazing. The severity of the hazing served as a moderator determining the
predictive strength of the attitudes, norms, and control on intentions.
The theory of planned behavior could explain employer intentions to retaliate and
juror intentions toward verdicts favoring defendants or plaintiffs in retaliation cases.
Jurors who have strong negative attitudes towards retaliation or discrimination and feel
more personal control over rendering a verdict may be more likely to find for the
plaintiff. Subjective norms could play a role in deliberation if there is a norm that is
salient among a jury. It is also possible that the instructions themselves, but-for versus
mixed motive, may serve as a subjective norm. Since but-for instructions require the
plaintiff to bear the majority of the burden, this may provide a norm that the plaintiff is
typically incorrect in their assertion, whereas mixed motive instructions may create a
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norm that the employer wronged the plaintiff if an illegitimate factor came into play at all
. Furthermore, employers who choose to retaliate may do so because they hold negative
attitudes towards employees who complain, there is a strong subjective norm that
suggests people do not tolerate complaining employees, and their own perception of
personal control over the decision to retaliate is elevated. It is also possible that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar could influence subjective norms. Specifically, by
stating that an employer is not liable if they took other, legal factors into consideration, it
could create a norm that retaliation is acceptable if there is some legitimate reason that
supports a reprisal. This change in subjective norm may influence intentions to retaliate.
Thus, the theory of planned behavior might also be helpful in predicting when and why
employers choose to retaliation or discriminate against employees.
General emotion theories. It is difficult to consider decision-making without the
influence of emotions. This is particularly true in cases of discrimination and/or
retaliation, which are almost always emotionally charged. I will discuss several broad
theories of emotion to briefly address some of the most important issues.
Mood-as-information suggests that people use the subjective experience of moods
and emotions in their decision-making (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 2003).
In the seminal study, participants reported higher life satisfaction on sunny days than on
rainy days, but only when researchers did not draw their attention to the weather
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Subjective experiences with elements unknown to a person –
such as the weather or emotions—can be strong predictors of decision-making. It may be
possible that emotions within jurors, unbeknownst to them, influence their overall
verdicts. Imagine a juror who feels anger over getting the wrong coffee order before the

53
trial, and this anger dissipates to annoyance that continues throughout the course of the
trial and into deliberation. This juror may interpret this irritation as a sign that that the
defendant is liable, not realizing that her or his emotions emerged from a different source
having nothing to do with the case under consideration. This is particularly important as
anger makes people more certain in their judgments, more punitive, and more likely to
render a guilty verdict (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Salerno & PeterHagene, 2013; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).
Conscious emotions also influence behavior and decision-making and are at the
core of cognitive appraisal theory. Under this theory, emotions result from the
interpretations and explanations that people assign to a given circumstance, especially
absent physiological arousal (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Lazarus, 1991). That is, in the
absence of other information we look to our emotions as a source of information for how
we should react in many situations. Under appraisal theories emotions give rise to a
range of cognitive dimensions including certainty, pleasantness, attentional activity,
anticipated effort, and responsibility (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Lazarus, 1991). Each
individual emotion has its own footprint of cognitive appraisals. Consider the emotions
that arise form negative events. For example, anger is associated with the belief that
another person, instead of the self or a situation, is responsible for the negative event
(Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Scherer,1999,
2001;

Weiner,1986). When a perceiver attributes a negative event to external

situations or to the self, it will likely lead to either sadness or shame. The cognitive
appraisal dimensions themselves determine future decisions and judgments.
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Jurors likely appraise events that give rise to their current emotions. For example,
Kadous (2001) studied jurors’ decisions in a negligence case by varying the amount of
distressing emotional content in the case description. Overall, the more distressed jurors
felt the more likely they were to find the firm liable. This effect, however, dissipated
when jurors rated their anxiety levels before reading the case (Kadous, 2001). This study
found that when jurors are aware of the source of their anxiety, the emotions that they
feel during the trial has less impact on their judgments and decisions. Appraisals of the
source of an emotion may also influence employer decisions. Kligyte, Connelly, Thiel,
and Devenport (2013) found that anger inhibited ethical decision-making while fear
facilitated it. If an employer is angry about receiving a complaint of discrimination, this
anger may lead to retaliation, whereas if the complaint made them afraid of the
consequences they might refrain from retaliating.
The plaintiff’s emotions may also influence juror decision-making. Research has
consistently shown that people overestimate how they will emotionally respond to
positive and negative situations and this overestimation influences decision-making.
These errors in affective forecasting commonly known as the impact bias has important
implications for how people make responsibility judgments (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall,
& Zhang, 2007; Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Baron, 1992; Igou,
2008; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993; Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999; Wilson & Gilbert,
2003; Zeelenberg 1999; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, &
van der Pligt, 2000). People, in general, are able to predict the valence (positive or
negative) of an event, but they are unable to accurately predict the duration and intensity
of the same event (Gilbert et al., 1998; Gilbert, Lieberman, Morewedge, & Wilson, 2004;
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Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). When forecasting the emotions of others, people over rate the
negative affect that someone else will experience in relation to a negative event because
they underestimate others’ coping mechanisms (Igou, 2008). Most people have an
understanding of their own coping behaviors and mechanisms but do not have accurate
knowledge of the coping capabilities of others. So we know how we will adapt to our
own experiences of negative events (although, Gilbert et al., -- 1998 suggests that we
underestimate our own coping abilities) but misjudge the ability of others to do so. Igou
(2008) referred to this process as the Asymmetric Immune Knowledge hypothesis.
Affective forecasting and the asymmetric immune knowledge (AIK) hypothesis
likely plays a significant role in legal decision-making. Recall that retaliation requires a
reasonable belief that an action was discrimination. In determining reasonable beliefs
jurors may attempt to forecast the emotions and thoughts that a “reasonable” person
experienced. Invoking the AIK theory, jurors are likely to see an action as more negative
in affect than the plaintiff experienced. Research has found that affective forecasting the
emotional experiences of a sexual misconduct complainant can lead to more judgments of
sexual harassment (Wiener, Gervais, Allen, & Marquez, 2013; Kimble, Farnum, Wiener,
Gervais, Allen, 2016).
General decision making theories. It is commonly assumed, especially under the
law, that decision makers are rational actors. However, research on the psychology of
decision making challenges this assumption (Slovic, Fischoff, & Lichenstein, 1977).
Central to behavioral decision theory is the notion that people use non-rational
information, such as social norms, to make decisions because decision making is complex
and contradictory. (Hillman, 2000). Since the world is replete with complex and
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contradictory information, people use strategies of bounded rationality, that is, they
process information only until they are satisfied with a decision, even if that decision is
not the optimal, rational choice (Simon, 1957). Behavioral decision theory shows that
decision makers use both normative and descriptive information to reach judgments and
decisions (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Slovic, Baruch, Eischoff, & Lichenstein, 1997).
Normative information conforms to the beliefs and values of the individual and those
around him or her. Descriptive information refers to the beliefs and values associated
with the decision in a way that makes it more accessible for incorporating that
information into the decision making process. This tradeoff and comparison of
normative information with descriptive information has been found to predict decision
making in business ethics (Loewenstein, 1996), consumer choices (Khan, Dhar, &
Wertenbroch, 2004), and the management and regulation of risk (Slovic, Fischhoff, &
Lichtenstein, 1984.).
To make matters even more complex, people rely on heuristics, simple and
efficient rules to make a variety of decisions in their daily life (Tversky & Kahneman,
1973). People use a variety of different types of heuristics in their decisions many of
which turn out to be robust predictors of decision outcomes (Block & Harper, 1991;
Campbell, Chao, Robertson, & Yokum, in press; Marti & Wissler, 2000; Epley &
Gilovich, 2002; Epley, van Boven, Keysar, Gilovich, 2004; Robbenolt & Studebaker,
1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Wansink, Kent, & Hoch, 1998). For example,
anchoring and adjustment occurs when people focus on a piece of information (the
anchor) that dictates a reference point for a decision (Block & Harper, 1991; Epley &
Gilovich, 2002; Epley, Keysar, van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Wansink, Kent, & Hoch,
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1998). Research studies show that anchoring is influential in determining damages in
civil claims such that jurors focus on any suggested amount or a cap and then adjust their
decision based on this number (e.g. Campbell, Chao, Robertson, & Yokum, 2014; Marti
& Wissler, 2000; Robbenolt & Studenbaker, 1999). Another commonly used heuristic,
the availability heuristic, occurs when people base their current decision on the ease with
which they can remember concepts or past experiences related to the decision at hand
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). In a trial, if the defendant was recently in the news as a
paragon of charity, the availability of this memory could lead to more pro-defendant
verdicts. The availability heuristics influences moral perceptions (Wasieleski & Hayibor,
2008) and verdicts in criminal cases (Kassin & Garfield, 1991; Lieberman, 2002)
especially when there is an abundance of pretrial publicity (Greene, 1990; Greene &
Wade, 1988; Steblay, Besirevic, Fulero, & Jimenez-Lorento, 1999). The representative
heuristic is similar to the availability heuristic, but under this mental shortcut people
focus on recalling the prototype, or representative, of a group or situation (Kahneman &
Frederick, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). This heuristic is most salient in cases in
which jurors view groups or individuals stereotypically (Darby & Jeffers, 1988;
FörsterLee, FörsterLee, Horowitz, & King, 2006; Lieberman, 2006).
Understanding Causality in Retaliation
The recent decision in Nassar (2013) brings the issue of causality into the
forefront of retaliation law. Plaintiffs are filing an increasing number of claims of
retaliation each year, making it imperative to understand how jurors interpret case facts
under both mixed motive and but-for causality instructions. Further, the application of
but-for causality may influence the decision making of employers who are contemplating
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retaliation either deliberatively or unconsciously. While many social psychological
theories of decision making can shed light on these issues, regulatory focus and its close
cousin, prospect theory may be particularly useful in understanding how people evaluate
risk in reaching retaliation judgments. Regulatory focus provides a framework for
understanding the psychological pathways that jurors traverse and the effects of their
motivational states when contemplating a retaliation case. To study this effect researchers
can manipulate regulatory focus incidentally or integrally to determine when and why
regulatory focus influences decisions. Prospect theory may explain the relationship
between perceived risk and decision making by offering guidance to understand the way
in which jury instructions frame losses and gains and thereby influence juror verdicts.
Where gain framed jurors may act in risk averse ways loss framed jurors may seek out
risky decisions. Employers may also act in accordance to gains or losses when reacting
to employee discrimination claims. Gain framed employers may be less likely to retaliate
than loss framed employers.
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Chapter 2: Current Research
The current studies first seek to extend Wiener and Farnum’s (2013) findings on
age discrimination to cases of retaliation. The studies manipulated participant regulatory
fit and examined the pathways that participants use to reach their decisions by measuring
how they weigh plaintiff and defendant evidence. Study 1 focused on a retaliation case
following the firing of an employee while Study 2 used a case based upon failure to
promote a deserving employee. The current research also seeks to understand the
influence of regulatory fit and knowledge of retaliation law on decisions concerning
promoting or firing employees. Study 3 included measures to examine the pathway that
defendants use when determining if retaliation is an acceptable reaction to an employee
complainant. All three studies measured regulatory focus incidentally and manipulated
task focus integrally to extend the understanding of how regulatory fit influences the
comprehension and application of jury instructions as well as employment decisions
when there are opportunities for retaliation.
Overall Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1. In line with previous research (Wiener & Farnum 2013; Farnum &
Wiener, 2016; Wiener & Farnum, 2016), participants using but-for instructions will be
more likely to find for the defendant, while participants using mixed motive instructions
will be more likely to find for the plaintiff.
Hypothesis 1a. When participants face two different sets of instructions, mixed
motive for a discrimination claim and but-for for a retaliation claim, the but for
instructions will bleed over and dilute participants use of the mixed motive instructions.
Thus, in cases that include both statutory and retaliation claims jurors will be more likely
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to find for the defendant in the discrimination case when they must use both types of
instructions as opposed to when the law instructs them to apply only mixed motive
instructions. However, it is possible (but less likely) that participants will compare the
instructions, notice the differences in the decision criterion, and adhere even more closely
to the mixed motive approach in the discrimination case and be more likely to find for the
plaintiff than those who either used but-for instructions for both claims, or those who
only decided a retaliation claim with but-for instructions.
Hypotheses 1b. When jurors are rendering a verdict for a retaliation case in which
an employer denied the plaintiff a promotion, they will show less instruction effects than
in a retaliation case in which the employer fired the plaintiff.
Hypotheses 1c. When making employment decisions (firing or promoting) in a
system that relies upon but for causality instructions, participants playing the role of
employers will be more likely to retaliate, while those operating in a system that uses
mixed motive causality will be less likely to retaliate.
Hypothesis 2. In line with previous research (Wiener & Farnum, 2013),
participants high in either chronic promotion or prevention focus, as compared to
participants low on either, will be more likely to find for the plaintiff.
Hypothesis 2a. Participants who are in a state of regulatory fit (i.e. chronic
promotion/promotion manipulation) will be more likely to find for the plaintiff than those
who are in a state of regulatory misfit. Promotion focused regulatory fit will lead to
participants overvaluing the plaintiff’s evidence, while participants in a state of
prevention focused regulatory fit will undervalue the defendant’s evidence (Wiener &
Farnum, 2013).
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Hypothesis 3. When making employment decisions (promoting or firing),
participants high in promotion focus playing the role of employers will be more likely to
retaliate against the plaintiff, whereas participants high in prevention focus will be less
likely to retaliate against the plaintiff. Participants low in both will fall back on the
causality instructions and show but for versus mixed motive effects on their verdicts.
Hypothesis 3a. Retaliation will be more likely to occur when making a promotion
decision as compared to termination judgment, because the promotion decision is an act
of omission while the termination decision is an act of commission (Charness & Levine,
2010).
Hypothesis 3b. Participants who are in a state of regulatory fit will weigh the
resumes differently. Specifically, participants in a state of promotion regulatory fit will
more value the good work qualities of the applicants who did not complain about
discrimination more highly than the applicant who did complain about discrimination.
Participants in a state of prevention regulatory fit will be more likely to undervalue the
negative aspects of the applicant who complained about discrimination, as compared to
the applicants who did not complain about discrimination.
Hypothesis 4. Regulatory focus, and especially regulatory fit, will be the most
influential under but-for causality than mixed motive causality because it discourage
respondents from considering all the case information so that they resort to their own
feelings and motivations to make a decision.
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Chapter 3: Study 1
Study 1: Regulatory Focus and Jury Decision Making in Retaliation Cases involving
firing an employee
Study 1 seeks to replicate and extend previous research on the influence of jury
instructions (Wiener & Farnum, 2013; Farnum & Wiener, in press; Wiener & Farnum, in
press) to cases of retaliation. Specifically, does the use of different instructions, mixed
motive versus but-for, influence juror decision making in cases of retaliation and cases
where jurors have to decide both discrimination and retaliation claims. Participants were
given a case vignette and had to render a verdict for the case. Additionally, Study 1 also
examines the role of regulatory focus on juror decision making.
Research Design and Procedure. Study 1 was a 2 (Regulatory frame: promotion
v. prevention) x 2 (Claim type: Retaliation v. Discrimination/Retaliation) x 2 (Instruction:
mixed motive v. but-for) + 1 (Mixed Motive and But-for instructions for a
Discrimination/Retaliation claim) between participants design with chronic prevention
and promotion as continuous variables. Participants signed up for the study on
Mechanical Turk, which directed them to the survey link. Participants had to complete
the survey in one sitting. Participants read the informed consent and indicated (yes or no)
whether they consented to participate in the study. They completed the chronic regulatory
focus measure before reading the trial transcript and then read the framing instructions,
completed the decision motivation questionnaire, read the causality instructions, and then
rendered their verdicts. Lastly, participants completed the manipulation check and
demographic questionnaire. After completing the study, the program thanked participants
and paid them $1 for their time.
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Participants. Only participants who were 18 or older and a U.S. citizen were able
to see the survey on Mechanical Turk. Participants were 210 community members
recruited via Mechanical Turk. Eleven participants were dropped from the dataset for
falling outside two standard deviations of response time for the survey. The final 199
participants were 50% (N = 100) women, had a mean age of 35.71, and 83.8% of them
were employed. The ethnic breakdown of the participants was representative of the
Mturk community with 79.3% European American, 6.6% African American, 4.5% Asian
American, 4% Hispanic, 2% Latino/a, 1.5% Native American, and 1.5% other.
Participants were well educated with 57.8% holding at least a college degree, 30.7%
having completed some college, and 11.6% holding a high school diploma. Finally,
42.2% of participants had occupied a work position in which they had made hiring or
firing decisions.
Chronic Regulatory Focus. Participants first completed Shah and Higgins (1997)
incidental measure of regulatory chronicity by listing four attributes of their ideal self and
four attributes of their ought self. They rated the extent to which they actually possess
each attribute on a 1 to 5 scale (Ideal M = 2.77, SD = .69 ; Ought M = 2.84, SD = .63).
The sum of the amount of time it took them to rate the ideal and ought attributes served
as the measure of chronic prevention and promotion focus, respectively (Ideal M = 72.82,
SD = 61.66; Ought M = 76.49 , SD = 63.66) (Appendix A).
Trial Transcript. The trial summary was a modified version of the case facts in
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar (Appendix B). In the first
version of the summary (retaliation only), the plaintiff only brought a claim of retaliation
but in the second version (discrimination and retaliation) the plaintiff brought two claims
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– discrimination and retaliation. In the transcript, the plaintiff alleges that the hospital
fired him in retaliation to his national origin discrimination complaint that he had brought
while he worked as a University affiliated doctor. The plaintiff’s complaint of national
origin discrimination was based on treatment from his supervisor in which she scrutinized
his work more than she scrutinized other employees and she made offensive ethnic
comments to other co-workers regarding the defendant’s ethnicity, such as “Middle
Easterners are lazy.” After he filed a complaint and sent a letter detailing the
discrimination and resigned from the University, the hospital fired the plaintiff from his
newly negotiated position as a non-University affiliated doctor. Pilot testing using
Mechanical Turk found that respondents viewed the scenario as neutral with 50% (20)
finding for the plaintiff and 50% (20) finding for the defendant.
Decision Motivation Measure. Participants assessed the extent to which each of
the following was a motivating factor in the University Medical Center’s actions that
ultimately led to the decision to fire Dr. Ahmad on a 0 (not at all) to 11 (extremely) scale.
The factors included 1. “Dr. Ahmad’s national origin.”(M = 4.25, SD = 3.04) 2.
“Meadowood’s rehiring policy” (M = 5.03, SD = 3.26) 3. “Dr. Ahmad’s adversarial
relationship with his supervisors” (M = 6.52, SD = 3. 28) 4. “Dr. Ahmad’s discrimination
complaint” (M = 5.95, SD = 3.50) and 5. Dr. Ahmad’s letter to the University Medical
Center’s faculty.” (M = 6.80, SD = 3.23) (Appendix C).
Framing manipulation. Immediately after reading the trial transcript, participants
read the judge’s explanation of the juror’s task akin to jury instructions in a real trial.
There were two versions of these instructions: promotion framed and prevention framed.
The promotion framed instructions informed the participants that it was their job to
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achieve the satisfaction that comes from knowing they completed their job and achieved
the best possible outcome. The prevention framed instructions informed the participants
that it was their job to avoid the dissatisfaction that comes from knowing they improperly
completed their job and contributed to a miscarriage of justice (Appendix D).
Causal Instructions. After reading the transcript, half of the participants received
mixed motive instructions while the other half received but-for jury instructions. These
were the instructions that Wiener and Farnum (2013) used modified to include language
from Title VII that explained retaliation. The mixed motive instructions informed
participants that for a retaliation claim three elements must be met: 1. The plaintiff
complained about national origin discrimination, 2. The defendant took a materially
adverse action, and 3. That the discrimination complaint was a motivating factor for the
defendant’s actions. “A “motivating factor” is a factor that played some part in the
defendants decision.” For the but-for retaliation instructions, elements 1 and 2 were the
same but element 3 required that the discrimination complaint be a determinative factor.
“A determinative factor means the Defendant would not have taken the challenged
employment decision but for the Plaintiff’s protected class.”
For the discrimination instructions, there were only two elements: 1. The
defendant’s actions led to the plaintiff being fired and 2. The plaintiff’s national origin
was the determinative/motivating factor. Participants in the discrimination and retaliation
condition either received but-for instructions for both charges, mixed motive for both
charges, or mixed motive for the discrimination charge and but-for, for the retaliation
charge (Appendix E).
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Verdict and Case Decisions. Participants then completed a verdict ballot where
they indicated whether they found in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant. For
retaliation verdicts 48.2% (N = 96) found for the defendant and 51.8% (N = 103) found
for the plaintiff. For discrimination verdicts 55.8% (N = 67) found for the defendant and
44.2% (N = 53) found for the plaintiff. Jurors also completed a verdict certainty scale on
an 11-point scale ranging from -5 (completely certain the defendant is not liable) to 5
(completely certain the defendant is liable) (retaliation verdict certainty M = .64, SD =
2.86; discrimination verdict certainty M = .14, SD = 3.03). Next jurors rated the strength
of the plaintiff and defendant’s evidence on 1 (not at all convincing) to 9 (very
convincing) separate Likert Scales for both retaliation verdicts (plaintiff evidence M =
5.21, SD = 2.29; defendant evidence M = 4.66, SD = 2.25) and discrimination verdicts
(plaintiff evidence M = 4.66, SD = 2.28; defendant evidence M = 5.28, SD = 2.10).
Finally participants completed an item that measured their perception of the burden of
proof in the case by marking how certain (0-100%) they had to be of the evidence in
order to find the defendant liable (retaliation verdict burden of proof M = 70.41, SD =
2.25; discrimination verdict burden of proof M = 72.51, SD = 21.35)(Appendix F).
Manipulation Check. To determine whether participants’ understood the
instructions, they answered 2 true/false questions regarding the discrimination charge: 1.
“University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s national origin was the
determining factor in University Medical Center’s efforts to have Dr. Ahmad fired.” 2.
“University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s
national origin in University Medical Center’s efforts to have Dr. Ahmad fired.”
Participants also answered 2 true/false questions regarding the retaliation charge: 1.
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“University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s discrimination charge
was the determining factor in University Medical Center’s efforts to have Dr. Ahmad
fired.” 2. “University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr.
Ahmad’s discrimination charge in University Medical Center’s efforts to have Dr. Ahmad
fired.” As an added manipulation check, participants indicated if they had heard of the
case before, if they answered “yes,” (N = 2) they then rated their familiar with the facts of
the case (neither was familiar with the facts of the case). Since neither participant was
familiar with the facts, they were kept in the data analyses (Appendix G).
Demographics. Participants also completed a brief demographic survey on which
they supplied their age, ethnicity, marital status, and other relevant self-report statistics.
See Appendix H for the full survey.
Results
The results of this study appear in four phases. Phase 1 displays preliminary
analyses of the experimental task to determine which factors predict verdict and verdict
certainty using only simple main effects. Phase 2 presents the full model analyses of the
experimental task, absent the added condition of mixed motive instructions for
discrimination and but-for instructions for retaliation, to test the influence of significant
predictors. This analysis was a 2 (Regulatory frame: promotion v. prevention) x 2 (Claim
type: retaliation v. discrimination/retaliation) x 2 (Instruction: mixed motive v. but-for)
factorial design. Phase 3 presents the full model analyses including the added condition to
test the influence of manipulations on the dependent variables. Finally, phase 4
examined in more detail the moderators that emerged as viable during phase 1 and 2 of
the analyses.
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Phase 1: Preliminary Analyses of Verdict and Verdict Certainty
Manipulation checks. A causal knowledge index was created in which
participants who correctly identified the instruction type in the manipulation check were
coded as 1 and those who incorrectly identified the instruction type were coded as 0. A
binary logistic regression predicting accurate understanding of the instruction with the
instruction manipulation (which included the condition in which participants had both
instructions) revealed that for retaliation claims, instruction did predict accuracy, χ2(2) =
7.10, p < .03, Nagelkerke R2 = .05. Categorical contrasts showed that participants who
received both instructions were significantly less accurate in their knowledge of
instructions compared to those who only received but-for, β = .975 (SE = .406), Wald =
5.76, p < .016, LLCI = 1.20, ULCI = 5.88, or only mixed motive instructions, β = .979
(SE = .411), Wald = 5.675, p < .017, LLCI = 1.19, ULCI = 5.96. Table 3.1 shows the
breakdown for accuracy by instructional condition. A binary logistic regression
predicting accurate understanding of instruction by the instruction manipulation for
discrimination claims was not significant, χ2(2) = .113, p < .945, Nagelkerke R2 = .001.
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Table 3.1: Instruction Accuracy by Instruction Condition

Retaliation Claim Instruction Accuracy

Inaccurate

Accurate

Total

N

%

N

%

N

%

But-for Only

19

23.8

61

76.3

80

100

Mixed Motive
Only

18

23.7

58

76.3

76

100

Mixed Motive
and But-for

19

45.2

23

54.8

42

100

Total

56

28.3

142

71.7

198

100

A binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict by accuracy knowledge
of the retaliation instruction approached significance, χ2(1) = 3.42, p < .06, Nagelkerke R2
= .02, such that those who were accurate were marginally more likely to find for the
plaintiff, β = .587 (SE = .320), Wald = 3.372, p < .066, LLCI = .96, ULCI = 3.37. Table
3.2 displays the retaliation verdict breakdown by accuracy. A binary logistic regression
predicting discrimination verdict by instruction accuracy was not significant, χ2(1) = .074,
p = .785, Nagelkerke R2 = .001.
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Table 3.2: Retaliation Verdict Decisions by Instruction Accuracy

Retaliation Claim Instruction Accuracy

Plaintiff

Defendant

Total

N

%

N

%

N

%

Inaccurate

23

41.1

33

58.9

56

100

Accurate

79

55.6

63

44.4

142

100

Total

102

51.5

96

48.5

198

100

To assess the influence of instruction accuracy on retaliation verdict certainty, a
one-way ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict certainty revealed a non-significant effect
of instruction accuracy, F(1, 196) = 2.927, p = .09, partial η2 = .022. A one-way ANOVA
predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction accuracy also failed to reveal a
significant effect of instruction accuracy on certainty, F(1, 116) = 1.865, p = .175, partial
η2 = .016.
Motivational Analyses. A preliminary forced entry binary logistic regression
predicting retaliation verdict with the five motivating factors (plaintiff national origin,
rehiring policy, relationship with supervisors, discrimination complaint, and the letter to
the university) produced a significant overall model

2

(5) = 24.67, p < .001, Nagelkerke

R2 = .157, but only one of the motivating factors, plaintiff’s national origin, was
significant, β = .244 (SE = .054), Wald = 20.626, p < .001, LLCI = 1.15, ULCI = 1.42. A
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forced binary logistic regression predicting discrimination verdict from the motivating
factors also produced a significant model, χ2(5) = 23.706, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .242,
again only plaintiff’s national origin was a significant predictor of verdict, β = .331 (SE =
.077), Wald = 18.215, p < .001, LLCI = 1.20, ULCI = 1.62. In both retaliation and
discrimination verdicts, those who thought the defendant took into consideration the
plaintiff’s national origin were more likely to find for the plaintiff. This is interesting
because under the law, the plaintiff’s national origin should not be a factor in determining
a retaliation verdict. Instead, the participants should only have considered whether the
hospital relied on the plaintiff’s discrimination complaint in its adverse employment
decision.
Next, to determine the influence of motivating factors on retaliation verdict
certainty, a multiple regression predicted certainty with a significant model, R2 = .18, F
(5, 196) = 8.48, p = .001. The plaintiff’s national origin was the only significant
predictor, β = .37 (SE = .06), t = 1.16, p < .001, LLCI = .25 ULCI = .49. Finally, a
multiple regression predicting discrimination verdict certainty by the five motivating
factors produced a significant model, R2 = .12, F (5, 120) = 3.30, p = .001. Only national
origin significantly predicted discrimination verdict certainty, β = .33 (SE = .09), t =
3.72, p < .001, LLCI = .15 ULCI = .51.
Strength of Evidence Analyses. To understand how participants weighed the
evidence of the plaintiff and defendant in deciding a verdict, I performed a preliminary
forced entry binary logistic predicting retaliation verdict with strength of plaintiff and
defendant evidence. The model was significant, χ2(2) = 127.556, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2
= .631, with both plaintiff, β = .783 (SE = .140), Wald = 31.151, p < .001, LLCI = 1.66,
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ULCI = 2.88, and defendant evidence, β = -.516 (SE = .121), Wald = 18.304, p < .001,
LLCI = .47, ULCI = .76, as significant predictors. Importantly, participants who viewed
the plaintiff’s evidence as strong were more likely to find for the plaintiff, while those
who viewed the defendant’s evidence as strong were more likely to find for the
defendant. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting discrimination verdict by
plaintiff and defendant evidence also produced a significant model, χ2(2) = 84.925, p <
.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .683. For discrimination verdicts only plaintiff evidence emerged
as a significant predictor, β = 1.155 (SE = .228), Wald = 26.632, p < .001, LLCI = 2.03,
ULCI = 4.96, such that participants who believed the plaintiff’s evidence is stronger more
likely to find for the plaintiff. The defendant’s evidence did not factor into this decision,
= -.25 (SE = ..19), Wald = 1.75, p = .19, LLCI = .53, ULCI = 1.13.
To examine the influence of strength of evidence on verdict certainty, separate
multiple regressions predicting certainty by strength of evidence were conducted. For
retaliation verdict certainty, the model was significant, R2 = .48, F (2, 198) = 89.19, p =
.001 and both plaintiff evidence, β = .67 (SE = .09), t = 7.84, p < .001, LLCI = .50 ,
ULCI = .84, and defendant evidence, β = -.26 (SE = .09), t = -2.95, p = .004, LLCI = .43, ULCI = -.08, were significant predictors. For discrimination verdict certainty, the
overall model was significant, R2 = .39, F (2, 120) = 37.77, p = .001. Plaintiff evidence
was significant, β = .69 (SE = .13), t = 5.46, p < .001, LLCI = .44 ULCI = .94, but
defendant evidence was not significant, β = -.21 (SE = .14), t = -1.51, p = .13, LLCI = .48, ULCI = .06.
Trait regulatory focus analyses. Trait regulatory focus was not analyzed in this
study due to a failure in the regulatory focus measure to differentiate between promotion
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and prevention focused individuals. Specifically, the reaction times did not correlate with
the ratings of the traits (ideal rating r = -05, p = .44, ought rating r = -.06, p = .36, even
when transforming the data to be a normal distribution. More concerning, individuals
who rated themselves high in ideal/promotion traits also significantly rated themselves
high in ought/prevention traits (Pearson r = .51, p = .001). This suggests that the measure
was not sensitive enough to parse out participants’ trait regulatory focus.
Phase 2: Full Experimental Model Analyses
In the analyses of the full model, participants from the different instruction
condition (discrimination complaint with mixed motive instruction and retaliation
complaint with but-for instruction) were left out. A separate analysis in phase 3 examined
these participants’ responses.
Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, regulatory focus, and claim type. A
forced binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict (0 = plaintiff, 1 =
defendant) by instruction (0 = but-for, 1 = mixed motive), regulatory focus manipulation
(0 = prevention, 1 = promotion), and claim type (0 = retaliation only, 1 = discrimination
and retaliation) failed to produce a significant model, χ2(3) = 1.27, p = .736, Nagelkerke
R2 = .011 and none of manipulated variables predicted retaliation verdict, all ps > .429.
To test for interactions between the variables, a second forced entry binary logistic
regression included the three manipulated variables and their interactions to predict
retaliation verdict. The model was not significant, χ2(7) = 4.454, p = .726, Nagelkerke R2
= .038, with none of the variables or interactions reaching significance, all ps > .109.
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by Instruction, Regulatory Focus, and
Claim Type. An ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction,
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regulatory focus manipulation, and claim type revealed no main effects (all Fs < 1.541,
all ps > .216) and no significant two-way interactions (all Fs < 2.16, all ps > .144) but
there was as significant three-way interaction, F(1, 148) = 5.617, p = .019, partial η2 =
.037. In order to more closely examine this three-way interaction, I split the data by
instruction type and performed an ANOVA testing retaliation verdict certainty as a
function of the regulatory focus manipulation and claim type. For but-for instructions
there was a significant two-way interaction between regulatory focus and claim type, F(1,
76) = 6.541, p = .013, partial η2 = .079 but that interaction was not significant in the
mixed motive instruction condition, F(1, 72) = .768 , p = .384, partial η2 = .011. Figure
3.1 displays the but-for instruction results. Participants who only made a retaliation claim
showed no regulatory focus effect, F(1, 37) = 1.120, p = .297, partial η2 = .029; however,
for those that had to make both a discrimination and retaliation claim, regulatory focus
was significant, F(1, 39) = 6.759, p = .013, partial η2 = .148. Figure 1 shows that
participants who used the prevention focused judge’s instructions were more certain that
the defendant was liable while participants who received the promotion focused judge’s
instructions were more certain that the defendant was not liable.
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Figure 3.1: Retaliation Verdict Certainty predicted by Regulatory Focus x Claim
Type for But-For Instructions

Verdict certainty
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Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction, regulatory focus, and claim
type. A forced entry binary logistic regression with instruction and regulatory focus
manipulation predicting discrimination verdict produced a non-significant model, χ2(2) =
1.60, p = .449, Nagelkerke R2 = .028. Neither instruction (β = -.401, p = .401) or
regulatory focus manipulation (β = -.463, p = .334) were significant predictors. Claim
type is not included in this analysis because in order to evaluate a discrimination
complaint participants also had to evaluate a retaliation complaint. A second forced entry
binary logistic regression predicting discrimination verdict by instruction, regulatory
focus manipulation, and the added instruction X regulatory focus interaction also resulted
in a non-significant model, χ2(3) = 1.698, p = .637, Nagelkerke R2 = .030, with none of
the predictors significant, all ps > .370.
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Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction and regulatory focus.
A 2 (instruction type) by 2 (regulatory focus) ANOVA on discrimination verdict certainty
demonstrated a main effect of instruction, F(1, 75) = 7.809, p = .007, partial η2 = .094,
but no two-way interaction between regulatory focus and instruction, F(1, 75) = .001, p =
.977, partial η2 = .000. The main effect of instruction (see Figure 2) shows that
participants who received but-for instructions were significantly more certain (M = -.858,
SD = .461) that the defendant was not liable, whereas participants who received mixed
motive instructions were significantly more certain (M = 1.00, SD = .479) that the
defendant was liable (See Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Discrimination Verdict Certainty predicted by Instruction
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Phase 3: Experimental Model Analyses with +1 Instruction Condition
The following analyses examine the full model effects on the dependent variables,
taking into consideration the third level of instruction: mixed motive for discrimination
claims and but-for for retaliation claims. These analyses do not include claim type
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because all participants who received the added level of instruction decided both claims.
As such, all analyses in this phase only examine participants who made both a
discrimination and retaliation claim.
Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction and regulatory focus. A forced entry
binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict from instruction (coded with the
mixed motive/but-for condition as the comparison) and from regulatory focus resulted in
a non-significant model, χ2(3) = 2.93, p = .40, Nagelkerke R2 = .03. There was a no effect
of instruction (Wald = 2.35, p = .31) or regulatory focus (β = -.27, p = .46). A second
forced-entry binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict with instruction,
regulatory focus, claim type, and the added interaction of instruction x regulatory focus
produced a non-significant model, χ2(5) = 5.96, p = .31, Nagelkerke R2 = .06. There were
again no significant effects of instruction (Wald = 2.38, p = .30), regulatory focus (β = .51, p = .42), or their interaction (β = 1.15, p = .21).
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by Instruction and Regulatory Focus. A
3 (Instruction type: but for vs. mixed motive vs. combined) by 2 (Regulatory Focus)
ANOVA on verdict certainty produced no significant main effects, all Fs < 1.33 and all
ps > .25, but there was a significant two-way interaction between instruction and
regulatory focus, F(2, 116) = 3.94, p = .02, partial η2 = .06. To better understand this
interaction, I split the data into promotion and prevention focus and performed two
ANOVAs. For participants in the prevention focused condition there was no effect of
instruction, F(1, 57) = .72, p = .49, partial η2 = .02; however, participants in the
promotion focused condition did show an instruction effect, F(1, 59) = 3.99, p = .02,
partial η2 = .12 (See Figure 3.3). Participants who were in the promotion focused
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condition and received only mixed motive instructions were significantly more certain in
their verdict for the plaintiff than those in the but for only condition. Neither of these
instruction conditions was significantly different combined condition.
Figure 3.3: Instruction x Regulatory Focus Interaction for Retaliation Verdict
Certainty
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Note: Different subscripts are significantly different
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction and regulatory focus. A
separate forced entry binary logistic regression predicting discrimination verdict with all
three levels of instruction (coded with the mixed motive/but-for condition as the
comparison) and regulatory focus again failed to produce a significant model, χ2(3) =
6.85, p = .08, Nagelkerke R2 = .07. However, there was a main effect of instruction, Wald
= 6.61, p = .04. The comparisons reveal that there is a significant difference in
discrimination verdicts when comparing participants who used only but-for instructions
to those who used mixed motive instructions for the discrimination claim, β = -.1.15 (SE
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= .46), Wald = 6.29, p = .012, LLCI = .13, ULCI = .78 (See Table 3.3 for percentages).
This suggests that participants who used only but-for instructions for both claims were
more likely to find for the defendant on the discrimination charge as opposed to those
who used separate instructions for the two claims. The difference between those who
only used mixed motive instructions and those who used both instructions was not
significant (β = -.77, p = .09).
Table 3.3: Discrimination Verdict Decisions by Instruction Condition

Plaintiff

Defendant

Total

N

%

N

%

N

%

But-For only

13

31.7

28

68.3

41

100

Mixed Motive
Only

15

40.5

22

59.5

37

100

Mixed
Motive/ButFor
Total

25

59.5

17

40.5

42

100

67

55.8

53

44.2

120

100

A second forced-entry binary logistic regression predicted discrimination verdict
with the 3-level instruction, regulatory focus, and the added interaction of instruction by
regulatory focus produced a non-significant model, χ2(5) = 9.64, p = .09, Nagelkerke R2 =
.10 and failed to show a significant interaction (β = -1.46, p = .12).
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction and regulatory focus.
Rounding out Phase 3, a separate 3 (Instruction type) x 2 (Regulatory Focus) ANOVA on
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discrimination verdict certainty yielded a significant main effect of instruction, F (2, 116)
= 4.00, p = .02, partial η2 = .06 (See Figure 3.4). LSD pairwise comparisons revealed that
participants who received only mixed motive instructions were significantly more certain
of a verdict for the plaintiff as compared to participants who only received but for
instructions (p = .007) and were marginally less certain in their verdict for the plaintiff as
compared to participants who received both instructions (p = .06). Participants who
received only mixed motive instructions did not differ in their verdict certainty as
compared to participants who received both instructions.
Figure 3.4: Discrimination Verdict Certainty by Three-Level Instruction
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Phase 4: Moderation Analyses
For the following analyses, unless otherwise noted instruction refers to only butfor or mixed motive. The mixed motive/but-for condition will be specifically mentioned
if it is being used in the analysis.
National Origin Motivation as a Moderator.
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Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus
manipulation, and motivation. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting
retaliation verdict from instruction, claim type, regulatory focus, and the plaintiff’s
national origin as a motivating factor resulted in a significant model, χ2(4) = 15.921, p =
.003, Nagelkerke R2 = .129, but only the motivating factor was a significant predictor of
retaliation verdict, β = -.226 (SE = .062), Wald = 13.182, p = .001, while instruction (β =
-.187, p = .581), claim type (β = .106, p = .754), and regulatory focus (β = .192, p = .571)
were not significant. The same forced entry binary adding all interactions produced a
significant model, χ2(15) = 31.508, p = .008, Nagelkerke R2 = .244 (see Table 3.4 for all
effects) with main effects of instruction, claim type, and national origin motivation. In
line with the hypotheses, participants who received but-for instructions were more likely
to find for the defendant, while those who received mixed motive instructions were more
likely to find for the plaintiff. Participants who had to decide only a retaliation claim
were more likely to find for the defendant, while those who had to determine both a
discrimination and retaliation claim were more likely to find for the plaintiff. Finally,
those who thought the plaintiff’s national origin motivated the Medical Center’s actions
were more likely to find for the plaintiff as compared to those who thought his national
origin was not a motivating factor. There were also two two-way interactions, one
between claim type and national origin, as well as an interaction between claim type and
instruction.
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Table 3.4
Predicting Retaliation Verdicts as a Function of Instruction, Regulatory Focus, Claim
Type, and Plaintiff National Origin

Standard

Odds

Factor

Beta

Error

Wald

d.f.

Prob

Ratio

Instruction
Claim
Regulatory Focus
National Origin
motivation
Instruction x National
Origin
Claim x National Origin

3.049
3.464
1.104
.631

1.563
1.570
1.691
.253

3.806
4.865
.427
6.213

1
1
1
1

.051
.027
.514
.013

.047
.031
.331
.532

-.521

.307

2.877

1

.09

1.684

-.703

.315

4.972

1

.026

2.02

Regulatory Focus x
National Origin
Instruction x Regulatory
Focus
Instruction x Claim
Claim x Instruction x
Regulatory Focus
Claim x Instruction x
National Origin
Claim x Regulatory Focus
x National Origin
Instruction x Regulatory
Focus x National Origin
Instruction x Claim x
Regulatory Focus x
National Origin
Constant

-.123

.346

.127

1

.721

1.131

-2.980

2.144

1.932

1

.165

19.685

-4.809
4.606

1.972
2.713

5.949
2.882

1
1

.015
.09

122.555
.010

.836

.403

4.312

1

.038

.433

.089

.450

.039

1

.843

.915

.385

.430

.802

1

.370

.680

-.394

.571

.477

1

.490

1.483

-3.006

1.345

4.997

1

.025

20.202

To examine the interaction between claim type and national origin, the data was
split between claims and a forced entry binary logistic regression predicting retaliation
verdict by instruction, regulatory focus, and national origin produced a significant model
for retaliation only, χ2(7) = 23.748, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .354, but produced a nonsignificant model for the discrimination and retaliation condition, χ2(7) = 7.353, p = .393,
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Nagelkerke R2 = .119. Participants who only had to render a verdict for retaliation
considered the use of the plaintiff’s national origin, β = .631 (SE = .253), Wald = 6.213,
p = .013.. Those participants who had to render a verdict for both a discrimination and
retaliation claim did not show a difference in verdict when considering the plaintiff’s
national origin,

= .072 (SE = .188), Wald = .147, p = .701.

A moderation analysis, using Hayes’ (2013) process moderation, more closely
examined the moderation of national origin on the effect of claim type on retaliation
verdict. Using the Johnson-Neyman technique, participants who strongly believe national
origin was considered showed marginally significant moderation, z = 1-72, p =.08., LLCI
-1.90, ULCI = .12 (rating = 6.92). Participants who were extremely high on their belief
that national origin played a role (ratings starting at 8.25) did show significant differences
(all ps < .05). Figure 3.5 shows the moderation pattern in that participants who received
the retaliation only decision, are more influenced by the use of national origin as
compared to those who made both a discrimination and retaliation claim. Specifically,
those who were only asked to render a retaliation verdict were most likely to find for the
plaintiff if they strongly believed the defendant took into consideration the plaintiff’s
national origin and were least likely to find for the plaintiff if they believed the defendant
did not take into consideration the plaintiff’s national origin.
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Figure 3.5: National origin motivation as a moderator for the effect of retaliation
claim type on retaliation verdict.
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Hayes (2013) process moderation was also conducted to examine the moderation
of national origin on the interaction of claim type by instruction on retaliation verdict. For
participants using but-for instructions, national origin moderated the effect of claim type
on verdict at both low (z = 2.11, p = .03, LLCI = .12, UCLI = 3.16) and high (z = -2.26, p
= .02, LLCI = -3.31, UCLI = -.24) levels of belief that national origin played a role in the
defendant’s decision. The pattern of results for this moderation is similar to the overall
moderation of national origin on the effect of claim type on retaliation verdict.
Specifically, participants in the retaliation only condition were more influenced by their
belief that the defendant considered national origin than those in the discrimination and

85
retaliation condition (see Figure 3.6). National origin did not moderate the effects of
claim type under mixed motive instructions, β = -.004 (SE = .168), Wald = .001, p =
.981.
Figure 3.6: National origin motivation as a moderator for the effect of retaliation
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Predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and motivation. Next, I conducted a forced entry binary logistic
regression predicting retaliation verdict from the three-level instruction, regulatory focus,
and the plaintiff’s national origin as a motivating factor. The model was significant,
χ2(11) =23.12 p = .02, Nagelkerke R2 = .18; however, there were no significant main
effects or interactions (all ps > .08) and no need to conduct further moderation analyses.

86
Predicting retaliation verdict confidence by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus
manipulation, and motivation. To test the potential moderating role of national origin on
retaliation verdict certainty, an ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict confidence by
instruction, claim type, regulatory focus, and national origin as a moderator was
conducted. The only main effect in the model was for national origin, F (1, 147) =
33.647, p = .001, partial η2 = .186. There were no two-way interactions, but a three-way
interaction between instruction, claim type, and regulatory focus was significant, F (1,
147) = 9.110, p = .003, partial η2 = .059. Splitting the file by instruction type, revealed a
two-way interaction between claim and regulatory focus under but-for instructions, F(1,
75) = 9.978, p = .002, partial η2 = .117, but not under mixed motive instructions, F(1, 71)
= 1.527, p = .221, partial η2 = .021. Hayes (2013) process moderation for but-for
instructions found that when participants decided only a retaliation claim, national origin
did not moderate the effect of regulatory focus on retaliation verdict certainty, β = -.255
(SE = .274), t = -.930, p = .359, LLCI = -.812, ULCI = .302.
For participants using but-for instructions and deciding both a discrimination and
retaliation claim, national origin did moderate the effect of regulatory focus on retaliation
verdict certainty. The Johnson-Neyman Technique of significance did find that for
participants who had low, t (1, 37) = -2.86, p = .01, LLCI = -5.54, ULCI = -.95) and
moderate beliefs, t (1, 37)= -2.73, p = .01, LLCI = -3.79, ULCI = -.56) that the defendant
considered national origin, there was significant moderation (see Figure 7). Specifically,
participants in the promotion condition who believed strongly that national origin
influenced the employer’s decision, were more certain in a plaintiff’s verdict than those
who believed that national origin played less of a role (i.e., low or medium national origin
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beliefs). However prevention participants who were trying to avoid errors of commission
did not show effects for national origin discrimination beliefs.
Figure 3.7: National origin motivation as a moderator for the effect of regulatory
focus on retaliation verdict certainty for but-for instructions and
discrimination/retaliation claims.
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An ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction, regulatory
focus, claim type, and rehiring policy motivation as a covariate produced no significant
main effects or interactions, all Fs < 3.32 and all ps > .08.
Predicting retaliation verdict confidence by three-level instruction, regulatory
focus manipulation, and motivation. A one-way ANOVA predicting verdict certainty be
the three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and national origin motivation as a covariate
resulted in a significant main effect of national origin, F (1, 153) = 29.46, p = .001,
partial η2 = .16, and regulatory focus, F (1, 153) = 4.37, p = .04, partial η2 = .03, and a
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significant interaction between instruction and regulatory focus, F (2, 153) = 3.57, p =
.03, partial η2 = .04. I split the file first by regulatory focus and conducted moderation
analyses of national origin on the effect of instruction on retaliation verdict certainty. No
moderation was found for either prevention or promotion focused participants, all ps >
.14. However, when splitting the file by instruction type Hayes’ (2013) process
moderation showed that for participants using but-for instructions, national origin
moderated the effect of regulatory focus at both low, t (1, 76)= -2.86, p = .01, LLCI = 5.54, ULCI = -.95, and moderate, t (1, 76)= = -2.72, p = .01, LLCI = -3.78, ULCI = -..56, levels of national origin motivation (See Figure 3.8). National origin did not
influence participants who were in the prevention focused condition, but participants in
the promotion condition were more certain in their verdict for the defendant if they
believed the defendant did not consider the plaintiff’s national origin. Analyses produced
no moderation effects of national origin on the relationship between regulatory focus and
retaliation verdict certainty for participants using only mixed motive instructions, all ps >
.46, and for participants using the combined instructions, all ps > .21.
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Figure 3.8: National Origin as a moderator for regulatory focus on retaliation
verdict certainty under but-for instructions.
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An ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict certainty by three-level instruction,
regulatory focus, claim type, and rehiring policy motivation as a covariate produced no
significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 3.01 and all ps > .09.
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction, regulatory focus manipulation,
and motivation. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting discrimination
verdict from instruction, regulatory focus, and the plaintiff’s national origin as a
motivating factor was produced a significant model, χ2(3) =19.019 p = .001, Nagelkerke
R2 = .297, but only national origin emerged as a significant predictor of discrimination
verdict, β = -.411 (SE = .111), Wald = 13.567, p = .001, while instruction (β = -1.159, p
= .408) and regulatory focus (β = 1.498, p = .228) were not significant. The same forced
entry binary adding all interactions produced a significant model, χ2(6) = 22.342, p =
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.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .342, but no main effects or interactions were significant, all ps >
.099.
Predicting discrimination verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and motivation. A forced-entry binary logistic regression predicting
discrimination verdict with the three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and national
origin produced a significant model, χ2(11) = 36.69, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .35. There
was only a significant main effect of instruction (Wald = 7.50, p = .02), with a marginally
significant difference when comparing the but-for only condition to the two instruction
condition, β = -2.51 (SE = .1.35), Wald = 3.45, p = .06, and a significant difference
between the mixed motive only condition and the two instruction condition, β = -2.18
(SE = 1.27), Wald = 2.92, p = .02. Specifically, participants were marginally more like to
find for the defendant if they only used but-for instructions, and were significantly more
likely to find for the defendant if they only used mixed motive instructions as compared
to using mixed motive for discrimination and but-for for retaliation. There were no other
main effects or interactions, all ps >.09.
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and motivation. To test the potential moderating role of national origin on
discrimination verdict certainty, an ANOVA predicting discrimination verdict confidence
by instruction, regulatory focus, and national origin as a moderator was conducted. Only
main effects of national origin, F (1, 74) = 13.232, p = .001, partial η2 = .152, and
instruction, F (1, 74) = 6.959, p = .010, partial η2 = .086, emerged. Hayes’ (2013) process
moderation, using the Johnson-Neyman technique, revealed that national origin
moderated the effect of instruction on discrimination verdict certainty at both moderate, t
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(1, 75)= 2.670, p =.010, LLCI = .416, ULCI = 2.864, and high, t (1, 75) = 2.414, p =.018,
LLCI = .378, ULCI = 3.946 levels (see Figure 3.9). Specifically, participants either
moderate or high in their belief that national origin motivated the defendant’s action were
more likely to be certain in their verdict for the plaintiff under mixed motive as compared
to but-for instructions. Under low belief that national origin was a motivating factor,
there was no difference in certainty of verdict based on instruction.
Figure 3.9: National origin motivation as a moderator for the effect of instruction on
discrimination verdict certainty.
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Next, to test the potential moderating role of discrimination complaint on
discrimination verdict certainty, an ANOVA predicting discrimination verdict confidence
by instruction, regulatory focus, and discrimination complaint as a moderator was
conducted. There was a main effect of discrimination complaint, F (1, 79) = 12.61, p =
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.001, partial η2 = .15, a significant two-way interaction between instruction and
regulatory focus, F (1, 79) = 5.84, p = .02, partial η2 = .08, and a significant three-way
interaction between instruction, regulatory focus, and discrimination complaint, F (1, 79)
= 7.13, p = .01, partial η2 = .09. The data file was split on regulatory focus and separate
process analyses, following Hayes’ (2013) procedure, were conducted. For prevention
focused participants, moderate, t (1, 35) = 2.02, p = .05, LLCI = -.91, ULCI = 3.56, and
high, t (1, 35) = 2.80, p = .01, LLCI = .99, ULCI = 6.19 levels of discrimination
complaint motivation (See Figure 3.10). Prevention focused participants who were either
moderate or high in their belief that the discrimination complaint motivated the defendant
were more likely to be certain the defendant is liable under mixed motive instructions
than but-for instructions. Similarly, for promotion focused participants, those low, t (1,
36) = 2.93, p = .01, LLCI = 1.06, ULCI = 5.82, and moderate, t (1, 36) = 2.33, p = .03,
LLCI = .25, ULCI = 3.54, in discrimination complaint motivation were more certain the
defendant was liable under mixed motive than but-for instructions (See Figure 3.11).
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Figure 3.10: Discrimination complaint motivation as a moderator for the effect of
instruction on discrimination verdict certainty for prevention focused participants.

Verdict certainty (higher scores favor plaintiff )

2

1.5

1
High
Discrimination
Complaint

0.5

0
But-For
-0.5

-1

-1.5

Mixed Motive

Medium
Discrimination
Complaint
Low
Discrimination
Complaint

94
Figure 3.11: Discrimination complaint motivation as a moderator for the effect of
instruction on discrimination verdict certainty for prevention focused participants.
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Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory
focus manipulation, and motivation. An ANOVA predicting discrimination verdict
certainty by the three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and national origin motivation
as a covariate was produced only a main effect of national origin, F (1, 110) = 13.22, p =
.001, partial η2 = .11. Specifically, those who thought national origin motivated the
decision were more likely to be certain in a verdict for the plaintiff. All other main
effects and interactions were not significant, all Fs < .84 and all ps > .44.
An ANOVA predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction, regulatory
focus, claim type, and discrimination complaint motivation as a covariate produced a
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significant main effect of instruction, F (1, 110) = 6.41, p = .002, partial η2 = .10. The
main effect of instruction found that participants using but-for instructions were more
certain the defendant was liable than participants in the two-instruction condition (p =
.01). Mixed motive only instructions were not significantly different from the other two
(ps > .08). There were two significant two-way interactions, the first between instruction
and regulatory focus, F (1, 110) = 3.46, p = .03, partial η2 = .06, and also between
instruction and the discrimination complaint, F (1, 110) = 7.38, p = .001, partial η2 = .12.
Finally, there was a significant three-way interaction between instruction, regulatory
focus, and the discrimination complaint, F (1, 110) = 3.56, p = .03, partial η2 = .06.
To better understand the three-way interaction between instruction, regulatory
focus manipulation, and discrimination complaint motivation, the data was split based on
regulatory focus manipulation. Using Hayes’ (2013) process moderation, separate
moderation analyses were conducted for prevention and promotion conditions. For
participants in the prevention focused condition, both low, t (1, 56) = 2.70, p = .01, LLCI
= .48, UCLI = 3.27, and moderate levels, t (1, 56) = 1.96, p = .05, LLCI = -.02, UCLI =
1.89, of discrimination complaint motivation moderated the relationship between
instruction and discrimination verdict certainty (see Figure 3.12). Specifically, for
participants who were either low or moderate in their belief the discrimination complaint
motivated the defendant, they were more certain the defendant was not liable under butfor instructions and most certain the defendant was liable if they used the mixed motive
instructions for the discrimination complaint and but-for instructions for the retaliation
complaint. Interestingly, those who were high in the belief the discrimination complaint
played a role showed no differences based on instruction. This mirrors participant
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misunderstanding for retaliation claims, as the discrimination complaint should not
matter for the discrimination claim.
Figure 3.12: Discrimination Complaint as a Moderator for Instruction on
Discrimination Verdict Certainty for Prevention Focused Jurors.
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Moderation analyses for promotion focused participants also showed significant
moderation for participants who had low levels of belief the discrimination complaint
influenced the defendant’s actions, , t (1, 58) = 2.46, p = .02, LLCI = .29, UCLI = 2.86,
and the Johnson-Neyman results showed significant moderation at the highest levels of
belief the discrimination complaint mattered, t (1, 58) = -2.00, p = .05, LLCI = -3.02,
ULCI = .00. For participants low in discrimination complaint motivation, they were more
certain the defendant was not liable under but-for instructions and most certain the
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defendant was liable under the two-instruction condition. For participants high in
discrimination complaint motivation, they were more certain the defendant was liable
under but-for instructions and least certain under the two-instruction condition (See
Figure 3.13).
Figure 3.13: Discrimination Complaint as a Moderator for Instruction on
Discrimination Verdict Certainty for Promotion Focused Jurors.
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Strength of Evidence as Moderator.
Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus
manipulation, and strength of evidence. A forced entry binary logistic regression
predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, and regulatory focus with
plaintiff and defendant evidence as moderators produced a significant model, χ2(24)
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=134.74 p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .771. The only main effect was for plaintiff evidence,
β = 1.342 (SE = .671), Wald = 3.997, p = .046. There was a two-way interaction between
instruction and regulatory focus, β = -19.928 (SE = 10.046), Wald = 3.935, p = .047.
Finally, there were two three-way interactions: the first between instruction, regulatory
focus, and plaintiff evidence, β = 2.163 (SE = .1.126), Wald = 3.688, p = .055; and the
second between instruction, regulatory focus, and defendant evidence, β = 2.142 (SE =
.106), Wald = 4.034, p = .045.
First I examined the three-way interaction between instruction, regulatory focus,
and plaintiff evidence on verdict. When looking at participants in the prevention
condition, Hayes’ (2013) process moderation, using the Johnson-Neyman technique,
revealed that plaintiff evidence did not moderate the effect of instruction on retaliation
verdict at any level of the moderator (all ps > .45). However, for participants in the
promotion focused conditions, high plaintiff evidence moderate the relationship between
instruction and retaliation verdict, z = 2.08, p = .04, LLCI = .20, UCLI = 6.41.
Specifically, participants were significantly more likely to find for the plaintiff under
mixed-motive instruction, as opposed to but-for instructions, if they also believed the
plaintiff’s evidence was strong (See Figure 3.14). Moderation was not significant at the
low (p = .43) or moderate (p = .12) levels of plaintiff evidence.
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Figure 3.14: Plaintiff Evidence as a Moderator for Instruction on Retaliation
Verdict for Promotion Focused Jurors.
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Next, Hayes’ (2013) process moderation analyses were conducted to examine the
three-way interaction between instruction, regulatory focus, and defendant evidence.
Process analyses for neither promotion focused or prevention focused participants
revealed significant moderation (ps > .06 and ps > .35, respectively). Though promotion
focused individuals had a marginal moderation at p = .06, no values were significant
under the Johnson-Neyman technique and the confidence intervals crossed zero,
suggesting that moderation does not actually exist. Next, I split the data was then by
instruction type to examine potential moderation of the relationship between regulatory
focus and retaliation verdict, but no moderation was found for either but-for (all ps > .09)
or mixed motive instructions (all ps > .12).
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Predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and strength of evidence. A forced entry binary logistic regression
predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and strength of
evidence produced a significant model, χ2(11) = 102.91, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .63.
There was only a main effect of plaintiff evidence, β = .80 (SE = .33), Wald = 5.88, p =
.01, all other main effects and interactions were not significant, all ps > .21.
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus
manipulation, and strength of evidence. Since only plaintiff evidence predicted
retaliation verdict certainty in Phase 1, defendant evidence will not be considered a
moderator in the following analyses. A one-way ANOVA with instruction, regulatory
focus, claim type, and plaintiff evidence as a covariate was conducted. There was only a
main effects of plaintiff evidence, F (1, 141) = 120.18, p = .001, partial η2 = .46, with
stronger plaintiff evidence predicting a pro-plaintiff verdict. There were not significant
interactions, all ps > .14 and thus no moderation analyses were conducted.
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and strength of evidence. A one-way ANOVA predicting retaliation
verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and plaintiff evidence
showed only a main effect for plaintiff evidence, F (1, 148) = 114.10, p = .001, partial η2
= .43, in that participants who thought the plaintiff’s evidence was stronger were more
likely to be certain in a verdict for the plaintiff. There were no other main effects or
interactions, all Fs < 1.4 and all ps > .24.
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction, regulatory focus manipulation,
and plaintiff evidence. In Phase 1, only plaintiff evidence predicted discrimination
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verdict certainty, and so the following analyses only include plaintiff evidence as a
moderator. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting discrimination verdict
based on instruction, regulatory focus, and plaintiff evidence produced a significant
model, χ2(7) = 57.07, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .71. However there was only a
significant main effect of plaintiff evidence, β = 1.06 (SE = .47), Wald = 5.20, p = .02
such that stronger plaintiff evidence predicted greater likelihood of a plaintiff verdict. No
other main effects or interactions were significant, all ps >.46.
Predicting discrimination verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and plaintiff evidence. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting
discrimination verdict based on three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and plaintiff
evidence as the moderator produced a significant model, χ2(11) = 102.06, p = .001,
Nagelkerke R2 = .77. Again, there was only a main effect of plaintiff evidence, β = .68
(SE = .33), Wald = 4.13, p = .04, but no other main effects or interactions, all ps > .27.
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and plaintiff evidence. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to predict
discrimination verdict certainty with instruction, regulatory focus, and strength of
evidence as covariates. There was only a main effect for plaintiff evidence, F (1, 71) =
36.96, p = .001, partial η2 = .34, in which those who viewed the plaintiff’s evidence as
stronger were more certain in their verdict for the plaintiff. No other main effects or
interactions were significant (all Fs < 1.89, all ps > .17). No moderation analyses were
conducted based on these results.
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory
focus manipulation, and plaintiff evidence. A one-way ANOVA predicting
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discrimination verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and strength
of evidence showed only a main effect for plaintiff evidence, F (1, 103) = 18.39, p =
.001, partial η2 = .15, in that those who believed the plaintiff’s evidence was strong were
more certain in their verdict for the plaintiff. There were no other main effects or
interactions, all Fs < .32 and all ps > .18.
Previous employment decisions as a moderator.
Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus
manipulation, and previous employment decisions. I conducted a forced entry binary
logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict from instruction, claim type, regulatory
focus manipulation, and whether participants had ever made previous employment
decisions. The overall model was not significant, , χ2(15) =7.14 p = .95, Nagelkerke R2 =
.06 and there were no main effects or interactions. No further analyses were necessary.
Predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and previous employment decisions. I conducted a forced entry binary
logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict from the three-level instruction,
regulatory focus manipulation, and whether participants had ever made previous
employment decisions. The overall model was not significant, , χ2(7) =5.13, p = .64,
Nagelkerke R2 = .04. No main effects or interactions were significant, all ps > .34.
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus
manipulation, and employment decision. A one-way ANOVA examined the role of
instruction, claim type, regulatory focus, and previous employment decisions (as a
covariate) on retaliation verdict certainty. There was a main effect of regulatory focus, F
(1, 140) = 4.65, p = .03, partial η2 = .03, in which participants in the prevention focused
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condition were significantly more certain of their verdict for the plaintiff as compared to
promotion focused individuals. There were two significant two-way interactions, the first
between regulatory focus and previous employment decisions, F (1, 140) = 4.96, p = .03,
partial η2 = .03, and the second between instruction and claim type, F (1, 140) = 4.65, p =
.03, partial η2 = .03. There was also a marginally significant three-way interaction
between instruction, claim type, and previous employment decisions, F (1, 140) = 3.57, p
= .06, partial η2 = .02.
First, moderation analyses were done on the two-way interaction between regulatory
focus and previous employment decisions. Using Hayes’ (2013) process moderation, the
interaction of regulatory focus and previous employment experience was significant, t (1,
152)= -2.25, p = .03, LLCI = -3.97, UCLI = -.26, suggesting significant moderation.
Figure 15 shows that this moderation is strongest for participants in the prevention
focused condition, as compared to the promotion focused condition. For participants in
the prevention focused condition, if they had no previous experience making employment
decisions (such as firing or hiring) they were more certain in finding for the plaintiff,
while those who had previous experience were slightly certain in finding for the
defendant. All participants in the promotion focused condition were certain in finding for
the plaintiff, but those with previous experience were more certain in their verdict than
those with no previous experience. This could suggest that when put into prevention
focus, those who know what goes into these decisions may not want to risk overlooking a
legitimate factor that might have led to the alleged retaliation.
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Figure 3.15: Previous Employment Experience as a Moderator for Regulatory
Focus on Retaliation Verdict Certainty
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Next, moderation analyses assessed the potential moderation of previous
employment experience on the effect of instruction by claim type on retaliation verdict
certainty. Separate process moderation was done on both participants were decided only a
retaliation claim and those who decided a discrimination and a retaliation claim focused
participants separately, but no significant moderation was found (ps > .10 and ps > .25,
respectively). The data was then split by instruction type to examine potential moderation
of the relationship between claim type and retaliation verdict certainty, but no moderation
was found for either but-for (all ps > .49) or mixed motive instructions (all ps > .13).
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory
focus manipulation, and previous employment decisions. A one-way ANOVA with
three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and previous employment decisions, as a
covariate, on retaliation verdict certainty failed to produce main effects of instruction,
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regulatory focus, or previous employment decisions (all Fs < .72 and all ps > .40). Nor
were there any significant interactions between any of the variables, all Fs < .2.65 and all
ps > .07. Moderation analyses were not necessary.
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction, regulatory focus manipulation,
and previous employment decisions. Next, I conducted a forced entry binary logistic
regression predicting discrimination verdict from instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and whether participants had ever made previous employment decisions.
The overall model was not significant, χ2(7) = 4.67 p = .70, Nagelkerke R2 = .08 and
there were no main effects or interactions. I conducted no further analyses on the
potential moderating effects of previous employment decisions.
Predicting discrimination verdict by three-level instruction. regulatory focus
manipulation, and previous employment decisions. A forced entry binary logistic
regression predicting discrimination verdict from the three-level instruction, regulatory
focus manipulation, and whether participants had ever made previous employment
decisions produced a non-significant overall model, χ2(7) = 11.77 p = .11, Nagelkerke R2
= .12 and there were no main effects or interactions, all ps > .14. No further analyses
moderation analyses with these variables were necessary.
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and employment decision. A one-way ANOVA on discrimination verdict
certainty with instruction, regulatory focus, and previous employment decisions as a
serving as independent variables resulted in only a significant main effect of instruction,
F (1, 71) = 4.20, p = 04, partial η2 = .06. In line with previous effect, participants who
used but-for instructions were more certain in their verdicts for the defendant, while
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participants who used mixed motive instructions were more certain in their verdicts for
the plaintiff. No other main effects or interactions were significant (all ps > .16).
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory
focus manipulation, and previous employment decisions. A one-way ANOVA
predicting discrimination verdict certainty with three-level instruction, regulatory focus,
and previous employment decisions as a covariate resulted in no significant main effects
or interactions, all Fs < 2.56 and all ps > .08. No moderation analyses were conducted.
Study 1 Discussion
The results of study sought to examine several hypotheses that were mostly
supported. Hypothesis 1 predicted that participants using but-for instructions would be
more likely to find for the defendant, as compared to the plaintiff. Although logistic
regressions of the full dichotomized verdict resulted in no effects for retaliation verdict or
discrimination in the full model analyses, verdict certainty analyses of variance showed
that participants using but-for instructions were more likely to be certain in their verdict
for the defendant while those using mixed motive were more certain in their verdict for
the plaintiff. Moderation analyses further found that under but-for instructions, but not
mixed motive, belief that the plaintiffs national origin motivated the defendant
significantly predicted retaliation verdicts for participants when they made only a
retaliation decision as compared to those who made both a discrimination and retaliation
decision. National origin also moderated the relationship between regulatory focus and
claim type, but only under but-for instructions. This is in line with previous research
(Wiener & Farnum, 2013; Farnum & Wiener, 2015) who have found that extralegal
psychological factors are more influential under but-for instructions.
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Hypothesis 1a predicted that when participants used mixed motive instructions for
a discrimination claim and but-for instructions for a retaliation claim, that the but-for
instructions would potentially bleed over and lead to more pro-defendant verdicts.
Although there was no evidence for this phenomenon, participants who used two
different instruction types were less certain in their retaliation verdict as compared to
participants who only used one type of instruction. Participants were less certain of
finding for the plaintiff, such that the pattern of certainty for plaintiff verdict was more in
line with mixed motive instructions than but-for charges. This suggests that perhaps
mixed motive instructions from the discrimination claim may bleed over into the
retaliation claim. Additionally, participants who determined a discrimination claim were
more likely to find for the plaintiff in the two-instruction condition than those in the pure
the but-for only condition. This suggests that but-for instructions do not bleed over into
discrimination claims.
Unfortunately, I was unable to test Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, concerning
chronic regulatory focus and regulatory fit because the chronic regulatory focus measure
that was unreliable and unable to differentiate participants in either promotion or
prevention focused conditions. Hypothesis 4 predicted that regulatory focus, as
manipulated in the study, would be the most influential under but-for instructions. This
hypothesis was partially supported. Specifically, for retaliation verdict certainty
regulatory focus predicted verdict certainty under but-for instructions but not under
mixed motive. On the other hand, when looking at all three levels of instruction for
retaliation verdict certainty, prevention focused individuals did not show any difference
in their use of instructions, but participants in the promotion focused condition were more
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certain in their verdict in favor of the defendant under but-for instructions as compared to
mixed motive instructions. There was no difference, however, between those who used
both instructions and those who only used one type of instruction.
An interesting and pervasive finding from the first study is that whether or not the
defendant considered the plaintiff’s national origin in reaching the employment decision
drove the participants verdicts. . This information should from the basis of the
discrimination judgment, but not the retaliation claim. Regardless, national origin
motivation influenced participant verdict and verdict certainty for retaliation claims.
Additionally, participants used the discrimination complaint as a moderating factor in
their discrimination verdict certainty decisions. The discrimination complaint should not
legally be influencing discrimination verdicts decisions. There was also some evidence
that if participants had previous experience making hiring or firing decisions that this
could influence how they determined their verdicts. Specifically, participants who were
in the prevention focused condition were more certain in their verdict for the defendant if
they had previous experience, whereas promotion focused participants were more certain
in their verdict for the plaintiff if they had previous experience. Perhaps, the assessment
of risk occurs differently depending on regulatory focus. Those with prevention focus,
having made these decisions before, understand that there are many factors that go into
firing someone. As such, they may be less willing to risk finding retaliation when it may
not exist.
Study 2 next assesses the role of regulatory focus, instruction, and claim type in a
case where the plaintiff did not receive a promotion, instead of being fired.
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Chapter 4: Study 2
Study 2: Regulatory Focus and Jury Decision Making in Retaliation Cases involving
failure to promote an employee
The second study utilized the same design and analyses as the first but the trial
transcript described a case in which the employee did not receive a promotion. Thus, the
design of study 2 was a 2 (Regulatory frame: promotion v. prevention) x 2 (Claim type:
Retaliation v. Discrimination/Retaliation) x 2 (Instruction: mixed motive v. but-for) + 1
(Mixed Motive and But-for instructions for a Discrimination/Retaliation claim) between
participants design with chronic prevention and promotion as continuous variables. The
discrimination judgment and the retaliation judgment was the same as in study 1 except
that the charges were 1) that the hospital failed to promote the plaintiff because of his
national origin and 2) the hospital failed to promote the plaintiff because of his
discrimination complaint. The fact pattern was a modification of University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, similar to study 1 except that the plaintiff
complained that he deserved a promotion that the hospital denied him (See Appendix I).
The chronic regulatory focus measure was the same as in study 1 as was the regulatory
focus framing manipulation. Appendices J, K, L, and M are the jury instructions,
manipulation checks, motivation factors measures, and verdict decisions for study 2 (See
Table 4.1 for means and standard deviations of all measures).
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 Measures
Motivating Factors
National Origin
Rehiring Policy
Adversarial
Relationship
Discrimination
Complaint
Letter to University
Retaliation Verdict
Plaintiff Verdict
Defendant Verdict
Retaliation Verdict
Certainty
Retaliation Plaintiff
Evidence
Retaliation
Defendant Evidence
Retaliation Burden of
Proof
Discrimination
Verdict
Plaintiff Verdict
Defendant Verdict
Discrimination
Verdict Certainty
Discrimination
Plaintiff Evidence
Discrimination
Defendant Evidence
Discrimination
Burden of Proof

N

M

SD

198
197
198

4.97
5.09
6.32

3.12
3.10
2.98

198

5.83

3.33

198
198
107 (54%)
91 (46%)
198

6.74

3.00

.90

2.91

198

5.57

2.27

197

4.57

2.49

197

71.49

25.03

61 (51.7%)
57 (48.3%)
119

.13

3.32

120

4.82

2.49

120

5.41

2.31

120

69.60

.70

120

Though failure to promote and firing an employee are both adverse actions under
Title VII, I hypothesized that retaliation that occurs as a failure to promote will be viewed
as less legitimate than retaliation as discharge. That is, participants may not show as
strong regulatory fit effects and instruction effects because they do not believe the
employer retaliated when not promoting the complainant. This is consistent with other
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research examining employee retaliatory acts of omission (e.g. failing to look for an
important missing file), which participants perceived as more acceptable than acts of
commission (e.g. hiding an important file) (Charness & Levine, 2010). Specifically,
Charness and Levine presented participants with one of five scenarios that described a
negative action by a manager (e.g., a manager who has sexually harassed your friend
needs help finding a missing file) and then described the employee’s actions. These
actions were be one of five responses that varied in either being an act of commission
(employee hides the file) or omission (the employee does not tell the manager where the
file is) and then whether the influence of the action was far-reaching (it took weeks to
find or replace the file) or resolved quickly (it took hours to find or replace the file).
Participants then rated the acceptability of the employee’s behavior. Charness and
Levine (2010) found that participants viewed an act of omission as more acceptable than
an act of commission, but the influence of the action (far reaching or resolved quickly)
was not rated as significantly different. I anticipate similar results when comparing study
1 and study 2.
Participants. Participants were 212 community members recruited via
Mechanical Turk that were at least 18 years of age or older and were U.S. citizens..
Eleven participants were dropped from the dataset for falling outside the standard
deviation of response time for the survey and 3 participants were dropped for incomplete
data. The final 198 participants who were kept for analyses were 54% women, had a
mean age of 34.38, and 80.3% of them were employed at least part-time. The ethnic
breakdown of the participants was representative of the Mturk community with 79.7%
European American, 8.6% African American, 4.6% Asian American, 3.6% Hispanic,
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1.5% Native American, 1% Latino/a, and 1% Middle Eastern. Participants were fairly
educated with 56.1% holding at least a college degree, 30.8% having completed some
college, and 12.6% holding a high school diploma. Lastly, 46.5% of participants
indicated that they had been in a position to make hiring or firing decisions in their jobs.
Results
As with Study 1, the results of Study 2 appear in four phases. Phase 1 displays
preliminary analysis of the experimental task to determine which factors predict verdict
and verdict certainty using only simple main effects. Phase 2 presents the full model
analyses, absent the +1 condition of mixed motive instructions for discrimination and
but-for instructions for retaliation, of the experimental task to test the influence of
significant predictors while taking into consideration the 2 (Regulatory frame: promotion
v. prevention) x 2 (Claim type: Retaliation v. Discrimination/Retaliation) x 2 (Instruction:
mixed motive v. but-for) factorial design. Phase 3 presents the full model analyses
including the third level of instruction to test the influence of manipulations on the
dependent variables using the 2 (Regulatory frame: promotion v. prevention) x 3
(Instruction: mixed motive v. but-for v. mixed motive/but-for) factorial design. Finally,
phase 4 will examine the proposed moderators that emerge as viable during phase 1of the
analyses.
Phase 1: Preliminary Analyses of Verdict and Verdict Certainty
Manipulation checks. As in study 1, I created a causal knowledge index in which
participants who correctly identified the instruction type in the manipulation check were
coded as 1 and those who incorrectly identified the instruction type were coded as 0. A
binary logistic regression predicting accurate understanding of the instruction by the
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instruction manipulation (which included the condition in which participants had both
instructions) revealed that for retaliation claims, instruction did predict accuracy χ2(2) =
6.81, p < .03, Nagelkerke R2 = .05. Categorical contrasts revealed that participants who
received but-for instructions were significantly more accurate in their knowledge of
instructions as compared to those who received mixed motive instructions, β = -.97 (SE =
.38), Wald = 6.44, p < .01. LLCI = .18, ULCI = .80, but were not different from those
who received both but-for and mixed motive instructions, β = -.59 , p < .20, LLCI = .22,
ULCI = 1.38. Participants who received either only mixed motive instructions or both
instructions were not significantly different on retaliation instruction accuracy, β = -38 , p
< .36, LLCI = .30, ULCI = 1.56. Table 4.2 shows the breakdown for accuracy by
instructional condition for retaliation claims. A binary logistic regression predicting
accurate understanding of instruction by the instruction manipulation for discrimination
claims was not significant, χ2(2) = 3.07, p < .22, Nagelkerke R2 = .04.
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Table 4.2: Instruction by Instruction Accuracy

Retaliation Claim Instruction Accuracy

Inaccurate

Accurate

Total

N

%

N

%

N

%

But-For

13

16.9

64

83.1

77

100

Mixed Motive

28

35

52

65

80

100

Mixed
Motive/ButFor
Total

11

26.8

30

73.2

41

100

52

26.3

145

73.7

198

100

A binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict by accuracy knowledge
of the retaliation instruction was significant, χ2(1) = 6.90, p < .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .05,
and indicated that those who were accurate about the instructions were more likely to find
for the plaintiff, β = .86 (SE = .33), Wald = 6.72, p < .01, LLCI = 1.23, ULCI = 4.51.
Table 4.3 displays the retaliation verdict breakdown by accuracy. A binary logistic
regression predicting discrimination verdict by instruction accuracy was not significant,
χ2(1) = .00, p < .99, Nagelkerke R2 = .00.
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Table 4.3: Retaliation verdict by instruction accuracy

Retaliation Verdict by Instruction Accuracy

Defendant

Plaintiff

Total

N

%

N

%

N

%

Inaccurate

32

61.5

20

38.5

52

100

Accurate

59

40.4

87

59.6

146

100

Total

91

46

107

54

198

100

To assess the influence of instruction accuracy on retaliation verdict certainty, a
one-way ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict certainty revealed a non-significant effect
of instruction accuracy, F(1, 196) = 04, p = .84, partial η2 = .00. A one-way ANOVA
predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction accuracy also revealed no
significant effect of instruction accuracy on certainty, F(1, 116) = .83, p = .36, partial η2
= .007.
Motivational Analyses. A preliminary forced binary logistic regression predicting
retaliation verdict by the five motivating factors (plaintiff national origin, rehiring policy,
relationship with supervisors, discrimination complaint, and the letter to the university)
tested whether these factors from the case predicted retaliation verdict. The overall model
was significant, χ2(5) = 32.84, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .20. Two of the motivating
factors were significant predictors, plaintiff’s national origin, β = .23 (SE = .06), Wald =
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17.26, p < .001, LLCI = 1.13, ULCI = 1.41, and the rehiring policy, β = -.17 (SE = .05),
Wald = 9.94, p < .002, LLCI = .76, ULCI = 94. Specifically, participants who believed
national origin played a role in the defendant’s actions were more likely to find for the
plaintiff, while participants who believed the rehiring policy influenced the defendant’s
actions were more likely to find for the defendant. As with Study 1, national origin is not
a legally relevant motivating factor for a retaliation claim (See Figure 4.1). The rehiring
policy is also problematic, as the rehiring policy is a legitimate reason for the defendant’s
actions. None of the other motivating factors were significant, all ps > .51.
Figure 4.1: Motivating Factors and Retaliation Verdict

Belief in Motivating Factor

7
6
5
4

Defendant

3

Plaintiff

2
1
0
National Origin

Rehiring Policy

A forced binary logistic regression predicting discrimination verdict by the
motivating factors also produced a significant model, χ2(5) = 24.43, p < .001, Nagelkerke
R2 = .25, but only plaintiff’s national origin was a significant predictor of verdict, β = .28
(SE = .07), Wald = 13.67, p < .001, LLCI = 1.42, ULCI = 1.53. Participants who thought
the defendant took into consideration the plaintiff’s national origin were more likely to
find for the plaintiff, as compared to the defendant. This is legally appropriate for the
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discrimination complaint and is in the right direction. All other motivating factors were
not significant, all ps > .29.
Next, to determine the influence of motivating factors on retaliation verdict
certainty, a multiple regression predicting certainty by the motivating factors produced a
significant model, R2 = .12 , F (5, 196) = 5.27, p = .001. The plaintiff’s national origin, β
= .15 (SE = .07), t = 2.33, p = .02, LLCI = .02 ULCI = .29, and the rehiring policy, β = .18 (SE = .06), t = -2.81, p = .01, LLCI = -.31 ULCI = 0.05 were the only significant
predictors. Specifically, participants who believed the plaintiff’s national origin was a
strong motivating factor were more likely to find the defendant liable, while those who
thought the rehiring policy was a motivating factor were more likely to find the defendant
not liable. A multiple regression predicting discrimination verdict certainty by the
motivating factors produced a significant model, R2 = .18 , F (5, 118) = 5.10, p = .001,
and found that the plaintiff’s national origin, β = .31 (SE = .10), t = 3.23, p = .01, LLCI
= .12 ULCI = .51, and the plaintiff’s discrimination complaint were significant
predictors, β = .22 (SE = .10), t = 2.22, p = .03, LLCI = .02 ULCI = .41.
Strength of Evidence Analyses. To understand how participants weighed the
evidence of the plaintiff and defendant in deciding a verdict, I conducted a forced entry
binary logistic predicting retaliation verdict with strength of plaintiff and defendant
evidence and found the model was significant, χ2(2) = 150.64, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 =
.71, with both plaintiff evidence, β = 1.11 (SE = .16), Wald = 47.52, p < .001, LLCI =
2.21, ULCI = 4.16, and defendant evidence, β = -.44 (SE = .13), Wald = 11.64, p = .001,
LLCI = .50, ULCI = .83, as significant predictors. Participants who viewed the plaintiff’s
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evidence as strong were more likely to find for the plaintiff, while those who viewed the
defendant’s evidence as strong were more likely to find for the defendant.
Next, a forced entry binary logistic regression predicting discrimination verdict by
plaintiff and defendant evidence also produced a significant model, χ2(2) = 105.82, p <
.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .79. For discrimination verdicts both plaintiff evidence, β = 1.41
(SE = .29), Wald = 24.40, p < .001, LLCI = 3.35, ULCI =7.21, and defendant evidence, β
= -.46 (SE = .22), Wald = 4.32, p = .04, LLCI = .41, ULCI =97, emerged as a significant
predictors. Again, participants who believed the plaintiff’s evidence was strong were
more likely to find for the plaintiff, while those that viewed the defendant’s evidence as
strong were more likely to find for the defendant.
To examine the influence of strength of evidence on verdict certainty, separate
multiple regressions predicting retaliation verdict certainty and discrimination verdict
certainty by plaintiff and defendant evidence were conducted. For retaliation verdict
certainty, the model was significant, R2 = .38 , F (2, 196) = 59.28, p < .001, but only
plaintiff evidence was a significant predictor, β = .75 (SE = .08), t = 9.13, p = .001, LLCI
= .59 ULCI = .92, while defendant evidence was not significant, β = -.05, p = .41. For
discrimination verdict certainty the model was significant, R2 = .44 , F (2, 118) = 46.18, p
< .001, and plaintiff evidence was significant, β = .80 (SE = .11), t = 7.07, p = .001,
LLCI = .58 ULCI = 1.02, but defendant evidence was not significant, β =-.15, p = .23.
For both retaliation and discrimination verdict certainty, participants who viewed the
plaintiff’s evidence as strong were more likely to be certain in their verdict for the
plaintiff as opposed to the defendant.
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Trait regulatory focus analyses. Again, I was unable to analyze chronic
regulatory focus due to a failure in the regulatory focus measure to differentiate between
promotion and prevention focused individuals. Specifically, the reaction times did not
correlate with the ratings of the traits, even when transforming the data to be a normal
distribution. More concerning, individuals who rated themselves high in ideal/promotion
traits also significantly rated themselves high in ought/prevention traits (Pearson r = .63,
p < .001). This suggests that the measure was not sensitive enough to parse out
participants’ trait regulatory focus.
Phase 2: Full Experimental Model Analyses
In the analyses of the full model, participants from the different instruction
condition (discrimination complaint with mixed motive instruction and retaliation
complaint with but-for instruction) are not included. These participants will be analyzed
in separate analyses in phase 3.
Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, regulatory focus, and claim type. A
forced binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict (0 = plaintiff, 1 =
defendant) by instruction (0 = but-for, 1 = mixed motive), regulatory focus manipulation
(0 = prevention, 1 = promotion), and claim type (0 = retaliation only, 1 = discrimination
and retaliation) produced a non-significant model, χ2(3) = 3.92, p = .27, Nagelkerke R2 =
.03. None of the manipulated variables predicted retaliation verdict, all ps > .13. Testing
for interactions between the variables, a second forced entry binary logistic regression
with the three manipulated variables and their interactions predicting retaliation verdict
failed to produce a significant model, χ2(7) = 6.81, p = .45, Nagelkerke R2 = .06, with
none of the variables or interactions predicting retaliation verdict, all ps > .15.
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Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by Instruction, Regulatory Focus, and
Claim Type. A one-way ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction,
regulatory focus manipulation, and claim type revealed a main effect of instruction, F(1,
149) = 4.68, p = .03, partial η2 = .03, with participants in the mixed motive condition
more certain of their verdict for the plaintiff (M = 1.54, SD = .32) than participants in the
but-for condition (M = .56, SD = .32). No other main effects or interactions were
significant (all Fs < 1.45, all ps > .23),
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction, regulatory focus, and claim
type. A forced entry binary logistic regression with instruction and regulatory focus
manipulation predicting discrimination verdict produced a significant model, χ2(2) =
8.98, p = .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .14 with instruction as a significant predictor, β = 1.13 (SE
= .49), Wald = 5.41, p = .02, LLCI = 1.19, ULCI =8.02. Specifically, participants using
the mixed motive instructions were more likely to find for the plaintiff than participants
using the but-for instructions (See Table 4.4). There was also a marginally significant
effect of regulatory focus, β = -.92 (SE = .49), Wald = 3.67, p = .056, LLCI = .15, ULCI
=1.02, with prevention focused jurors more likely to find for the plaintiff and promotion
focused jurors more likely to find for the defendant (See Table 4.5).
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Table 4.4: Discrimination Verdict by Instruction

Discrimination Verdict by Instruction

Defendant

Plaintiff

Total

N

%

N

%

N

%

But-For

24

63.2

14

36.8

38

100

Mixed Motive

15

37.5

25

62.5

40

100

Total

39

50

39

50

78

100

Table 4.5: Retaliation verdict by regulatory focus manipulation

Discrimination Verdict by Instruction

Defendant

Plaintiff

Total

N

%

N

%

N

%

Prevention

15

39.5

23

60.5

38

100

Promotion

24

60

16

40

40

100

Total

39

50

39

50

78

100
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A second forced entry binary logistic regress predicting discrimination verdict by
instruction, regulatory focus manipulation, and instruction X regulatory focus
manipulation produced a significant model, χ2(3) = 8.98, p = .03, Nagelkerke R2 = .14,
with no significant main effects or interactions, all ps > .10.
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction and regulatory focus.
A one-way ANOVA predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction and
regulatory focus manipulation found a marginal main effect of instruction, F(1, 74) =
3.55, p = .06, partial η2 = .05, but no two-way interaction between regulatory focus and
instruction, F(1, 74) = .47, p = .50, partial η2 = .01. The main effect of instruction shows
that participants who received but-for instructions were significantly more certain (M = .53, SD = .55) that the defendant was not liable, whereas participants who received mixed
motive instructions were significantly more certain (M = .92, SD = .54) that the defendant
was liable.
Phase 3: Experimental Model Analyses with +1 Instruction Condition
The following analyses examine the full model effects on the dependent variables,
taking into consideration the third level of instruction: mixed motive for discrimination
claims and but-for for retaliation claims. In these analyses, claim type will not be used, as
all participants who received the third level of instruction decided both claims. As such,
all analyses in this phase only examine participants who made both a discrimination and
retaliation claim.
Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, regulatory focus, and claim type. A
forced entry binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict with instruction
(coded with the mixed motive/but-for condition as the comparison) and regulatory focus
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resulted in a non-significant model, χ2(3) = 1.18, p = .76, Nagelkerke R2 = .01 without
main effects of instruction or regulatory focus, all ps > .47.
A second forced-entry binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict with
instruction, regulatory focus, and the interaction of instruction x regulatory focus
produced a non-significant model, χ2(5) = 4.15, p = .53, Nagelkerke R2 = .04. There were
no significant main effects and the interaction was not significant either, all ps > .14.
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by Instruction and Regulatory Focus. A
one-way ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction and regulatory
focus failed to find any main effects nor an interaction between instruction and regulatory
focus , all Fs < .73 and all ps > .48,
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction and regulatory focus. A forced
entry binary logistic regression predicting discrimination verdict with all three levels of
instruction (coded with but-for only as the comparison) and regulatory focus resulted in a
non- significant model, χ2(3) = 6.48, p = .09, Nagelkerke R2 = .07. However, there was a
marginally significant main effect of instruction, Wald = 5.40, p = .067. Analyses
revealed that there is a significant difference in discrimination verdicts when participants
used only but-for instructions compared to those who used only mixed motive
instructions, β = 1.07 (SE = .47), Wald = 5.14, p = .02, LLCI = 1.15, ULCI = 7.34 (See
Table 4.6 for percentages). Participants who used only but-for instructions for both
claims were more likely to find for the defendant on the discrimination charge as opposed
to those who used only mixed motive instructions. The differences between those who
used both instructions as compared to those who used only but-for (β = .31, p = .49) and
those who used only mixed motive instructions (β = -.76, p = .10) were not significant.

124
Table 4.6: Discrimination Verdict by Three Level Instruction Condition

Defendant

Plaintiff

Total

N

%

N

%

N

%

But-For only

24

63.2

14

36.8

38

100

Mixed Motive
Only

15

37.5

25

62.5

40

100

Mixed
Motive/ButFor
Total

18

45

22

55

40

100

57

48.3

61

51.7

118

100

A second forced-entry binary logistic regression predicted discrimination verdict
with the instruction, regulatory focus, and the interaction of instruction by regulatory
focus produced a non-significant model, χ2(5) = 10.10, p = .07, Nagelkerke R2 = .11.
There were no significant main effects or interactions, all ps >.10.
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction and regulatory focus.
I conducted a separate ANOVA to predict discrimination verdict certainty by the
instruction and regulatory focus. There were no significant main effects and the
interaction between instruction and regulatory focus was also not significant, all Fs <
1.92 and all ps > .15.
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Phase 4: Moderation Analyses
For the following analyses, unless otherwise noted instruction refers to only butfor or mixed motive instructions. The mixed motive/but-for condition will be specifically
mentioned if it is being used in the analysis.
Instruction Accuracy as a Moderator
Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus, and
instruction accuracy. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting retaliation
verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus, and instruction accuracy produced a
significant model, χ2(4) = 16.64, p = .002, Nagelkerke R2 = .13. There was a significant
main effect of instruction, β = .80 (SE = .36), Wald = 5.09, p = .02. LLCI = 1.11, ULCI =
4.50, in which participants who used mixed motive instructions, as compared to but-for
instructions, were more likely to find for the plaintiff. There was also a main effect of
accuracy, β = 1.44 (SE = .42), Wald = 11.62, p = .001, LLCI = 1.84, ULCI = 9.65, where
participants who were more accurate in their knowledge of the instructions were more
likely to find in favor of the plaintiff. . No other mains effects were significant, all ps >
.33. A second binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim
type, regulatory focus, accuracy, and adding all interactions produced a significant
model, χ2(14) = 25.57, p = .03, Nagelkerke R2 = .20, but there were no significant main
effects or interactions, all ps > .11. Since accuracy did not interact with any of the
manipulated variables, moderation analyses were not necessary.
National Origin and Rehiring Policy Motivation as a Moderator. Based on
analyses from Phase 1, only national origin and the rehiring policy will be considered
potential moderators. Specifically, potential moderators for predicting retaliation verdict
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are national origin and rehiring policy, while only national origin is a potential moderator
for discrimination verdicts. Since neither motivation factor predicted verdict certainty,
moderation analyses do not include those factors.
Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus
manipulation, and national origin motivation. A forced entry binary logistic regression
predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus, and national
origin produced a significant model, χ2(4) = 18.17, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .15. Only
national origin motivation emerged as a significant predictor, β =.22 (SE = .06), Wald =
12.94, p = .001, LLCI = .1.10, ULCI = 1.39, all other effects had p values of .07 or
greater. A second forced entry binary logistic regression predicting retaliation with the
same model plus all interactions resulted in a significant model, χ2(15) = 25.61, p = .04,
Nagelkerke R2 = .20, but there were no significant main effects or interactions, all ps >
.09.
Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, regulatory focus manipulation, and
rehiring policy motivation. Next, a forced entry binary logistic regression predicting
retaliation verdict from instruction, regulatory focus, claim type and the rehiring policy as
a motivating factor also generated a significant model, χ2(4) =13.95 p = .01, Nagelkerke
R2 = .11, with a main effect of the rehiring policy, β =-.18 (SE = .06), Wald = 9.31, p =
.002, LLCI = .74, ULCI = .94. No other effects were significant, all ps > .11.
A second forced entry binary logistic regression predicted retaliation verdict by
instruction, regulatory focus, claim type, rehiring policy as a employer motivation, and
added all the interactions. The model was significant, χ2(15) =29.32 p = .01, Nagelkerke
R2 = .23, and there were a significant effects for instruction, β = 4.70 (SE = 2.05), Wald
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= 5.23, p = .02, LLCI = 1.95, ULCI = 6156.99, a two-way interaction between
instruction and rehiring policy, β = -.87, (SE = .35), Wald = 6.06, p = .01, LLCI = .21,
ULCI = .84, and a marginally significant three-way interaction between instruction, claim
type, and rehiring policy, β =.88 (SE = .45), Wald = 3.82, p = .05, LLCI = 1.00, ULCI =
5.86. With regard to the main effect of instruction, participants who used mixed motive
instruction were significantly more likely to find for the plaintiff, while participants using
but-for instruction were more likely to find for the defendant.
To examine the interaction between instruction and rehiring policy, I used Hayes’
(2013) process moderation to find instruction effects under low levels of belief in the
rehiring policy on retaliation verdict, z = 2.35, p = .02, LLCI = .21, ULCI = 2.27.
Moderate (z = 1.71, p = .09, LLCI = -.09, ULCI = 1.27) but no instruction effects at high
levels (z = -.12, p = .91, LLCI = -.98, ULCI = .87) of belief in the use of the rehiring (See
Figure 4.2). Specifically, mixed motive participants, as compared to but-for participants,
were most likely to find in favor of the plaintiff when they believed the defendant did not
take into consideration the rehiring policy. On the other hand, belief in the employer’s
use of hiring policy had no impact under but-for instructions. Thus, respondents using
mixed motive causality instructions held the company accountable when the respondents’
believed the company made employment decisions that did not take their own hiring
policy into consideration.
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Figure 4.2: Rehiring Policy as a Moderator for Instruction on Retaliation Verdict.
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To examine the three-way interaction between claim type, instruction, and
rehiring policy, I performed separate Hayes (2013) process moderation analyses under
each claim type. For participants who only had to determine a retaliation claim, low
levels of rehiring policy motivation moderated the relationship between instruction and
retaliation verdict, z = 2.29, p = .02, LLCI = .27, ULCI = 3.50. Again, as seen in Figure
4.3, beliefs that the company failed to use its rehiring policy led to increases a plaintiff
verdict when respondents used mixed motive instructions compared to when they used
but-for instructions. Analyses with participants deciding both a discrimination and
retaliation claim did not find significant moderation effects for rehiring policy on the
relationship between instruction and retaliation verdict, all ps > .36.
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Figure 4.3: Rehiring Policy as Moderator for Instruction on Retaliation Verdict for
Retaliation Claims
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Predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and national origin motivation. A forced entry binary logistic regression
predicting retaliation verdict from the three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and the
plaintiff’s national origin as a motivating factor resulted in a significant model, χ2(4)
=23.97 p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .24, but with only national origin motivation as a
significant effect, β = .32 (SE = .07), Wald = 18.50, p < .001, LLCI = 1.19, ULCI =
1.59. A second forced entry binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict with
the same model plus all interactions also produced a significant model, χ2(11) = 32.77 p =
.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .32. There were, however no significant main effects or
interactions (all ps > .08). Moderation analyses were unnecessary.
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Predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and rehiring policy motivation. Next, a forced entry binary logistic
regression predicting retaliation verdict from the three-level instruction, regulatory focus,
and the rehiring policy as a motivating factor was not significant overall, χ2(4) =8.12 p =
.09, Nagelkerke R2 = .09. Only instruction was marginally significant, Wald = 5.67 , p <
.06, with but-for instructions leading to more pro-defendant verdicts than mixed motive
instructions, β = 1.09 (SE = .47), Wald = 5.29, p < .02, LLCI = 1.18, ULCI = 7.57. There
was no difference when comparing participants who used both instructions to those who
only used but-for (β = .81, p = .08) and those who only relied on mixed motive
instructions (β = .28, p = .55). Regulatory focus (β = -.40, p = .30) and the rehiring policy
(β = .-.08, p = .20) were not significant. A second forced entry binary logistic regression
adding all the interactions to the first model produced a non-significant model, χ2(11)
=23.53, p = .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .24. No main effects or interactions were significant, all
ps > .11. I conducted no moderation analyses.
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction, regulatory focus manipulation, and
national origin motivation. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting
discrimination verdict from instruction, regulatory focus, and the plaintiff’s national
origin as a motivating factor produced an overall significant model, χ2(3) =17.97 p <
.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .27, with both national origin, β = .27 (SE = .10), Wald = 7.73, p
= .01, and instruction, β = 1.35 (SE = .53), Wald = 13.567, p = .001 emerging as
predictors of discrimination verdict, β = -.411 (SE = .111), Wald = 6.44, p = .01, while
regulatory focus (β = -.77, p = .14) was not significant. As already described in Phase 1
and Phase 2, participants who believed national origin played a role were more likely to
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find for the plaintiff than the defendant, and participants using mixed motive instructions,
as opposed to but-for instructions, were more likely to find for the plaintiff. A second
forced entry binary logistic regression adding all the interactions to the first model also
produced a significant model, χ2(7) = 19.44, p = .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .29, but no main
effects or interactions emerged, all ps > .14.
Predicting discrimination verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and national origin motivation. A forced-entry binary logistic regression
predicting discrimination verdict with the three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and
rehiring policy significant overall, χ2(4) = 25.60, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .26, with
effects for national origin, β = .32 (SE = .08), Wald = 17.77, p <.001, LLCI = 1.19,
ULCI = 1.61, and instruction, Wald = 7.15, p = .03. When comparing instruction types,
participants who received but-for instructions were marginally more likely to find for the
defendant as compared to participants who used mixed motive causality for
discrimination claims and but-for for retaliation claims, β = -1.02 (SE = .53), Wald =
3.72, p = .05, LLCI = .13, ULCI = 1.02. There was no difference in verdict between
participants who only used mixed motive instructions and participants who used both
instructions (β = .36, p = .48). Regulatory focus was not significant (β = -.21, p = .62). A
second forced entry binary logistic regression adding the interactions to the first model
was significant, χ2(11) = 31.60, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .31, but only national origin
was emerged as an effect, β = .47 (SE = .21), Wald = 5.23, p = .02, LLCI = 1.07, ULCI =
2.41. All other main effects and interactions were not significant, all ps > .40.
Strength of Evidence as a Moderator.
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Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus
manipulation, and strength of evidence. A forced entry binary logistic regression
predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, and regulatory focus with
plaintiff and defendant evidence as moderators produced a significant model, χ2(5)
=140.09 p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .79. There were main effects of regulatory focus, β =
1.41 (SE = .66), Wald = 4.51, p = .03, LLCI = 1.11, ULCI = 15.05, and plaintiff
evidence, β = 1.66 (SE = .32), Wald = 27.61, p < .001, LLCI = 2.83,ULCI = 9.77.
Specifically, participants who were promotion focused were more likely to find for the
plaintiff, as compared to prevention focus, and participants who believed the plaintiff’s
evidence was stronger were more likely to find for the plaintiff as opposed to the
defendant. All other effects were not significant, all ps > .08. A second forced entry
binary logistic regression adding all interactions to the first model was significant, χ2(23)
=159.69 p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .85, but with no main effects or interactions, all ps >
.09. No moderation analyses were conducted.
Predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and strength of evidence. A forced entry binary logistic regression
predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and strength of
evidence was significant overall, χ2(5) = 81.19, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .66. There
were main effects of plaintiff evidence, β = 1.00 (SE = .19), Wald = 26.87, p < .001,
LLCI = 1.86, ULCI = 3.96, and defendant evidence, β = -.43 (SE = .15), Wald = 8.42, p =
.004, LLCI = .49, ULCI = .87. Instruction and regulatory focus were not significant, ps >
.24. A second forced entry binary logistic adding all interactions to the main effects was
also significant overall, χ2(17) = 100.10, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .76. There was still
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only main effects of plaintiff evidence β = .86 (SE = .45), Wald = 3.70, p = .05, LLCI =
.98, ULCI = 5.73, and defendant evidence, β = -.86 (SE = .39), Wald = 4.79, p = .03,
LLCI = .00, ULCI = .20. Instruction, regulatory focus, and all interactions were not
significant, all ps > .09.
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus
manipulation, and strength of plaintiff evidence. Since only plaintiff evidence predicted
retaliation verdict certainty in Phase 1, I did not include defendant evidence as a potential
moderator in the following analyses. An ANOVA with instruction, regulatory focus,
claim type, and plaintiff evidence as a covariate resulted in a main effect of regulatory
focus, F (1, 141) = 5.06, p = .03, partial η2 = .03, in which promotion focused participants
were more certain of their verdict for the plaintiff than prevention focused individuals.
There was also a main effect of plaintiff evidence, F (1, 141) = 94.77, p = .001, partial η2
= .40. There were no significant two-way interactions or three way interactions, all Fs <
3.38 and all ps > .08. The four way interaction between instruction, regulatory focus,
claim type, and plaintiff evidence was significant, F (1, 141) = 4.16, p = .04, partial η2 =
.03.
To better understand the four way interaction, I split the data first split by claim type
and performed separate ANOVAs, predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction,
regulatory focus, and plaintiff evidence separately for retaliation only and discrimination
and retaliation conditions. For participants only making a retaliation decision, there was a
significant three-way interaction between instruction, regulatory focus, and plaintiff
evidence, F (1, 70) = 5.80, p = .02, partial η2 = .08. This interaction was not present for
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participants who decided both discrimination and retaliation claims, F(1, 70) = .35 and p
= .55.
Using only participants who decided a retaliation claim, I next split the data according
to the regulatory focus condition. There was only a significant interaction between
instruction and plaintiff evidence for prevention focused participants, F (1, 36) = 5.16, p
= .03, partial η2 = .12, and not for promotion focused participants, F (1, 36) = 1.19 and p
= .28. Figure 15 shows that respondents do not weigh plaintiff evidence as much under
but-for instructions as under mixed motive instructions. Hayes (2013) process moderation
for participants in the retaliation only condition who were also in the prevention focused
condition showed significant instruction effects for those who believed the plaintiff
evidence was strong, t (1, 36) = 2.39, p = .02, LLCI = .36, ULCI = 4.41, but not under
low, t (1, 36) = -.83, p = .41, and moderate, t (1, 36) = 1.12, p = .27, belief levels. For
participants who believed the plaintiff’s evidence was strong, they were more likely to
find for the plaintiff under mixed motive instructions as compared to but-for instructions
(See Figure 4.4).
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Figure 4.4: Plaintiff Evidence as a Moderator of Instruction on Retaliation Verdict
Certainty for Participants in Retaliation Only and Prevention Conditions.
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Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and strength of evidence. An ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict
certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and plaintiff evidence showed only
a main effect for plaintiff evidence, F (1, 113) = 70.79, p < .001, partial η2 = .38.
Instruction and regulatory focus were not significant, Fs < .82 and ps > .44. A second
ANOVA adding all interactions again resulted in only one significant effect, for plaintiff
evidence, F (1, 108) = 70.85, p < .001, partial η2 = .40. All all other main effects and
interactions were not significant, all Fs < 2.97 and all ps > .09.
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction, regulatory focus manipulation, and
previous employment decisions. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting
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discrimination verdict from instruction, regulatory focus manipulation, and strength of
evidence produced a significant model, , χ2(4) = 76.07, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .85
with main effects for plaintiff evidence, β = 1.60 (SE = .43), Wald = 14.02, p < .001,
LLCI = 2.14, ULCI = 11.44, and a marginally significant effect of defendant evidence, β
= -.61 (SE = .32), Wald = 3.64, p = .06, LLCI = .29, ULCI = 1.02. No other effects were
significant, all ps > .10. A second forced entry binary logistic regression adding all
interactions to the main effect model was also significant overall, χ2(11) = 86.57, p =
.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .89, but without significant main effects or interactions, all ps >
.07. No further analyses were needed.
Predicting discrimination verdict by three-level instruction. regulatory focus
manipulation, and strength of evidence. A forced entry binary logistic regression
predicting discrimination verdict from the three-level instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and strength of evidence was significant overall, χ2(5) = 108.61 p = .001,
Nagelkerke R2 = .80. There were main effects of plaintiff evidence, β = 1.44 (SE = .29),
Wald = 24.25, p < .001, LLCI = 2.37, ULCI = 7.44, and defendant evidence, β = -.46
(SE = .23), Wald = 4.08, p = .04, LLCI = .40, ULCI = 1.00. Instruction and regulatory
focus were not significant, ps > .23. A second binary logistic adding all interactions to
the first model produced a significant model, χ2(17) = 127.17, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 =
.88, but there were no main effects or interactions, all ps > .80.
Previous employment decisions as a moderator.
Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus
manipulation, and previous employment decisions. A forced entry binary logistic
regression predicting retaliation verdict from instruction, claim type, regulatory focus
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manipulation, and whether participants had ever made previous employment decisions
failed to produce a significant overall model, χ2(4) =4.76, p = .31, Nagelkerke R2 = .04
and there were no main effects, all ps > .12. The same model adding all interactions again
failed to produce a significant model, χ2(15) =17.62, p = .28, Nagelkerke R2 = .14. There
was, however, a significant main effect of claim type, β = -4.89 (SE = 2.32), Wald =
4.45, p = 03, LLCI = .00, ULCI = .71, in which participants only deciding a retaliation
claim were more likely to find for the plaintiff as compared to participants deciding both
a discrimination and retaliation claim. There was also a significant two-way interaction
between claim type and regulatory focus, β = 8.14 (SE = 3.27), Wald = 6.19, p = .01,
LLCI = 5.63, ULCI = 2092942.13, a significant two-way interaction between claim type
and previous employment decision, β = 2.79 (SE = 1.42), Wald = 3.86, p = .049, LLCI =
1.01, ULCI = 264.59, and a significant three-way interaction between claim type,
regulatory focus, and previous employment decisions, β = -4.79 (SE = 1.98), Wald =
585, p = .02, LLCI = .00, ULCI = .40. All other main effects and interactions were not
significant, all ps > 12.
To better explore the significant three-way interaction between regulatory focus,
claim type, and previous employment decisions, which subsumes the significant two-way
effects, I divided the sample based on claim type. For participants only deciding a
retaliation claim, moderation analyses found that the effect of regulatory focus on
retaliation verdict was not significant for either participants with no previous experience,
z = -.36, p = .72, LLCI = -1.68, ULCI = 1.16, or participants with previous experience, z
= .93, p = .35, LLCI = -.64, ULCI = 1.81. However, when looking at participants who
had to decide both a discrimination and retaliation claim, there was a regulatory focus
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effect on retaliation verdict for participants who had no experience, z = 1.92, p = .05,
LLCI = -.03, ULCI = 2.84, but not for participants who had experience, z = -1.45, p = .14,
LLCI = -2.06, ULCI = .31. Specifically, as seen in Figure 16, prevention focused
participants with no previous employment decision experience were more likely to find
for the plaintiff as compared to promotion focused participants with no previous
experience. Additionally, for prevention focused individuals, the difference between
participants with and without previous experience is significant β = 2.79 (SE = 1.42),
Wald = 3.86, p = .049, LLCI = 1.01, ULCI = 264.59, suggesting that prevention focused
participants with a background in employment decisions were less willing to risk finding
for the defendant than those without previous experience. Since this is for a retaliation
verdict, it is possible that those with previous experience were more aware of the
differences between the claims and may even have had experience in knowing how
employers can misuse illegal factors in employment decisions. Promotion focused jurors
do not show a difference in experience, β = -1.99, p = .14.
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Figure 4.5: Previous Employment Decision Experience as a Moderator for
Regulatory Focus Predicting Retaliation Verdict for Discrimination and Retaliation
Condition.
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Predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and previous employment decisions. A forced entry binary logistic
regression predicting retaliation verdict from the three-level instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and whether participants had ever made previous employment decisions
failed to produce a significant overall model, χ2(4) =2.20, p = .70, Nagelkerke R2 = .02
or any predictor effects, all ps > .31. A second forced entry binary logistic regression
adding all the interactions to the main effect model was also not significant, χ2(11)
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=12.29, p = .34, Nagelkerke R2 = .13, and there were no significant main effects or
interactions, all ps > .08.
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus
manipulation, and employment decision. An one-way ANOVA examined the role of
instruction, claim type, regulatory focus, and previous employment decisions (as a
covariate) on retaliation verdict certainty yielding only a n effect of instruction, F (1, 148)
= 4.80, p = .03, partial η2 = .03, but no other main effects or interactions significant, all
Fs < .1.37 and all ps > .24. The same ANOVA model adding all the interactions resulted
in no significant main effects, all Fs < 2.80 and all ps > .10, but there was a significant
two-way interaction between claim and regulatory focus, F (1, 141) = 9.37, p = .003,
partial η2 = .06, and a significant three-way interaction between claim, regulatory focus,
and previous employment decision experience, F (1, 141) = 10.27, p = .002, partial η2 =
.07. No other interactions were significant, all Fs < 2.71 and all ps > .10
After splitting the data on claim type, I performed moderation analyses on the twoway interaction between regulatory focus and previous employment decision experience
to find regulatory focus effects for respondents with no previous experience deciding
only on the retaliation claim, t (1, 74) = -1.13, p = .26, LLCI = -2.61, ULCI = .72, but not
for those with previous experience, t (1, 74) = 1.53, p = .13, LLCI = -.35, ULCI = 2.73.
For participants who had to decide both a discrimination and retaliation claim and had no
previous experience regulatory focus produced a marginal effect, t (1, 75) = 1.96, p = .05,
LLCI = -.03, ULCI = 4.23, while the effect was not significant for those with previous
employment experience, t (1, 75) = -1.23 , p = .22, LLCI = -2.88, ULCI = .69.
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As seen in Figure 4.6, the pattern of the moderation is the same as it was for
retaliation verdict, in that those with no previous employment decision experience are
more certain in their verdict for the defendant under prevention focus than those in
promotion focus. For prevention focused participants, the difference between those with
and without experience is significant, F (2, 70) = 9.23, p = .003, partial η2 = .12. That is,
for prevention focused jurors, those who have previous employment decision experience
are more certain in finding for the plaintiff, while those without previous experience are
more certain in finding for the defendant, but only when they have to decide two claims,
as opposed to one. Promotion focused jurors did not significantly differ based on
previous experience, F (1, 71) = 1.96, p = .17, partial η2 = .03.
Figure 4.6: Previous Employment Decision Experience as a Moderator for
Regulatory Focus Predicting Retaliation Verdict Certainty for Discrimination and
Retaliation Condition.
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Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and previous employment decisions. An one-way ANOVA testing the role
of instruction, claim type, regulatory focus, and previous employment decisions (as a
covariate) on retaliation verdict certainty failed to produce any significant effects, all Fs
< .62 and all ps > .54. A second ANOVA using the same model but adding all the
interactions, again produced no significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 2.91 and
all ps > .09.
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction, regulatory focus
manipulation, and employment decision. An ANOVA on discrimination verdict certainty
with instruction and regulatory focus serving as factors and experience with previous
employment decisions as a covariate resulted in only a marginally significant effect of
instruction, F (1, 73) = 3.57, p = .06, partial η2 = .05. No other main effects were
significant (all Fs < .50 and all ps > .48). A second ANOVA adding the interactions
between the main effects produced no significant effects, all Fs < .2.70 and all ps > .10.
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction, regulatory focus manipulation, and
previous employment decisions. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting
discrimination verdict from instruction, regulatory focus manipulation, and whether
participants had ever made previous employment decisions produced a significant model
, χ2(3) = 10.54 p = .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .17. There was a main effect of instruction, β =
1.09 (SE = .49), Wald = 4.93, p = .03, LLCI = 1.14, ULCI = 7.78, but regulatory focus
and previous employment decisions were not significant, ps > .07. A second forced entry
binary logistic regression using the same model adding the interactions was significant, ,
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χ2(7) = 14.51, p = .04, Nagelkerke R2 = .23, but no significant main effects or interactions
resulted, all ps > .21.
Predicting discrimination verdict by three-level instruction. regulatory focus
manipulation, and previous employment decisions. A forced entry binary logistic
regression predicting discrimination verdict from the three-level instruction, regulatory
focus manipulation, and whether participants had ever made previous employment
decisions produced an overall significant model, χ2(4) = 9.84 p = .04, Nagelkerke R2 =
.12 but without significant predictor effects, all ps > .07. A second binary logistic
regression adding all the interactions produced a non-significant model, χ2(11) = 17.83, p
= .09, Nagelkerke R2 = .19, without any significant main effects or interactions, all ps >
.07.
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory
focus manipulation, and previous employment decisions. An ANOVA predicting
discrimination verdict certainty with three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and
previous employment decisions as a covariate failed to find any significant effects, all Fs
< 1.88 and all ps > .16. A second one-way ANOVA adding the interactions from the first
model also failed to produce significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 2.37 and all
ps > .10.
Study 2 Discussion
Study 2 sought to examine the same hypotheses as Study 1 with the addition of
Hypothesis 1b, which states there will be weaker instruction effects due to the fact that
the retaliatory event was a denial of promotion as compared to the firing in the first study.
The hypotheses were partially supported.
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Results supported Hypothesis 1, participants using but-for instruction reached
more pro-defendant verdicts than participants using mixed motive instructions, for
retaliation verdict certainty, discrimination verdict, and discrimination verdict certainty
but not for retaliation verdict. That is, participants using but-for instruction, as compared
to mixed motive were more likely to find for the defendant for the discrimination claim
and were also more certain of a verdict for the defendant for retaliation verdict certainty
and discrimination verdict certainty.
Moderation analyses exploring these results showed that type of causality
instruction moderated the effect of the defendant’s use of the rehiring policy to make
employment decisions on retaliation verdict. Participants using but-for instructions
showed no effect of whether they believed the defendant was motivated by the rehiring
policy, while participants using mixed motive instructions were influenced by the
rehiring policy motivation. Specifically, if participants strongly believed the defendant
relied on its rehiring policy (a legitimate reason for its actions) then they were more
likely to find for the defendant, whereas if they did not believe the defendant used the
rehiring policy they were more likely to find for the plaintiff. This is in-line with how
participants should have used the instructions, namely, if they believe the defendant used
a legitimate reason under but-for instructions, then they should find for the defendant.
Under mixed motive instructions the law allows participants to find for the plaintiff even
if there is a legitimate reason that used as well as an illegitimate reason. This same
moderation shaped participants judgments when they determined only a retaliation claim,
as compared to those determining both discrimination and retaliation claims. The
moderation effects showed the same pattern such that rehiring policy did not influence
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decisions under but-for instructions but did influence decisions under mixed motive
instructions. Additionally, perceived strength of plaintiff evidence moderated the
relationship between instruction and retaliation verdict certainty. Participants using mixed
motive instructions were more certain of their verdicts for the plaintiff if they believed
the plaintiff had strong evidence, as opposed to weak evidence. There was no difference
in retaliation verdict certainty for participants using but-for instructions regardless of the
strength of the plaintiff’s evidence.
Hypothesis 1a predicted that participants using mixed motive instructions for a
discrimination claim and but-for instructions for a retaliation claim would more closely
follow the but-for instructions for both claims. None of the results of the full model
analyses from Phase 1 or Phase 2 supported this hypothesis. There was only one
significant effect involving the three-level instruction on discrimination verdict in which
participants using only but-for instructions rendered verdicts for the defendant
significantly more than participants using mixed motive instructions. There was,
however, no difference between the two-instruction condition as compared to either the
but-for only or mixed motive only instruction conditions.
Unfortunately Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, concerning chronic regulatory
focus and regulatory fit, were untested because the chronic regulatory focus measure,
again (as in Study 1) could not differentiate participants as either prevention or promotion
focused. I take this failure up in greater detail in the general discussion.
Hypothesis 4, participants using but-for instructions would show the strongest
effects of the regulatory focus manipulation, failed to gain support as there were no
interactions between regulatory focus and instruction. However, there were some effects
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of manipulated regulatory focus that are in line with that theory. There was a main effect
of regulatory focus on discrimination verdicts such that prevention focused participants
were more likely to find for the plaintiff than promotion focused jurors. Moderation
analyses also found that previous employment decision experience moderated the
relationship of regulatory focus on retaliation verdict for participants who had to decide
both a discrimination and retaliation claim. For participants who had no previous
experience making such decisions (including firing or promoting employees), they were
more likely to find for the defendant when they were prevention focused, while
participants who were promotion focused were more likely to find for the plaintiff when
they had no experience. Prevention focused participants additionally showed significant
effects for between previous employment decision experience so that if they had previous
experience they were more likely to find for the plaintiff than if they did not have that
experience. This suggests that prevention focused individuals who understand the
decision making process are less willing to risk a defendant verdict against retaliation,
perhaps because they have experienced other employers bringing illegal factors into
employment decisions. The same pattern of moderation occurred under retaliation verdict
certainty, such that no previous experience led to more pro-defendant certainty under
prevention and more pro-plaintiff certainty under mixed motive instructions but only in
the two-claim condition.
Study 3 will expand this research to examine the role that legal standard and
regulatory focus influence employment decisions of firing and promoting.
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Chapter 5: Study 3
Study 3: Regulatory Focus, Causality and Employment Decisions
The third study moves out of the courtroom and examines the interactive
influence of type of legal causality and the role of regulatory focus on employer decisions
to promote or fire an employee. No research has examined when and why employer
retaliation occurs. Regulatory focus offers a clear motivational theory of why employers
choose to retaliate despite being aware that this action is illegal. The correct decision
outcome in this study is to promote the best employee or to fire the worst one. The
question of interest is, “What happens when the most qualified employee brings a claim
of discrimination against the company?”
Measures and Materials.
Chronic Regulatory Focus. Participants first completed the same measure of
regulatory focus as in studies 1 and 2. Ideal rating M = 2.56, SD = .69; Ought rating M =
2.95, SD = .68; Ideal reaction time M = 82.15, SD = 51.10; Ought reaction time M =
84.00, SD = 52.71 (Appendix A).
Employment Decision Frame. Participants learned that their company wanted to
either dismiss or promote someone and that their role was to review the resumes and
recommend whom to dismiss/promote. The promotion framed decision informed
participants that it was their job to promote (fire) the best (worst) employee in a way that
satisfies them because it means they completed their job and achieved the best possible
outcome for the hospital that employs them. The prevention framed decision informed
the participants that it was their job to avoid the dissatisfaction that comes from knowing
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they improperly completed their job and promoted (fired) the wrong employee leading to
a subpar outcome for the hospital that employs them (Appendix N).
Resumes. Participants read one of two sets (control v. discrimination complaint)
of three resumes and accompanying background information on the candidates. For those
in the control condition, none of the candidates complained of discrimination, while for
those in the experimental condition, one of the candidate resumes always contained a
note explaining that he had recently filed a claim against a supervisor alleging
discrimination based on national origin. A Latin square design was used to ensure that the
complainer appeared in each position within the packet an equal number of times.
Additionally, the complainant displayed stronger work evaluations and appeared to be an
excellent employee (Appendix O).
Causal Model manipulation. After reading the resumes, participants received a
policy guide from the University Medical Center concerning employment decisions. The
policy guide explained how the hospital makes promotion decisions and how it makes
dismissal decisions. With regard to employment decisions, the policy guide conveyed the
current law prohibiting retaliation. It varied whether or not the current law defined
causality in retaliation using a but-for model (prohibiting retaliation only if the
discrimination complaint is the determinative factor for an adverse action) or mixed
motive framework (prohibiting retaliation even if the decision maker considers the
discrimination complaint along with other legitimate reasons in making a decision). The
policy page informed the participants that all employment decisions should take into
consideration the Human Resource Department policies. The policy guide also discussed
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affirmative action initiatives, workforce reductions, and promotion decisions (See
Appendix P).
Decision Condition and Measure. Participants picked one of the three employees
they would recommend for promotion or one of the three for dismissal depending upon
the decision condition. Participants also rated their confidence in their decision on an 9point scale ranging from 1 (not at all certain) to 9 (very certain). Additionally,
participants ranked the three applicants in the order in which they would have
promoted/dismissed each one. Finally, participants also completed measures assessing
which factors they took into consideration when making their decision. These included:
application qualifications (M = 9.02, SD = 2.45), applicant education (M = 2.76, SD =
2.76), unfavorable qualities of the applicant (e.g. the complaint v. other applicants
showing up late) (M = 10.22, SD = 2.15) , and favorable qualities of the applicant (M =
9.89, SD = 1.99) (Appendix Q).
Causality Manipulation Check. Two questions assessed whether participants
understood the EEOC/Title VII guidelines concerning retaliation in the workplace based
on type of causality. These questions were: 1) “Retaliation occurs only if the
discrimination complaint was the determinative factor in an adverse decision.”….(true,
false, note specified) (but for) and 2) “Retaliation occurs even if the discrimination
complaint played only a role in the adverse decision along with other legitimate
factors…” (true, false, not specified). (mixed motive) (Appendix R).
Demographics. Demographic questions were the same as those in Study 1 and
Study 2 (Appendix H).
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Research Design and Procedure. Study 3 is a 2 (Framing manipulation:
promotion v. prevention) x 2 (Resumes: control v. complained of discrimination) x 2
(Employment decision: promote v. fire) x 2 (Retaliation Causality: but-for v. mixed
motive) between subjects design with chronic prevention and promotion as continuous
variables. Participants were 316 community members recruited from Mechanical Turk.
All measures were programed in Qualtrics.
In line with studies 1 and 2, the program directed the Mechanical Turk
participants to the survey and informed them that they needed to complete the study
within 3 days of accepting the invitation and that they needed to complete the work in
one sitting. Participants read and agreed to the informed consent and then completed the
chronic regulatory focus measure. Next they reviewed the employment decision task with
the three resumes. After reading the resumes, participants read the employment decision
guidelines and then rated what factors they took into consideration when deciding who to
promote and who to let go. Participants then recommended which employee to promote
(let go). Next, they completed the manipulation checks and demographic questionnaire.
Finally, participants read a debriefing statement, a thank you statement for donating their
time, and received $1 for completing the survey.
Participants. As with studies 1 and 2, only participants who were 18 or older and
a U.S. citizen were able to see the survey on Mechanical Turk. Seventeen of the 332
community member participants showed response times that were 2 or more standard
deviations above or below the mean response time. I dropped these participants, as well
as another who provided no employment decision (the primary dependent variable), and
one more who had not completed the regulatory focus measure. Of the final 316
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participants, 54.3% were women, the mean age of the sample was 35.38, and 77.9%
were employed at least part-time. The ethnic breakdown of the participants was
representative of the Mturk community with 81% European American, 6.6% African
American, 4.4% Asian American, 3.5% Hispanic, 1.9% Native American, 1.3% Latino/a,
1.6% Other, and .3% Middle Eastern. Fifty seven percent of participants had at least a
college degree, 33.2% had some college, 9.2% had a high school diploma, and .6% had
less than a high school diploma. Lastly, 52.2% of participants indicated that they had
been in an employment position in which they made hiring or firing decisions.
Results
The results of Study 3 will appear in 3 phases. Phase 1 includes preliminary
analyses of the experimental task testing overall differences in decisions about and
rankings of candidates based on main effects of non-manipulated variables. Phase 2
displays results of the full model analyses on the dependent variables using the 2
(Framing manipulation: promotion v. prevention) x 2 (Resumes: control v. complained
of discrimination) x 2 (Employment decision: promote v. fire) x 2 (Retaliation causality:
but-for v. mixed motive) between subjects design. Finally, Phase 3 tests for moderation
or mediation based on viable moderators and mediators from Phase 1 analyses.
Dependent variables. The three dependent variables for study 3 are the decision,
the certainty of their decision, and how they ranked the target resume for the decision. A
dichotomous decision variable was created in which dismissal or failure to promote the
target resume was 0 and not dismissing or promotion of the target resume was 1. This
factor differentiates between a retaliatory action and a non-retaliatory action. One
hundred and seventy participants (53.8%) chose the retaliatory action while 146 (46.2%)
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of participants chose the non-retaliatory action. The second dependent variable ranges
from -8 (very certain in dismissing/not promoting) to 8 (very certain of not
dismissing/promoting) with a middle value of 0 (uncertain of decision) (M = .35, SD =
5.40). Finally, the third dependent variable, the rank of the target resume, simply looks at
whether the target resume was ranked most likely for the decision (1; N = 107), second
most likely (2; N = 119), or least likely (3; N = 90) in terms of a favorable decision . I
transformed this variable so that a target rated last for being dismissed and a target rated
first for being promoted are both scored 1 because they are both the most favorable
outcome. Similarly a target that rated first for being dismissed and a target last for being
promoted are both 3 because they are both the least favorable outcome. Middle rankings
were scored 2.
Phase 1: Preliminary Analyses of Decision and Rank of Candidates
Manipulation checks. As with studies 1 and 2, an index of accuracy in
understanding the instructions was created and coded as 1 for correctly answering the
manipulation checks and 0 for incorrectly answering the manipulation checks. Accuracy
was slightly lower in this study with only 66.5% of participants correctly answering the
manipulation check. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting accuracy from
instruction condition produced a significant model, χ2(1) = 6.49, p = .01, Nagelkerke R2 =
.03 with instruction significantly predicting accuracy, β = -.61 (SE = .24), Wald = 6.39, p
= .01, LLCI = .34, ULCI = .87. Specifically, participants who received the but-for
instructions in the policy manual were more accurate in their understanding of the
instructions than those who received mixed motive instructions (See Table 5.1).
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Table 5.1: Instruction Accuracy by Instruction Condition

Inaccurate

Accurate

Total

N

%

N

%

N

%

But-for

42

26.8

115

73.2

157

100

Mixed Motive

64

40.3

95

59.7

159

100

Total

106

33.5

210

66.5

316

100

A force entry binary logistic regression testing the influence of accuracy on the
decision dependent variable was not significant, χ2(1) = 2.07, p = .15, Nagelkerke R2 =
.01 and accuracy was not a significant predictor of decision, β = .34 (SE = .24), Wald =
2.07, p = .15, LLCI = .88, ULCI = 2.25. A one-way ANOVA showed that accuracy did
not predict decision certainty, F(1, 314) = 3.21, p = .08, partial η2 = .01. Lastly, a oneway ANOVA showed that accuracy did not predict participants ranking of the resumes,
F(1, 314) = .90, p = .34, partial η2 = .003.
Motivational analyses. A forced entry binary logistic regression assessed which
motivational factors (application qualifications, application education, favorable qualities
of applicant, and unfavorable qualities of application) were influential in decision
making, The model was marginally significant, χ2(4) = 9.37, p = .052, Nagelkerke R2 =
.04, with only one significant factor, the participants who were not motivated by the
applicants qualifications, β = -.21 (SE = .08), Wald = 7.72, p = .01, LLCI = .70, ULCI =
.9 were less likely to dismiss or not promote the target resume. The applicant’s education,
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β = .09, p = .17, favorable qualities, β = .02, p = .74, and unfavorable qualities, β = .04,
p = .50, did not significantly influence decisions.
A one-way ANOVA tested the influence of motivating factors on decision
certainty. Only the applicant’s qualifications predicted certainty, F(1, 270) = 2.13, p =
.02, partial η2 = .08, in that participants who were more motivated by the applicant’s
qualifications were more certain in an unfavorable decision towards the target resume
(either more certain in firing or more certain in not promoting). No other motivating
factors were significant, all Fs < .82 and all ps > .62. A second one-way ANOVA testing
applicant rank found that none of the motivating factors significantly predicted rank, all
Fs < 1.36 and all ps > .20.
Trait regulatory focus analyses. Trait regulatory focus again failed to produce
analyzable data due to a failure of the regulatory focus measure to differentiate between
promotion and prevention focused individuals. Specifically, the reaction times did not
correlate with the ratings of the traits, even after several transformations to correct for
deviations for normality. As in the previous studies, individuals who rated themselves
high in ideal/promotion traits also significantly rated themselves high in ought/prevention
traits (Pearson r = .32, p = .001). This suggests that the measure was not sensitive enough
to parse out participants’ trait regulatory focus.
Phase 2: Full Model Analyses.
Predicting decision by instruction, regulatory focus, complaint type, and
decision type. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting decision to not dismiss
(promote) the target candidate by instruction ( 0 = but-for, 1 = mixed motive), decision
type (0 = dismiss, 1 = promote), regulatory focus (0= prevention, 1 = promotion), and
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complaint (0 = no complaint, 1 = complaint) produced an overall significant model, χ2(4)
= 43.48, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .17, with only the decision condition significantly
predicting the final decision, β = -1.53 (SE = .24), Wald = 39.54, p < .001, LLCI = .13,
ULCI = .35. Participants in the dismissal condition were less likely to make an
unfavorable decision towards the target resume as compared to participants in the
promotion condition. Specifically, participants in the dismissal condition were less likely
to dismiss the target resume, while participants in the promotion condition were more
likely to not promote the target resume (See Table 5.2). Instruction, β = .18, p = .45,
regulatory focus, β = .10, p = .68, and complaint condition, β = -.02, p = .93, did not
significantly influence decisions.
Table 5.2: Decision Condition by Decision

Dismiss Target/Not

Not Dismiss

Promote Target

Target/Promote Target

Total

N

%

N

%

N

%

Dismissal
Condition

43

27.7

112

72.3

155

100

Promotion
Condition

103

64

58

36

161

100

Total

146

46.2

170

53.8

316

100

A second forced entry binary logistic regression adding all the interactions
between the four manipulated variables to the first model was not significant, χ2(14) =
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49.81, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .19, again with only decision condition predicting
employment decision, β = -2.10 (SE = .72), Wald = 8.51, p = .004, LLCI = .03, ULCI =
.50. No other main effects or interactions were significant, all ps > .07.
Predicting decision certainty by instruction, decision condition, regulatory
focus, and complaint condition. An ANOVA predicting decision certainty by
instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus, and complaint condition found that only
decision condition significantly predicted the employment decision, F(1, 300) = 43.53, p
< .001, partial η2 = .13. Participants who made a dismissal decision were more certain of
their favorable decision to not dismiss the target while participants in the promotion
condition were more certain of their unfavorable decision to not promote the target (See
Figure 5.1). No other main effects or interactions were significant, all Fs < 2.06 and all ps
> .15.
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Figure 5.1: Decision Condition on Decision Certainty
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Predicting resume rank by instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus,
and complaint condition. An ANOVA predicting rank of target by instruction, decision
condition, regulatory focus, and complaint condition found no significant main effects or
interactions, all Fs < 2.09 and all ps > .15.
Phase 4: Moderation Analyses
Based on Phase 1 results, I tested employee qualifications and previous
employment decision experience as a potential moderators for decision and decision
certainty.
Predicting decision by instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus
manipulation, complainant condition, and applicant qualification motivation. A forced
entry binary logistic regression predicting decision from instruction, decision condition,
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regulatory focus, complaint condition, and the applicant’s qualifications as a motivating
factor produced a significant model, χ2(5) = 43.91, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .17.with
only decision condition as a significant predictor β = -1.46 (SE = .25), Wald = 33.90, p =
.001, LLCI = .14, ULCI = .38. Instruction (β = .17, p = .48), regulatory focus (β = .08, p
= .74), complaint condition (β = -.02, p = .92), and applicant qualification (β = -.05, p =
.30) were not significant. A second forced entry binary added the interactions and
resulted in a significant overall model, χ2(26) = 58.18, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .22.
The main effect of decision dropped out (β = -1.55, p = .51) but there was a marginally
significant effect of instruction, β = -2.97 (SE = .1.59), Wald = 3.47, p = .06, LLCI =
.002, ULCI = 1.17. Specifically, participants using but-for instructions were more likely
to make favorable decisions towards the target applicant as compared to participants
using mixed motive instructions. No further moderation analyses were necessary.
Predicting decision certainty by instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus
manipulation, complainant condition, and applicant qualification motivation. An
ANOVA predicting decision certainty with instruction, decision condition, regulatory
focus, complaint condition, and applicant qualifications as a covariate tested the potential
moderating role of applicant qualifications on decision certainty yielded only a main
effect of decision condition, F (1, 298) = 36.50, p < .001, partial η2 = .12. Participants
making a dismissal were more certain in their decision not to dismiss the target applicant
as compared to those considering a promotion who were more certain in their decision
not to promote the target applicant. All other main effects and interactions were not
significant, all Fs <2.23 and all ps > .14.
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A second ANOVA, that repeated this analysis adding in all the interactions of the
main effects produced no significant main effects, two-way interactions, or three-way
interactions, all Fs <2.46 and all ps > .12. There was a significant four-way interaction
between instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus, and complaint condition, F(1,
283) = 6.21, p = .013, partial η2 = .02, and a significant five-way interaction between
instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus, complaint condition, and applicant
qualifications, F(1, 283) = 5.01, p = .03, partial η2 = .02.
To further explore the significant five way interaction, I split the data file by
instruction and conducted an ANOVA on decision certainty using decision condition,
regulatory focus, complaint decision, and applicant qualifications as factors. For
participants that received mixed motive instructions there were no significant effects, all
Fs < 3.15 and all ps > .08. Participants using but-for instructions showed a significant
three-way interaction between regulatory focus, decision condition, and complaint
condition, F(1, 141) = 6.41, p = .012, partial η2 = .04, and a significant four-way
interaction between regulatory focus, decision condition, complaint condition, and
applicant qualification, F(1, 141) = 5.56, p = .02, partial η2 = .04. Only participants who
received but-for instructions were kept in analyses going forward.
Next, an ANOVA predicting decision certainty by regulatory focus, complaint
condition, and applicant qualifications with participants considering a dismissal decision
resulted in no significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 2.44 and all ps > .12.
However, for participants making a promotion decision this model produced had a
significant two-way interaction of regulatory focus and complaint condition, F(1, 73) =
3.98, p = .05, partial η2 = .05, and a marginally significant three-way interaction between
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regulatory focus, complaint condition, and applicant qualifications, F(1, 73) = 3.76, p =
.056, partial η2 = .05. Only participants who received but-for instructions and made
promotion decisions were kept in the analyses going forward.
I once again split the remaining data set, this time by regulatory focus and found no
effects for promotion focused participants, all Fs < .55 and all ps > .46, but for prevention
focused participants I found a significant main effect of complaint condition, F(1, 37) =
4.52, p = .04, partial η2 = .11 , and a significant two-way interaction for complaint
condition by applicant qualifications, F(1, 37) = 4.28, p = .046, partial η2 = .10.
Next I conducted moderation analyses using Hayes’ process program (2013) with
participants who received but-for instructions, considered a promotion decision, and who
were prevention focused. Following the Johnson-Neyman Technique there was
moderation was found at low levels of application qualification motivation, t (1, 37) = 2.11, p = .04, LLCI = -17.04, ULCI = -.33, but not at moderate, t (1, 37) = -.49, p = .62,
LLCI = -3.83, ULCI = 2.32, or high levels of application qualification motivation, t
(1,37) = .26, p = .26, LLCI = -1.94, ULCI = 6.84. Figure 5.2 shows that for participants
in the control condition, applicant qualification did influence decision certainty in that
those who were less motivated by applicant qualification were more certain in their
decision to promote the target applicant than those in the complaint condition. It is
interesting that all participants were certain of not promoting the target applicant in the
discrimination complaint condition – an action that would be considered retaliation as the
target applicant did complain about discrimination.
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Figure 5.2: Applicant Qualification as a Moderator for Complaint Condition on
Decision Certainty for Participants using But-For Instructions, Making a Promotion
Decision, and Prevention focused.

Certainty in Promoting Target Applicant

3
2
1
0
Control
-1
-2

Discrimination
Complaint

High Applicant
Qualifications
Moderate Applicant
Qualifications
Low Applicant
Qualifications

-3
-4
-5

Predicting decision by instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus
manipulation, complainant condition, and previous employment decisions. a forced
entry binary logistic regression predicting decision by instruction, decision condition,
regulatory focus, complaint condition, and previous decisions assed potential moderating
role of having made previous employment decisions about hiring and firing. The model
was significant, χ2(5) = 44.28, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .17 but produced only a main
effect of decision condition, β = -1.52 (SE = .24), Wald = 38.52, p < .001, LLCI = .14,
ULCI = .35, and no other effects, all ps > .37. A second forced entry binary logistic
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regression that added in all the interactions again produced a significant model, χ2(31) =
73.02, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .28, but one without any significant main effects or
interactions, all ps > .22. No additional moderation analyses were necessary.
Predicting decision certainty by instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus
manipulation, complainant condition, and previous employment decisions. A one-way
ANOVA predicting decision certainty by instruction, decision condition, regulatory
focus, complaint condition, and previous employment decisions as a covariate tested a
main effects model and resulted in a main effect of decision condition, F(1, 299) =42.35,
p = .001, partial η2 = .12, but no other main effects or interactions were significant, all Fs
< 1.99 and all ps > .16.
A second one-way ANOVA adding all interactions to the first model again produced
a significant effect of decision condition, F(1, 284) =5.56, p = .02, partial η2 = .02, as
well as a significant effect of regulatory focus, F(1, 284) =4.71, p = .03, partial η2 = .02.
With regard to regulatory focus, promotion focused individuals were more certain in their
favorable decisions towards the target applicant than prevention focused individuals.
There were also two significant two-way interactions, the first between regulatory focus
and previous employment decision experience, F(1, 284) =4.69, p = .03, partial η2 = .02,
and the second between instruction and regulatory focus, F(1, 284) =5.78, p = .02, partial
η2 = .02. There was also a marginally significant two-way interaction between decision
condition and regulatory focus, F(1, 284) =3.54, p = .06, partial η2 = .01. Finally, there
was a significant three way interaction between instruction, regulatory focus, and
previous employment decision experience, F(1, 284) = 3.91, p = .049, partial η2 = .01.
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Since instruction type moderated the two-way interaction between regulatory
focus and previous employment decision experience, I split the data into promotion and
prevention focused participants and performed moderation analyses to interpret the threeway interaction. The effect of employment decision experience was not significant for
prevention focused participants, t (1. 152.) = .21, p = .83, LLCI =-3.06, ULCI = 3.79 but
it was for promotion focused participants, t (1, 156) = 2.38, p = .02, LLCI = .45, ULCI =
4.87, but not for those with previous experience, t (1, 156) = -1.08, p = .28, LLCI = 3.78, ULCI = 1.11 (See Figure 5.3).
Figure 5.3: Previous Employment Decision Experience as a Moderator for
Instruction on Decision Certainty for Promotion Focused Condition.
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Predicting rank of target resume by instruction, decision condition, regulatory
focus manipulation, complainant condition, and previous employment decisions. First
an ANOVA predicting rank of target candidate by instruction, decision condition,
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regulatory focus, complaint condition, and previous employment decisions as a covariate
failed to produce any significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 1.99 and all ps >
.16. A second ANOVA, repeating the first model but adding all the interactions
produced a regulatory focus main effect, F(1, 284) = 16.02, p = .001, partial η2 = .05, in
which promotion focused participants ranked the target applicant more favorably (M =
1.93, SD = .06) than prevention focused participants (M = 1.99, SD = .06). There were no
other main effects, all Fs < 1.05 and all ps > .16. Significant two-way interactions
emerged between decision condition and complaint decision, F(1, 284) = 6.36, p = .01,
partial η2 = .02, and between decision condition and regulatory focus, F(1, 284) = 6.02, p
= .02, partial η2 = .02. In addition two three way interactions with previous employment
decisions emerged, specifically a decision condition x complaint decision x employment
decision experience interaction, F(1, 284) = 4.79, p = .03, partial η2 = .02, and an
interaction between decision condition, regulatory focus, and previous employment
decision experience, F(1, 284) = 4.56, p = .03, partial η2 = .02.
Moderation analyses to interpret the three-way interaction between complaint
condition, decision condition, and previous employment decision experience split the file
on complaint condition. For participants with no previous employment decision
experience in the control condition (none of the resumes mentioned a discrimination
complaint) there was significant effect of decision condition on rank of target applicant , t
(1, 150) = 2.23, p = .03, LLCI = 05, ULCI = .78, but not for those with previous
experience, t (1, 150) = -.35, p = .73, LLCI = -.41, ULCI = .29. Participants with no
previous employment decision experience ranked the target applicant more favorably in
the promotion decision condition as compared to the dismissal decision condition (See
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Figure 5.4). There was no moderation for participants in the complaint condition, t (1,
158) = 1.08, p = .28, LLCI = -.22, ULCI = .76.
Figure 5.4: Previous Employment Decision Experience as a Moderator for Decision
Condition on Applicant Rank for Control Participants.
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I next conducted moderation analyses to examine the three-way interaction
between decision condition, regulatory focus, and previous employment decision
experience by splitting the sample into those who considered dismissing an employee and
for those considering promoting an employee. For participants deciding whether to
dismiss an employee, previous employment decision experience did not moderate the
relationship between regulatory focus and applicant rank, t (1, 151) = 1.46, p = .14, LLCI
= -.13, ULCI = .86. Participants making promotion decisions who had previous
experience did show significant effects for regulatory focus, t (1, 157) = -3.71, p = .001,
LLCI = -.99, ULCI = -.30, as did those without previous experience, t (1, 157) = 2.42, p =
.02, LLCI = .07, ULCI = .73. Participants who have no previous experience in
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employment decisions ranked the target applicant less favorably if they were prevention
focused as compared to those who were promotion focused (See Figure 5.5). Participants
with previous employment decision experience showed the opposite pattern, ranking the
target applicant more favorably if they were in the prevention focused as compared to
promotion focused condition.
Figure 5.5: Previous Employment Decision Experience as a Moderator for
Regulatory Focus on Applicant Rank for Promotion Decision Condition.
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Study 3 Discussion
Study 3 examined how instructions and regulatory focus would influence
simulated employment decisions predicated on the different types of instruction
conditions. Unfortunately, the data failed to support the hypotheses, which anticipated
main effects and interactions between instruction, regulatory focus, the employment
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decision (dismiss v. promote) and the presence of a discrimination complaint (control v.
complaint) on the simulated decisions.
Hypothesis 1c posited that participants reacting to but-for instructions would be
more likely to retaliate than participants responding to mixed motive instructions. There
were no main effects of instruction on any of the dependent variables. The four-way
interaction between instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus, and complaint
moderated the one instruction effect that did emerge. Specifically, for prevention focused
participants who used but-for instructions while determining a promotion decisions, if
they were not motivated by applicant qualification they were more certain in making an
unfavorable decision towards the target applicant if the applicant had complained as
compared to if they had not complained. This suggests that even though the actual
decision was not significant, the certainty of the decision bordered on retaliation.
Hypothesis 3 stated that promotion focused participants would be more likely to
retaliate than prevention focused jurors because of the tendency chronically promotion
focus to facilitate the acceptance of risk in order to achieve a goal. The results did not
support this hypothesis. Moderation analyses did show that promotion focused
participants who had previous employment decision experience were more certain in
making unfavorable decisions for the target applicant, but this never occurred solely for
the target applicant who had complained of discrimination. Therefore, no retaliation was
observed.
Hypothesis 3a, based on work by Charness and Levine (2010), anticipated finding
more retaliation when participants made promotion decisions as compared to when they
made dismissal decisions. There was a main effect of decision condition on decision
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making and decision certainty such that participants who made promotion decisions were
more likely to not promote the target applicant and more certain in that decision as were
promotion focused participants making a dismissal decision. This effect is in the right
direction but it was independent of complaint condition and therefore was not an instance
of retaliation. It only suggests that people are more willing to make negative decisions in
promotion decisions.
Additionally a moderation analyses did find that for participants in the promotion
focused condition contemplating a promotion decision, ranked the target applicant more
favorably provided they had no previous experience with employment decisions.
However, when participants had previous experience they ranked the target applicant
more favorably if they were in the prevention focused condition.
Finally, Hypothesis 4 stated that regulatory focus would be most influential under
but-for instructions. This was partially supported by the moderation analyses that found
that applicant qualifications moderated certainty in promoting the target applicant for
prevention focused jurors using but-for instructions.
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Chapter 6: General Discussion
Review of Hypotheses
The results of this research, primarily studies 1 and 2, support some but not all of
the hypothesized legal decisions.
Hypothesis 1 through 1c. In line with previous research (Wiener & Farnum,
2013; Farnum & Wiener, in press; Wiener & Farnum, in press) the first hypothesis was
that participants would be more likely to find in favor for the defendant under but-for
instructions as compared to mixed motive instructions. The results partially replicated
this effect. For discrimination claims, both Study 1 and Study 2 found the instruction
disparity in that participants using but-for instructions were more likely to find for the
defendant while participants using mixed motive instructions were more likely to find for
the plaintiff. Further, participants were also more certain of their verdict for the
defendant under but-for instructions and more certain of a plaintiff verdict under mixed
motive. There were, however, no main effects of instruction for retaliation verdicts or
retaliation verdict certainty. One explanation is that participants did not fully understand
the retaliation claim and thus they may have simply relied on their own intuitions instead
of reacting to the instructions and evidence. The fact that participants in both Study 1 and
Study 2 believed national origin was the most important motivating factor in determining
how the hospital reached its employment decision, lends support to the idea that
participants were uncertain how to evaluate a retaliation claim. Specifically, the law does
not directly support national origin of the plaintiff as a determining factor for a retaliation
claim, instead the question of the causal connection of the plaintiff’s discrimination
complaint to the employment decision is the direct causal event under consideration. In
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neither study did the participants rate the plaintiff’s complaint as an important factor in
determining their retaliation verdict. Additionally, in Study 1 and Study 2 accuracy of
understanding of instructions was significantly lower for the retaliation claims as
compared to the discrimination claims. Most importantly, the accuracy of instructions
significantly predicted retaliation verdict in that those who understood the instructions
were more pro-plaintiff than those who did not. Furthermore, accuracy did not predict
discrimination verdicts. It is possible that participants’ confusion about what retaliation as
evidenced in Study 1 and Study 2 may have influenced their understanding of the task in
Study 3.
Hypothesis 1a suggested that participants with the charge of applying two types of
instructions (mixed motive instructions for the discrimination claim and but-for
instructions for the retaliation claim) would show a “bleeding over” effect of the but-for
instructions. That is, they would be more pro-defendant for the discrimination claim as
compared to those participants who used only mixed-motive instructions. I found no
support for this possibility. The alternative hypothesis was that through comparison,
participants might be more sensitive to the differences and adhere more strongly to the
details of the instructions. This was also not supported. Instead, there was support for the
mixed motive instructions bleeding over into the use of the but-for instructions.
Specifically, in Study 1 participants applying both types of instructions were more certain
of a pro-plaintiff verdict as compared to participants using but-for instructions for both
retaliation and discrimination claims, though they did not differ from participants using
only mixed motive instructions. This suggests that participants who used both
instructions relied on the mixed motive instructions for both claims instead of
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differentiating between the instructions. One explanation of these Study 1 results, is that
mixed motive approaches, those instantiating multiple sufficient causal schemas (Kelley,
1967; Wiener & Keller, 2011) are the default mode of casual judgment so that once
invoked it becomes the dominant mode of decision making.
Unfortunately this effect was not replicated in Study 2, though that is in line with
Hypothesis 1b. Specifically, Hypothesis 1b posited that in a case in which the employer
denied the plaintiff a promotion (Study 2) there would be weaker instruction effects than
when the employer fired the plaintiff (Study 1). While there were no main effects for
instruction in Study 2 there were moderation effects involving instruction for retaliation
verdict and verdict certainty in analyses of Study 2 data. The data partially supported
Hypothesis 1b.
Finally, Hypothesis 1c predicted that but-for causality would lead to more
retaliation than mixed motive causality in simulated employment decisions (Study 3).
Unfortunately there were no main effects of causality on any of the dependent variables.
Two moderation analyses lend some support to the hypothesis but only in highly
qualified situations. First, there was a 5-way interaction between instruction, decision
condition, regulatory focus, complaint condition, and applicant qualifications as a
motivating factor. Moderation was found for prevention focused participants using butfor instructions to determine a promotion. Specifically, if there was no complaint of
discrimination, then participants using but-for instructions were influenced by applicant
qualification in that they were more certain in a favorable decision (not dismissing or
promoting) than if they did not consider applicant qualification. For participants who had
a discrimination complaint in the resumes, applicant qualification did not moderate the
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relationship. Interestingly, Figure 19, which displays the moderation, reveals that for the
discrimination complaint decision all participants were more certain of making an
unfavorable decision – which would be retaliation. Second, a three-way interaction
between instruction, regulatory focus, and previous employment decision experience
found that for promotion focused jurors, those who had no previous experience were
more certain of a favorable/non-retaliatory decision under mixed motive than but-for
instructions. Though there were no direct retaliation effects, these two moderation
analyses suggests that retaliation may be more likely under but-for instructions.
In hindsight, it is possible that the reason Hypothesis 1c did not pan out was the
ecological validity of the task, which explicitly reminded mock employers of the law
immediately before they made a potentially illegal retaliation decision. It is likely that
employers are not reminded of the law immediately before making an employment
decision. Research on race salience suggests that people made aware of race in a trial are
more likely to actively work hard to not appear racist (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000;
Sommers & Ellswroth, 2003; Cohn, Bucolo, Pride, & Sommers, 2009). Participants may
have been actively working to avoid retaliating against the target when the resume
contained discrimination complaint. This is particularly interesting given that interactions
with complaint condition occurred only in the control condition. The control condition
participants were not concerned with retaliation and were freer to make decisions as they
saw fit, whereas their counterparts in the complaint condition did not show any of the
interaction affects. On the other hand, there were instruction effects for jurors, who knew
that it was their job to examine the law at hand and to make their decisions accordingly.
Thus, the mock jurors showed stronger instruction effects.
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If saliency of the law is leading to less retaliation, it could offer an intervention
for employment settings. Specifically it could be mandatory to review the law before
making any employment decisions. If employers are forced to review discrimination and
retaliation laws prior to making any employment decisions, they may be less likely to
make illegal employment decisions. Future research should test this possibility by
manipulating the salience of the law to participants.
Hypotheses 2 and 2a. Unfortunately, due to a failed measure of regulatory focus,
hypothesis 2, concerning chronic regulatory focus, could not be analyzed. When looking
at manipulated regulatory focus, there were some interesting interactions of regulatory
focus and instruction. Specifically, in Study 1, participants who were in the prevention
focus condition (as compared to those in the promotion condition) and had no previous
experience making employment decisions were more certain of finding for the plaintiff.
However, under prevention focus, if participants had previous experience making
employment decisions they were actually less certain of finding for the plaintiff for
retaliation. It is possible that participants with previous experience understand what goes
in to making employment decisions and therefore viewed finding for the plaintiff a high
risk that they wanted to avoid.
In Study 2, this pattern reversed such that previous employment decisions
moderated the effect of regulatory focus for participants who made both discrimination
and retaliation claim judgments. That is, when rendering a retaliation verdict after a
discrimination verdict, participants who were in the prevention focused condition and had
no previous employment decision were more likely to find for the defendant as compared
to those who had experience and those in the promotion focused condition. It is possible
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that after having already made a discrimination verdict decision that prevention focused
participants’ assessment of the risk dropped.
Hypothesis 2a concerned how regulatory fit (the match between chronic
regulatory focus and manipulated regulatory focus) would lead to different results.
Because of the failure of the chronic regulatory focus manipulation, I was not able to test
this hypothesis. Nonetheless, under Hypothesis 2a, promotion focused jurors should have
overvalued the plaintiff’s evidence in coming to a pro-plaintiff decision, while prevention
focused participants should have undervalued the defendant’s evidence in reaching a proplaintiff decision (in line with Wiener & Farnum, 2013). In Study 1, plaintiff evidence
moderated the relationship of instruction on retaliation verdict for promotion focused
participants. Promotion focused participants, but not prevention focused participants, who
believed the plaintiff’s evidence was strong were more likely to find for the plaintiff
under mixed motive as compared to but-for instructions. Study 2 produced a significant
four-way interaction between instruction, regulatory focus, claim type, and plaintiff
evidence. Moderation analyses found that for prevention focused jurors deciding only a
retaliation claim, those who believed the plaintiff had strong evidence were more certain
of finding for the plaintiff under mixed motive but not but-for instructions. Thus, Study 1
supported Hypothesis 2a but Study 2 did not.
Hypothesis 3 through 3b. Hypotheses 3 through 3b concerned the simulated
employment decisions in Study 2. Under Hypothesis 3, participants high in prevention
focus were expected to be less likely to retaliate than participants high in promotion
focus. Once again I was unable to test the effects of chronic regulatory focus but there
was a main effect of regulatory focus as manipulated on decision certainty in which
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promotion focused participants were more certain of a favorable decision toward the
target candidate than prevention focused participants. Previous employment decision
experience moderated the relationship between regulatory focus and decision certainty.
Participants who had no previous employment decision experience were more certain of a
favorable decision if they were promotion focused than if they were prevention focused.
Additionally, for promotion focused participants, those with no experience were more
certain of a favorable decision than those with previous employment decision making
experience. There was also a three-way interaction between decision condition,
regulatory focus, and previous employment decision experience. Moderation analyses
found that in the dismissal decision condition regulatory focus had no impact, but in the
promotion decision condition it was significant. For participants with no previous
experience, prevention focused participants ranked the target resume less favorably than
did promotion focused participants, while those with previous experience ranked the
resume more favorable under prevention than promotion focus. It is important to note that
no actual retaliation occurred, as complaint condition did not interact with regulatory
focus.
Hypothesis 3a posited that retaliation was more likely to occur when participants
were making a promotion decision as compared to a dismissal decision. This was in line
with Charness and Levine’s (2010) finding that people see acts of commission, such as
dismissing someone, more as retaliation than the view acts of omission, such as not
promoting someone. Consistent with this earlier research, I found a main effect of
decision condition (dismiss v. promote) for both the overall decision and decision
certainty. Participants in the promotion decision condition were more likely to make an
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unfavorable decision and were more certain of their unfavorable decision as compared to
participants in the dismissal condition. Even though retaliation did not occur, participants
were still significantly more willing to deny promotion to the target applicant than they
were to dismiss the target applicant. That is, they were more willing to commit an act of
omission than an act of commission, in line with Charness and Levine (2010). This
finding is somewhat consistent with research by Gino and Margolis (2011) who found
that promotion focused individuals are more likely to act unethically than prevention
focused individuals. It would be fully consistent if the effect had been found for the
retaliation condition as well. Perhaps if retaliation concerns were less salient there would
have been an interaction between decision and complaint condition.
Finally, Hypothesis 3b expected promotion focused participants to overvalue the
good work qualities of the applicant who did not complain and for prevention focused
participants to undervalue the negative aspects of the complainant. Unfortunately, neither
good nor bad work qualities predicted decision, decision certainty, or resume rank. In
fact, the only motivating factor that did predict effects on the dependent variables was
applicant qualification. The moderation analysis that examined the five-way interaction
between instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus, complaint condition, and
application qualification found that applicant qualification mattered only if the
participants were prevention focused using but-for instructions and making a promotion
decision. Specifically, if participants believed that the applicant’s qualifications were
low, they were more certain of a favorable decision in the control condition but more
certain of an unfavorable decision in the complaint condition. This suggests that
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prevention focused participants using but-for instructions were more likely to retaliate
when believing the applicant’s qualifications were low.
Implications for Psychology
The findings of the current studies show some encouraging findings that may help
to explain how jurors and employers make discrimination and retaliation decisions. The
current studies specifically examined the role of regulatory focus on decision making,
which bares directly on how people make causal judgments. Kelly (1967) argued that
most people tend to use “multiple sufficient schemata” when making causal decisions.
This means that people take into considerations a multitude of factors when making a
decision, not just one factor. Mixed motive causality allows decision makers, both jurors
and employers, to use multiple sufficient schemata. They may still find for the plaintiff
even if there are both illegitimate (such as a discrimination complaint) and legitimate
reasons for the defendant’s actions (such as an employee who is late often or not a team
player). However, the law under but-for causality instructions, requires a direct causality
judgment instead of reliance on a sufficient schema. Though there can be both legitimate
and illegitimate factors at play under but-for instructions, the illegitimate factor must be
the determinative, or most influential factor; whereas under mixed motive instructions it
need only play a contributing role. There is some evidence in the current studies that
limiting the use of multiple schema by applying but-for instructions encourages
participants to use regulatory focus in their decision making when determining verdict
decisions in a retaliation case. There is little evidence that regulatory focus is influential
in employer decisions of retaliation based on legal causality.
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When considering just the role of regulatory focus, independent of legal
instruction, the current studies revealed some interesting decision making findings. It
appears that regulatory focus can influence decisions differently depending on a person’s
previous experience. One of the most consistent findings in the current research was that
previous employment decision making experience moderated the influence of regulatory
focus. Participants who had made employment decisions before showed a different
pattern than those who had never been faced with these decisions. Namely, prevention
focused participants, as compared to promotion focused participants, were more likely to
find for the plaintiff, more certain of finding for the plaintiff, and more likely to make a
favorable employment decision if they had no previous experience of making
employment decisions. When they had previous experience, the results were flipped.
This suggests the possibility that what is considered a “risk” under regulatory focus may
hinge upon previous experience with the task at hand. Specifically for those with
previous experience they may believe the greater risk is keeping an employee who is not
considered best for the company, whereas those with no previous experience might
consider risk to be illegally retaliating against an employee. If this is assessment of risk is
correct, then the current research is in line with research on policy decisions and
regulatory focus. Botzen, de Boer, and Terpstra (2013) found that prevention focused
individuals were the most influenced by risk-framed communications and were in turn
more likely to buy flood insurance than promotion focused individuals. Additional
research to further explore the definition of risk in employment decisions is needed to
better understand how it shapes decisions under regulatory focus.
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Regulatory focus is likely not the only social cognitive model at play in jury or
employer retaliation decisions. For example, previous work relying on stereotype content
model (Farnum & Wiener, in press; Wiener & Farnum, in press) has shown that global
stereotypes concerning social groups is influential in verdict decisions under but-for but
not mixed motive instructions. Prospect theory, in particular the framing of gains and
losses, may also explain how jurors and employers use causal instructions (Belton,
Thomson, and Dhami 2014; Boettcher 2004; Mishra and Fiddick, 2012; Wiest, Raymond,
& Clawson, 2012). Employers who view dismissing an employee who has complained as
a gain to the working environment may be more willing to retaliate than an employer
who views this as a risk to the reputation of the company. In addition, the theory of
planned behavior (Ajzen & Madden, 1985; Ajzen 1991) would be particularly interesting
in examine the path that leads employers to retaliate against an employee. The theory of
planned behavior hypothesizes that intentions are the result of attitudes, subjective norms,
and perception of behavioral control. Studies examining the manipulation of each of
these areas would be interesting. For example, researchers might manipulate the
subjective norms of a company as participants make employment decisions. One might
instantiate the subjective norm in a cohesive and positive workplace through
inspirational posters and anti-discrimination signs that make it clear the company is
interested in a healthy environment. Conversely, and uncaring with authoritative
environment might instead feature signs about use of equipment and suggesting that the
company does seek employee feedback on relationship issues. I anticipate that retaliation
would be more likely under the less positive environment as mediated through
participant’s ratings of attitudes and perceptions of behavioral control.
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Implications for Law
Previous research found that but-for instructions led to more pro-defendant
verdicts and that mixed motive instructions lead to more pro-plaintiff instructions,
regardless of case strength (Wiener & Farnum, 2013; Farnum & Wiener, under review;
Wiener & Farnum, under review). The current research sought to determine if this would
replicate with retaliation claims in the context of the recent Supreme Court ruling
required but for causality for Title VII retaliation claims (Nasssar, 2013). The current
studies supported this in part but found less influence of instructions on retaliation
verdicts than hypothesized. This could be because retaliation is different than
discrimination claims, in line with Sherwyn, Heise, and Eigen (2014), who found that
employees fared better in retaliation claims than discrimination decisions. The current
studies did not necessarily find this. There is an argument that retaliation is different but
it appears that it may hinge on the understanding of what retaliation means to jurors. If
jurors are more educated on the definition of retaliation it might lead them to use and
react to differences in causality instructions more than they did in the current studies.
This is also a serious consideration as the Supreme Court, in their Nassar (2013)
decision, pointed out that jurors should have no issue differentiating discrimination
evidence from retaliation evidence and should understand how to make their decision.
Yet, Studies 1 and 2 found that participants relied on the whether or not the defendant
considered the plaintiff’s national origin, but not whether the defendant considered the
plaintiff’s discrimination complaint. It appears that jurors may not be as capable of
differentiating the evidence for a discrimination complaint from a retaliation complaint as
the Court assumed and that may help explain why jurors found the retaliation complaint
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more confusing. This may explain why participants who considered both claims and
using different instructions were more likely to follow the mixed motive instructions.
Perhaps those instructions that embrace the use of multiple causal schema felt more
comfortable to use when considering the retaliation, which the participants found difficult
to understand.
These results point to the need for more research to help explain how jurors
understand and process retaliation claims in the context of different types of causal
instructions and the influence of different types of causality models on employer decision
making. There is some empirical evidence that these instructions can impact
consequences in a case, and also some evidence that jurors are not as capable of
considering a retaliation claim especially when coupled with a discrimination claim.
These facts should be central to discussion going forward on how to treat retaliation
claims as well as whether to continue using different instructions for claims that could be
brought in the same case. Empirical analysis has an important role to play in determining
how to consider defining claims for jurors and the role of causal instructions on liability
judgments.
Limitations and Future Research
The current studies replicated, in part previous research on the influence of causal
instructions in civil litigation expanding the topic to include Title VII retaliation claims.
Regulatory focus theory served as the social cognitive model to help explain decision
making of jurors and employers. Finally, the current studies expanded research on causal
instructions into the workplace to explore how the law influences employer decision
making. One strength of the current research was the use of a national sample of jury-
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eligible participants as opposed to a student sample (Bornstein, 1999; Wiener, Krauss, &
Lieberman, 2011). Another strength was the use of legally accurate instructions.
Nonetheless, as is the case with all studies, the current research is not without its
own limitations. First, future research should utilize a more realistic trial paradigm. For
Studies 1 and 2 this would involve using a reenacted trial including direct and crossexaminations, more in-depth descriptions of the jury instructions, and jury deliberations.
The use of the full-trial experience might increase instruction effects by highlighting the
differences in the instructions. It is also possible instruction effects might disappear
within the rich context of a reenacted trial. Furthermore, regulatory focus may be less
influential in deliberating jurors. Finally, deliberation could lead to greater differences
between a plaintiff who was fired and one who was not promoted by encouraging the
discussion of the plaintiff’s experience of personal harm.
Furthermore, research on employer decisions should also utilize a more realistic,
in-lab paradigm that introduces real consequences and motivation to this simulated
judgment paradigm. A lab setting where the participants feel like they have true control
over others and where they must engage with the impact of discrimination may lead to
more retaliation. Also, a more subtle and less salient manipulation of causal legal
language might lead to more effects of instruction on retaliation. This is important as
retaliation does exist in the workplace and creating a realistic environment with more
power to induce retaliation would better allow researchers to understand why employers
might engage in that behavior. And of course, this project was unable to test the effects of
chronic regulatory focus and regulatory fit because of the failure of the chronic regulatory
measure (Shah & Higgins, 1997). Future research should add additional methods to
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assess chronic regulatory focus, trait measures of regulatory focus such as the Lockwood
Regulatory Focus Scale (Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002) or the Composite
Regulatory Focus Scale (Haws, Dholakia, & Bearden, 2010).
Conclusion
The current research provides some evidence of the influence of both causal legal
instruction as well as regulatory focus on decisions concerning Title VII retaliation.
Mock jurors fell more in line with previous research (Wiener & Farnum, 2013; Farnum &
Wiener, in press; Wiener & Farnum, in press) for discrimination claims, in that but-for
instructions were more likely to lead to more pro-defendant decisions than mixed motive
instructions, but the same main effects did not emerge for retaliation claims. An
unexpected but pervasive finding of the research suggests that jurors, despite receiving
legally correct instructions, appear to not understand what evidence can and cannot be
used when making a decision concerning retaliation. Unfortunately, the results from the
employer study (Study 3) did not find any differences in willingness to retaliate based on
instruction or regulatory focus. This is likely due to salience of the law and should be
examined in future research. Overall the current studies lend some support to the role of
regulatory focus and causal instructions, but also presents a number of exciting future
directions to better understand how people think about and act in retaliation cases.
Further research will better help to inform future policies and laws concerning retaliation
in the workplace.
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Appendix A
Chronic Regulatory Focus Measure
Shah, Higgins, & Friedman (1998)
You are going to be asked to list traits or attributes that describe both your ideal and
ought self. The traits or attributes that you provide must be different for the two selves.
After each trait or attribute, you will also be asked to rate the extent to which you believe
you possess this attribute.
Please list traits or attributes of your Ideal Self. Your ideal self is the type of person you
ideally would like to be, the type of person you hope, wish, or aspire to be.
1.
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute?
1
2
3
Slightly

4
Extremely

2.
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute?
1
2
3
Slightly

4
Extremely

3.
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute?
1
2
3
Slightly

4
Extremely

4.
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute?
1
2
3
Slightly

4
Extremely

5.
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute?
1
2
3
Slightly

4
Extremely
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Please list traits or attributes of your Ought Self. Your ought self is the type of person
you believe it is your duty, obligation, or responsibility to be.
1.
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute?
1
2
3
Slightly

4
Extremely

2.
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute?
1
2
3
Slightly

4
Extremely

3.
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute?
1
2
3
Slightly

4
Extremely

4.
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute?
1
2
3
Slightly

4
Extremely

5.
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute?
1
2
3
Slightly

4
Extremely
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Appendix B
Case Vignette – Fired (Study 1)
Based on University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar (2013)
The defendant, University Medical Center, is an academic institution that
specializes in medical education for medical students, health professionals, and scientists.
University Hospital affiliates itself with a number of healthcare facilities including
Meadowood Memorial Hospital. The agreement between Meadowood Memorial
Hospital and the University Medical Center permits medical students to gain real world
experiences by working in the hospital. As part of its obligations under the agreement,
Meadowood Memorial Hospital offers staff physician positions to the University’s
faculty members.
The plaintiff, Daren Ahmad, a medical doctor of Middle Eastern descent,
specializes in internal medicine and infectious diseases. In 1995 the University hired
Ahmad to work jointly on the University’s faculty and as a staff physician as Meadowood
Memorial Hospital. Dr. Ahmad left both positions in 1998 to seek additional medical
education and then returned to both positions in 2001. In 2004, the University hired Dr.
Anna Louis to be the Chief of Infectious Disease Medicine, and as such, became the
plaintiff’s ultimate (though not direct) superior. When Dr. Louis joined the faculty she
met with each clinic doctor for 15 to 20 minutes, but spent an hour and a half with Dr.
Ahmad discussing his resume in great detail.
Dr. Ahmad believed Dr. Louis, targeted him for more intense supervision due to
his national origin. He claimed that she scrutinized his productivity more than any of the
other doctors under her supervision. Although Dr. Kaisar, Dr. Ahmad’s previous
supervisor, stated that that Dr. Ahmad was a hard worker, Dr. Louis “took a long time to
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be satisfied with his opinion of Dr. Ahmad.” Ahmad alleges that Louis made several
derogatory comments concerning Middle Easterners. In 2005, Dr. Louis opposed hiring
another physician of Middle Eastern descent and remarked to a fellow colleague that
“Middle Easterner’s are lazy” and when that physician joined the staff Louis commented
to the same colleague, they had “hired another one.” On several occasions, the plaintiff,
Dr. Ahmad, met with Dr. Jeffrey Fitzgerald, the chair of the University’s Internal
Medicine and Dr. Louis’ supervisor, to complain about Dr. Louis’ alleged harassment.
In 2006, Dr. Louis nominated Dr. Ahmad for a promotion, for which she wrote a
letter of recommendation about his work that aided him in receiving the promotion.
Despite this help, Dr. Ahmad continued to believe that Dr. Louis was biased against him
due to his ethnic heritage. As a result, Dr. Ahmad negotiated his contract to continue
working at Meadowood Memorial Hospital without remaining as a faculty member at the
University under Dr. Louis’ supervision. Dr. Ahmad sent a letter along with his
resignation from his University teaching position to several faculty members, including
Dr. Fitzgerald, in which he stated that he was resigning due to the harassment he received
from Dr. Louis. The letter stated that Louis’ harassment stemmed “from racial and
cultural bias against Arabs and Muslims.” After reading the letter, Dr. Fitzgerald
expressed alarm at the accusations, which he believed publicly humiliated Dr. Louis. Dr.
Fitzgerald also commented to a colleague that he felt it was “important that Dr. Louis be
exonerated.”
Meadowood Memorial Hospital had offered Dr. Ahmad a position as a staff
physician as negotiated. However, upon learning about the offer, Dr. Fitzgerald protested
to Meadowood, claiming that the offer was inconsistent with the partnership agreement
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between the University and Meadowood Memorial Hospital. Specifically, Fitzgerald
argued that all staff physicians at the hospital should also be faculty members at the
University. Meadowood Memorial Hospital withdrew the contract from Dr. Ahmad,
effectively firing him from this position. The University Medical Center formally
discharged Dr. Ahmad.
After exhausting administrative remedies, Dr. Ahmad filed a Title VII suit in the
United States District Court alleging two discrete violations of Title VII. The first was a
status-based discrimination claim under §2000e-2(a) alleging that his constructive
discharge from the University was due to the alleged racially motivated harassment he
received from Dr. Louis. Dr. Ahmad’s second claim was that Dr. Fitzgerald’s efforts
directing Meadowood Memorial Hospital fire him was in retaliation for complaining
about Dr. Louis’ harassment in violation of §2000e-3(a).

Just discrimination
After exhausting administrative remedies, Dr. Ahmad filed a Title VII suit in the
United States District Court alleging a status-based discrimination claim under §2000e2(a). The claim alleges that his constructive discharge from the University was due the
alleged racially motivated harassment he received from Dr. Louis.
Just retaliation
After exhausting administrative remedies, Dr. Ahmad filed a Title VII suit in the
United States District Court alleging that Dr. Fitzgerald’s efforts directing the Hospital
fire him were in retaliation for complaining about Dr. Louis’ harassment in violation of
§2000e-3(a) of Title VII.
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Appendix C
Motivating Factors
Next, we would like you to answer some questions about why you think Dr. Ahmad
was fired.
To what extent was each of the following a motivating factor in the University
Medical Center’s actions that ultimately led to the decision to firing of Dr. Ahmad?
A “motivating factor” is a factor that played some part in University Medical
Center’s decision.
1. Dr. Ahmad’s national origin.
0
Not
at
All

1

2
Very
Little

3

4

5

6
Somewhat

7

8

9
Quite
a bit

10

11
Extremely

7

8

9
Quite
a bit

10

11
Extremely

2. Meadowood Hospital’s rehiring policy.
0
Not
at
All

1

2
Very
Little

3

4

5

6
Somewhat

3. Dr. Ahmad’s adversarial relationship with his supervisors.
0
Not
at
All

1

2
Very
Little

3

4

5

6
Somewhat

7

8

9
Quite
a bit

10

11
Extremely

7

8

9
Quite
a bit

10

11
Extremely

10

11
Extremely

4. Dr. Ahmad’s discrimination complaint
0
Not
at
All

1

2
Very
Little

3

4

5

6
Somewhat

5. Dr. Ahmad’s letter to the University Medical Center’s faculty.
0
Not
at
All

1

2
Very
Little

3

4

5

6
Somewhat

7

8

9
Quite
a bit
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Appendix D
Judge’s Instructions (Regulatory focus manipulation)
Promotion Focused
Judge’s Instructions
As a juror in this case, it is your job to achieve the satisfaction that comes from knowing
you completed your job and achieved the best possible outcome. You should base your
decision on the facts of the case as they apply to the following instructions. Using the
case facts appropriately to reach an outcome will promote the ideal of fairness in the
justice system. I hope that you will serve eagerly as an enthusiastic juror to aid the justice
system in reaching the optimal and just decision for the parties in the case.
Prevention Focused
Judge’s Instructions
As a juror in this case, it your job to avoid the dissatisfaction that comes from knowing
you improperly completed your job and contributed to a miscarriage of justice. You
should base your decision on the facts of the case as they apply to the following
instructions. Using the case facts appropriately to reach an outcome will prevent the loss
of the ideal of fairness in the justice system. I hope that you will serve vigilantly as a
careful juror to aid the justice system in avoiding an incorrect miscarriage of justice for
the parties in the case.
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Appendix E
Jury Instructions
Instructions
But-For Retaliation Instructions
To establish a claim of retaliation, the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, must prove each of the
following three basic elements by a preponderance of the evidence
Element 1: Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, complained about national origin discrimination; and
Element 2: Defendant, University Medical Center, took an action that a reasonable
employee would have found materially adverse – namely discharging Dr. Ahmad; and
Element 3: The Plaintiff making a discrimination complaint was the determinative factor
for the Defendant’s action to fire him. “Determinative Factor” means that the Defendant
would not have taken the challenged employment decision but for the Plaintiff’s
protected activity.
“Preponderance of the evidence” means that according to the evidence the statement is
more likely true than not.
A “Materially Adverse” action is any action by the employer that is likely to discourage a
reasonable worker in the Plaintiff’s position from exercising his or her rights under Title
VII.
To establish element #3, Dr. Ahmad must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 1)
that his discrimination complaint was the determinate cause of University Medical
Center’s actions that ultimately led to its decision to fire Dr. Ahmad and 2) the University
Medical Center would not have fired Dr. Ahmad if the administrators had not considered
his discrimination complaint. You must find for University Medical Center if Dr. Ahmad
failed to prove both of these facts by a preponderance of the evidence.
If you find that the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, has proven each of the three basic elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find for the Plaintiff and against the
Defendant, University Medical Center, on this claim. If, on the other hand, you find that
the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one or more of the three basic elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find against him on this claim and in favor
of the Defendant.
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Mixed Motive Retaliation Instructions
To establish a claim of retaliation, the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, must prove each of the
following three basic elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
Element 1: Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, complained about national origin discrimination; and
Element 2: Defendant, University Medical Center, took an action that a reasonable
employee would have found materially adverse – namely discharging Dr. Ahmad; and
Element 3: The Plaintiff making a discrimination complaint was a motivating factor for
the Defendant’s action to fire him. A “motivating factor” is a factor that played some
part in the defendant's decision.
“Preponderance of the evidence” means that according to the evidence the statement is
more likely true than not.
A “Materially Adverse” action is any action by the employer that is likely to discourage a
reasonable worker in the Plaintiff’s position from exercising his or her rights under Title
VII.
In showing that his discrimination complaint was a motivating factor for University
Medical Center’ actions (element #3), Dr. Ahmad is not required to prove that his
discrimination complaint was the sole motivation or even the primary motivation for
University Medical Center’s actions. Dr. Ahmad need only prove that his discrimination
complaint played a motivating part in University Medical Center’s actions to fire him
even though other factors allowable under the law may also have motivated University
Medical Center. Your verdict must be in favor of University Medical Center if Dr.
Ahmad failed to prove that his discrimination complaint was a motivating factor by a
preponderance of the evidence.
If you find that the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, has proven each of the three basic elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find for the Plaintiff and against the
Defendant, University Medical Center, on this claim. If, on the other hand, you find that
the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one or more of the three basic elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find against him on this claim and in favor
of the Defendant.
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But-For Discrimination Instructions
To establish a claim of discrimination based on national origin, the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad,
must prove each of the following two basic elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
Element 1: The Defendant, University Medical Center’s actions ultimately led to the
firing Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad; and
Element 2: The Plaintiff’s national origin was the determinative factor for the
Defendant’s action. “Determinative Factor” means that the Defendant would not have
taken the challenged employment decision but for the Plaintiff’s protected activity.
“Preponderance of the evidence” means that according to the evidence the truth of a
statement is more likely than not likely.
To establish element #3, Dr. Ahmad must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
1) his national origin was the determinate cause of University Medical Center’s decision
to fire Dr. Ahmad and that 2) the University Medical Center would not have fired Dr.
Ahmad if the University administrators had not considered his national origin. You must
find for University Medical Center if Dr. Ahmad failed to prove both of these facts by a
preponderance of the evidence.
If you find that the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, has proven each of the two basic elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find for the Plaintiff and against the
Defendant, University Medical Center, on this claim. If, on the other hand, you find that
the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one or more of the two basic elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find against him on this claim and in favor
of the Defendant.
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Mixed Motive Discrimination Jury Instructions
To establish a claim of discrimination based on national origin, the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad,
must prove each of the following two basic elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
Element 1: The Defendant, University Medical Center’s actions ultimately led to the
firing Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad; and
Element 2: The Plaintiff’s national origin was a motivating factor for the Defendant’s
actions. A “motivating factor” is a factor that played some part in the defendant's
decision.
In showing that his national origin was a motivating factor for University Medical
Center’s action (element #2), Dr. Ahmad is not required to prove that his national origin
was the sole motivation or even the primary motivation for the University Medical
Center’s decision to fire Dr. Ahmad. Dr. Ahmad need only prove that his national origin
played a motivating part in University Medical Center’s action even though other factors
allowable under the law may also have motivated University Medical Center to fire
him. Your verdict must be in favor of University Medical Center if Dr. Ahmad failed to
prove that his national origin was a motivating factor by a preponderance of the evidence.
If you find that the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, has proven each of the two basic elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find for the Plaintiff and against the
Defendant, University Medical Center, on this claim. If, on the other hand, you find that
the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one or more of the two basic elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find against him on this claim and in favor
of the Defendant.
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Appendix F
Verdict and Evidence Decisions
Wiener & Farnum (2013)
Verdict 1: With regard to the claim of discrimination I find in favor of:
Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad
Defendant, University Medical Center
How certain are you of the verdict for discrimination?
-5
Completely
certain the
defendant
is not liable

-4

-3

-2

-1

0
Uncertain
whether
the
defendant
is liable

1

2

3

4

5
Completely
certain the
defendant
is liable

Verdict 2: With regard to the claim of retaliation I find in favor of:
Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad
Defendant, University Medical Center
How certain are you of the verdict for retaliation?
-5
Completely
certain the
defendant
is not liable

-4

-3

-2

-1

0
Uncertain
whether
the
defendant
is liable

1

2

3

4

5
Completely
certain the
defendant
is liable

Next, we would like you evaluate the scenario that you just read on several
additional rating scales. Select the number that best summarizes your opinion.
1. How convincing was plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad’s evidence that University Medical Center
violated Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination when Dr. Ahmad was fired?
1
2
Not At All
Convincing

3

4

5
Somewhat
Convincing

6

7

8

9
Very
Convincing

2. How convincing was defendant University Medical Center’s evidence that it did not
violate Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination when Dr. Ahmad was fired?
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1
2
Not At All
Convincing
3.

3

4

5
Somewhat
Convincing

6

7

8

9
Very
Convincing

How convincing was plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad’s evidence that University Medical Center
violated Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation when Dr. Ahmad was fired?
1
2
Not At All
Convincing

3

4

5
Somewhat
Convincing

6

7

8

9
Very
Convincing

4. How convincing was defendant University Medical Center’s evidence that it did not
violate Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination when Dr. Ahmad was fired?
1
2
Not At All
Convincing

3

4

5
Somewhat
Convincing

6

7

8

9
Very
Convincing

5. For this case, on a scale of 0% (not at all certain) to 100% (completely certain), how
certain must you be of the evidence to find that defendant University Medical Center
violated Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination when Dr. Ahmad was fired?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

0% convinced
5% convinced
10% convinced
15% convinced
20% convinced
25% convinced
30% convinced

h. 35% convinced
i. 40% convinced
j. 45% convinced
k. 50% convinced
l. 55% convinced
m. 60% convinced
n. 65% convinced

o. 70% convinced
p. 75% convinced
q. 80% convinced
r. 85% convinced
s. 90% convinced
t. 95% convinced
u. 100% convinced

6. For this case, on a scale of 0% (not at all certain) to 100% (completely certain), how
certain must you be of the evidence to find that defendant University Medical Center
violated Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation when Dr. Ahmad was fired?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

0% convinced
5% convinced
10% convinced
15% convinced
20% convinced
25% convinced
30% convinced

h. 35% convinced
i. 40% convinced
j. 45% convinced
k. 50% convinced
l. 55% convinced
m. 60% convinced
n. 65% convinced

o. 70% convinced
p. 75% convinced
q. 80% convinced
r. 85% convinced
s. 90% convinced
t. 95% convinced
u. 100% convinced
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Appendix G
Manipulation Checks
Discrimination Only
The following questions are about the jury instructions that you read earlier.
Answer each question to the best of your ability based upon only those instructions.
These questions are NOT opinion questions. We are not interested in your views
about national origin discrimination. We are interested in your understanding of
the jury instructions that we supplied to you.
1. University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s national origin was
the determining factor in University Medical Center’s actions that ultimately led to Dr.
Ahmad being fired.
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify
2. University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s
national origin in University Medical Center’s actions that ultimately led to Dr. Ahmad
being fired.
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify
3. Have you heard of this case before you read it today?
a. yes
b. no
3b. If yes, were you familiar with the facts of this case?
a. yes
b. no
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Retaliation Only
The following questions are about the jury instructions that you read earlier.
Answer each question to the best of your ability based upon only those instructions.
These questions are NOT opinion questions. We are not interested in your views
about retaliation. We are interested in your understanding of the jury instructions
that we supplied to you.
1. University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s discrimination
complaint was the determining factor in University Medical Center’s actions that
ultimately led to Dr. Ahmad being fired.
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify
2. University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s
discrimination complaint in University Medical Center’s actions that ultimately led to Dr.
Ahmad being fired.
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify
3. Have you heard of this case before you read it today?
a. yes
b. no
3b. If yes, were you familiar with the facts of this case?
a. yes
b. no
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Discrimination and Retaliation
The following questions are about the jury instructions that you read earlier.
Answer each question to the best of your ability based upon only those instructions.
These questions are NOT opinion questions. We are not interested in your views
about national origin discrimination or retaliation. We are interested in your
understanding of the jury instructions that we supplied to you.
DESCRIMINATION CHARGE:
1. University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s national origin was
the determining factor in University Medical Center’s actions that ultimately led to Dr.
Ahmad being fired.
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify
2. University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s
national origin in University Medical Center’s actions that ultimately led to Dr. Ahmad
being fired.
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify
RETALIATION CHARGE:
3. University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s discrimination
complaint was the determining factor in University Medical Center’s actions that
ultimately led to Dr. Ahmad being fired.
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify
4. University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s
discrimination complaint in University Medical Center’s actions that ultimately led to Dr.
Ahmad being fired.
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify
5. Have you heard of this case before you read it today?
a. yes
b. no
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Appendix H
Demographics
(1) Please provide your age. ______
(2) Please provide your ethnic origin and/or race. (Check one)
___ European American
___ African American
___ Asian American
___ Latino/a
___ Hispanic
___ Native American
___ Middle Eastern
___ Other Please specify
_________________________
(3) Sex
_____ Male
______ Female
(4) What is your current marital status?
Select one:
Single

Married

Divorced

Widowed

(5) Which of the following best describes the area in which you are originally from?
____ Urban
____ Suburban
____ Small town
____ Rural
(6) What is your religious preference (if any)?
_____ Protestant

_____ Muslim

_____ Atheist

_____ Catholic

_____ Hindu

_____ Other

_____ Jewish

_____ Agnostic

(7) Do you have a current driver’s license?
____ Yes
(8) Are you currently registered to vote?
____ Yes
(9) Have you ever served on a jury
____ Yes
(10) Please provide what best describes your current employment.
____ Employed full-time
_____ Unemployed
____ Employed part-time
_____ Student
(11) What is your political affiliation? (check one)
____ Democrat
____ Republican
____ Green Party
____ Independent
____ Libertarian
____ Other
(12) Please provide your political orientation on social issues.
___ Very conservative
___ Conservative
___ Moderate
___ Liberal
___ Very liberal
(13) Please provide your political orientation on economic issues.
___ Very conservative
___ Conservative
___ Moderate
___ Liberal

____ No
____ No
____ No
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___ Very liberal
(14) Please provide your highest level of education achieved.
____ Less than high school diploma
____ High school diploma/ G.E.D.
____ Some college
____ College graduate
____ Advanced degree (Master’s degree, doctorate, etc.)
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Appendix I
Case Vignette –Not Promoted (Study 2)
Based on University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar (2013)
The defendant, University Medical Center, is an academic institution that
specializes in medical education for medical students, health professionals, and scientists.
University Hospital affiliates itself with a number of healthcare facilities including
Meadowood Memorial Hospital. The agreement between Meadowood Memorial
Hospital and the University Medical Center permits medical students to gain real world
experiences by working in the hospital. As part of its obligations under the agreement,
Meadowood Memorial Hospital offers staff physician positions to the University’s
faculty members.
The plaintiff, Daren Ahmad, a medical doctor of Middle Eastern descent,
specializes in internal medicine and infectious diseases. In 1995 the University hired
Ahmad to work jointly on the University’s faculty and as a staff physician as Meadowood
Memorial Hospital. Dr. Ahmad left both positions in 1998 to seek additional medical
education and then returned to both positions in 2001. In 2004, the University hired Dr.
Anna Louis to be the Chief of Infectious Disease Medicine, and as such, became the
plaintiff’s ultimate (though not direct) superior. When Dr. Louis joined the faculty she
met with each clinic doctor for 15 to 20 minutes, but spent an hour and a half with Dr.
Ahmad discussing his resume in great detail.
Dr. Ahmad believed Dr. Louis, targeted him for more intense supervision due to
his national origin. He claimed that she scrutinized his productivity more than any of the
other doctors under her supervision. Although Dr. Kaisar, Dr. Ahmad’s previous
supervisor, stated that that Dr. Ahmad was a hard worker, Dr. Louis “took a long time to
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be satisfied with his opinion of Dr. Ahmad.” Ahmad alleges that Louis made several
derogatory comments concerning Middle Easterners. In 2005, Dr. Louis opposed hiring
another physician of Middle Eastern descent and remarked to a fellow colleague that
“Middle Easterner’s are lazy” and when that physician joined the staff Louis commented
to the same colleague, they had “hired another one.” On several occasions, the plaintiff,
Dr. Ahmad, met with Dr. Jeffrey Fitzgerald, the chair of the University’s Internal
Medicine and Dr. Louis’ supervisor, to complain about Dr. Louis’ alleged harassment.
In 2006, Dr. Louis nominated Dr. Ahmad for a promotion, for which she wrote a
letter of recommendation about his work that aided him in receiving the promotion.
Despite this help, Dr. Ahmad continued to believe that Dr. Louis was biased against him
due to his ethnic heritage. As a result, Dr. Ahmad applied for a promotion within
Meadowood Memorial Hospital as head of Infectious Disease that would remove him as
a faculty member for the University, and thus no longer be supervised by Dr. Louis.
Upon favorably interviewing for the position at Meadowood Memorial Hospital, Dr.
Ahmad sent a letter along with his resignation from his University teaching position to
several faculty members, including Dr. Fitzgerald, in which he stated that he was
resigning due to the harassment he received from Dr. Louis. The letter stated that Louis’
harassment stemmed “from racial and cultural bias against Arabs and Muslims.” After
reading the letter, Dr. Fitzgerald expressed alarm at the accusations, which he believed
publicly humiliated Dr. Louis. Dr. Fitzgerald also commented to a colleague that he felt
it was “important that Dr. Louis be exonerated.”
Meadowood Memorial Hospital had, during this time, privately stated their
intention to offer Dr. Ahmad the promotion. On learning about the potential promotion,
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Dr. Fitzgerald protested to Meadowood, claiming that the promotion was inconsistent
with the partnership agreement between the University and Meadowood Memorial
Hospital. Specifically, Fitzgerald argued that all staff physicians at the hospital should
also be faculty members at the University. Meadowood Memorial Hospital offered the
promotion to another applicant and the University Medical Center formally discharged
Dr. Ahmad.
After exhausting administrative remedies, Dr. Ahmad filed a Title VII suit in the
United States District Court alleging two discrete violations of Title VII. The first was a
status-based discrimination claim under §2000e-2(a) alleging that his constructive
discharge from the University was due to the alleged racially motivated harassment he
received from Dr. Louis. Dr. Ahmad’s second claim was that Dr. Fitzgerald’s efforts
directing Meadowood Memorial Hospital to not offer him the promotion was in
retaliation for complaining about Dr. Louis’ harassment in violation of §2000e-3(a).

Just discrimination
After exhausting administrative remedies, Dr. Ahmad filed a Title VII suit in the
United States District Court alleging a status-based discrimination claim under §2000e2(a). The claim alleges that his constructive discharge from the University was due the
alleged racially motivated harassment he received from Dr. Louis.
Just retaliation
After exhausting administrative remedies, Dr. Ahmad filed a Title VII suit in the
United States District Court alleging that Dr. Fitzgerald’s efforts directing the Hospital to
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not offer him the promotion was in retaliation for complaining about Dr. Louis’
harassment in violation of §2000e-3(a) of Title VII.
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Appendix J
Jury Instructions
But-For Retaliation Instructions
To establish a claim of retaliation, the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, must prove each of the
following three basic elements by a preponderance of the evidence
Element 1: Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, complained about national origin discrimination; and
Element 2: Defendant, University Medical Center, took an action that a reasonable
employee would have found materially adverse – denial of a promotion; and
Element 3: The Plaintiff making a discrimination complaint was the determinative factor
for the Defendant’s action – denial of a promotion. “Determinative Factor” means that
the Defendant would not have taken the challenged employment decision but for the
Plaintiff’s protected activity.
“Preponderance of the evidence” means that according to the evidence the statement is
more likely true than not.
A “Materially Adverse” action is any action by the employer that is likely to discourage a
reasonable worker in the Plaintiff’s position from exercising his or her rights under Title
VII.
To establish element #3, Dr. Ahmad must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 1)
that his discrimination complaint was the determinate cause of University Medical
Center’s actions that ultimately led to its decision deny Dr. Ahmad his promotion and 2)
the University Medical Center would have promoted Dr. Ahmad if the administrators had
not considered his discrimination complaint. You must find for University Medical
Center if Dr. Ahmad failed to prove both of these facts by a preponderance of the
evidence.
If you find that the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, has proven each of the three basic elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find for the Plaintiff and against the
Defendant, University Medical Center, on this claim. If, on the other hand, you find that
the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one or more of the three basic elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find against him on this claim and in favor
of the Defendant.
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Mixed Motive Retaliation Instructions
To establish a claim of retaliation, the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, must prove each of the
following three basic elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
Element 1: Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, complained about national origin discrimination; and
Element 2: Defendant, University Medical Center, took an action that a reasonable
employee would have found materially adverse – namely denying Dr. Ahmad his
promotion; and
Element 3: The Plaintiff making a discrimination complaint was a motivating factor for
the Defendant’s action to deny him his promotion. A “motivating factor” is a factor that
played some part in the defendant's decision.
“Preponderance of the evidence” means that according to the evidence the statement is
more likely true than not.
A “Materially Adverse” action is any action by the employer that is likely to discourage a
reasonable worker in the Plaintiff’s position from exercising his or her rights under Title
VII.
In showing that his discrimination complaint was a motivating factor for University
Medical Center’ actions (element #3), Dr. Ahmad is not required to prove that his
discrimination complaint was the sole motivation or even the primary motivation for
University Medical Center’s actions. Dr. Ahmad need only prove that his discrimination
complaint played a motivating part in University Medical Center’s actions to deny him
his promotion even though other factors allowable under the law may also have
motivated University Medical Center. Your verdict must be in favor of University
Medical Center if Dr. Ahmad failed to prove that his discrimination complaint was a
motivating factor by a preponderance of the evidence.
If you find that the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, has proven each of the three basic elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find for the Plaintiff and against the
Defendant, University Medical Center, on this claim. If, on the other hand, you find that
the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one or more of the three basic elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find against him on this claim and in favor
of the Defendant.
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But-For Discrimination Instructions
To establish a claim of discrimination based on national origin, the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad,
must prove each of the following two basic elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
Element 1: The Defendant, University Medical Center’s actions ultimately led to failing
to promote Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad; and
Element 2: The Plaintiff’s national origin was the determinative factor for the
Defendant’s action not to promote him. “Determinative Factor” means that the Defendant
would not have taken the challenged employment decision but for the Plaintiff’s
protected activity.
“Preponderance of the evidence” means that according to the evidence the truth of a
statement is more likely than not likely.
To establish element #3, Dr. Ahmad must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
1) his national origin was the determinate cause of University Medical Center’s decision
not to promote Dr. Ahmad and that 2) the University Medical Center would have
promoted Dr. Ahmad if the University administrators had not considered his national
origin. You must find for University Medical Center if Dr. Ahmad failed to prove both of
these facts by a preponderance of the evidence.
If you find that the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, has proven each of the two basic elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find for the Plaintiff and against the
Defendant, University Medical Center, on this claim. If, on the other hand, you find that
the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one or more of the two basic elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find against him on this claim and in favor
of the Defendant.
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Mixed Motive Discrimination Jury Instructions
To establish a claim of discrimination based on national origin, the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad,
must prove each of the following two basic elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
Element 1: The Defendant, University Medical Center’s actions ultimately led to failing
to promote Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad; and
Element 2: The Plaintiff’s national origin was a motivating factor for the Defendant’s
action not to promote him. A “motivating factor” is a factor that played some part in the
defendant's decision.
In showing that his national origin was a motivating factor for University Medical
Center’s action (element #2), Dr. Ahmad is not required to prove that his national origin
was the sole motivation or even the primary motivation for the University Medical
Center’s decision not to promote Dr. Ahmad. Dr. Ahmad need only prove that his
national origin played a motivating part in University Medical Center’s action even
though other factors allowable under the law may also have motivated University
Medical Center to deny him a promotion. Your verdict must be in favor of University
Medical Center if Dr. Ahmad failed to prove that his national origin was a motivating
factor by a preponderance of the evidence.
If you find that the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, has proven each of the two basic elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find for the Plaintiff and against the
Defendant, University Medical Center, on this claim. If, on the other hand, you find that
the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one or more of the two basic elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find against him on this claim and in favor
of the Defendant.

236
Appendix K
Manipulation Checks
Discrimination Only
The following questions are about the jury instructions that you read earlier.
Answer each question to the best of your ability based upon only those instructions.
These questions are NOT opinion questions. We are not interested in your views
about national origin discrimination. We are interested in your understanding of
the jury instructions that we supplied to you.
1. University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s national origin was
the determining factor in University Medical Center’s decision to deny Dr. Ahmad his
promotion.
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify
2. University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s
national origin in University Medical Center’s decision to deny Dr. Ahmad his
promotion.
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify
3. Have you heard of this case before you read it today?
a. yes
b. no
3b. If yes, were you familiar with the facts of this case?
a. yes
b. no
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Retaliation Only
The following questions are about the jury instructions that you read earlier.
Answer each question to the best of your ability based upon only those instructions.
These questions are NOT opinion questions. We are not interested in your views
about retaliation. We are interested in your understanding of the jury instructions
that we supplied to you.
1. University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s discrimination
complaint was the determining factor in University Medical Center’s decision to deny Dr.
Ahmad a promotion.
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify
2. University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s
discrimination complaint in University Medical Center’s decision to deny Dr. Ahmad a
promotion.
.
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify
3. Have you heard of this case before you read it today?
a. yes
b. no
3b. If yes, were you familiar with the facts of this case?
a. yes
b. no
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Discrimination and Retaliation
The following questions are about the jury instructions that you read earlier.
Answer each question to the best of your ability based upon only those instructions.
These questions are NOT opinion questions. We are not interested in your views
about national origin discrimination or retaliation. We are interested in your
understanding of the jury instructions that we supplied to you.
DISCRIMINATION CHARGE:
1. University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s national origin was
the determining factor in University Medical Center’s decision to deny Dr. Ahmad his
promotion .
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify
2. University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s
national origin in University Medical Center’s decision to deny Dr. Ahmad his
promotion.
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify
RETALIATION CHARGE:
3. University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s discrimination
complaint was the determining factor in University Medical Center’s decision to deny Dr.
Ahmad his promotion.
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify
4. University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s
discrimination complaint in University Medical Center’s decision to deny Dr. Ahmad his
promotion.
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify
5. Have you heard of this case before you read it today?
a. yes
b. no
5b. If yes, were you familiar with the facts of this case?
a. yes
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b. no
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Appendix L
Motivating Factors
Next, we would like you to answer some questions about why you think Dr. Ahmad
was not promoted.
To what extent was each of the following a motivating factor in University Medical
Center’s actions that may have led Meadowood Memorial Hospital to not promote
Dr. Ahmad? A “motivating factor” is a factor that played some part in University
Medical Center’s decision.
1. Dr. Ahmad’s national origin.
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2. Hospital’s rehiring policy.
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2
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3

4

3. Dr. Ahmad’s relationship with his supervisors.
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4. Dr. Ahmad’s letter to the University Medical Center’s faculty.
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5. Dr. Ahmad’s discrimination complaint
0
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at
All
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2
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3

4

5

6
Somewhat
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Appendix M
Verdict and Evidence Decisions
Wiener & Farnum (2013)
Verdict 1: With regard to the claim of discrimination in the denial of promotion I
find in favor of:
Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad
Defendant, University Medical Center
How certain are you of the verdict for discrimination?
-5
Completely
certain the
defendant
is not liable

-4

-3

-2

-1

0
Uncertain
whether
the
defendant
is liable

1

2

3

4

5
Completely
certain the
defendant
is liable

Verdict 2: With regard to the claim of retaliation in the denial of promotion I find
in favor of:
Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad
Defendant, University Medical Center
How certain are you of the verdict for retaliation?
-5
Completely
certain the
defendant
is not liable

-4

-3

-2

-1

0
Uncertain
whether
the
defendant
is liable

1

2

3

4

5
Completely
certain the
defendant
is liable

Next, we would like you evaluate the scenario that you just read on several
additional rating scales. Select the number that best summarizes your opinion.
7. How convincing was plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad’s evidence that University Medical Center
violated Title VII’s prohibition against national origin discrimination when Dr. Ahmad
was denied promotion?
1
2
Not At All
Convincing

3

4

5
Somewhat
Convincing

6

7

8

9
Very
Convincing
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8. How convincing was defendant University Medical Center’s evidence that it did not
violate Title VII’s prohibition against national origin discrimination when Dr. Ahmad
was denied promotion?
1
2
Not At All
Convincing
9.

3

4

5
Somewhat
Convincing

6

7

8

9
Very
Convincing

How convincing was plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad’s evidence that University Medical Center
violated Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation when Dr. Ahmad was denied
promotion?
1
2
Not At All
Convincing

3

4

5
Somewhat
Convincing

6

7

8

9
Very
Convincing

10. How convincing was defendant University Medical Center’s evidence that it did not
violate Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation when Dr. Ahmad was denied
promotion?
1
2
Not At All
Convincing

3

4

5
Somewhat
Convincing

6

7

8

9
Very
Convincing

11. For this case, on a scale of 0% (not at all certain) to 100% (completely certain), how
certain must you be of the evidence to find that defendant University Medical Center
violated Title VII’s prohibition against national origin discrimination when Dr. Ahmad
was denied promotion?
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
m.
n.

0% convinced
5% convinced
10% convinced
15% convinced
20% convinced
25% convinced
30% convinced

h. 35% convinced
i. 40% convinced
j. 45% convinced
k. 50% convinced
l. 55% convinced
m. 60% convinced
n. 65% convinced

o. 70% convinced
p. 75% convinced
q. 80% convinced
r. 85% convinced
s. 90% convinced
t. 95% convinced
u. 100% convinced

12. For this case, on a scale of 0% (not at all certain) to 100% (completely certain), how
certain must you be of the evidence to find that defendant University Medical Center
violated Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation when Dr. Ahmad was denied
promotion?
h. 0% convinced
i. 5% convinced
j. 10% convinced

h. 35% convinced
i. 40% convinced
j. 45% convinced

o. 70% convinced
p. 75% convinced
q. 80% convinced
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k.
l.
m.
n.

15% convinced
20% convinced
25% convinced
30% convinced

k. 50% convinced
l. 55% convinced
m. 60% convinced
n. 65% convinced

r. 85% convinced
s. 90% convinced
t. 95% convinced
u. 100% convinced
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Appendix N
Resumes
Applicant 1: Daren Ahmad
Education
Fellowship
Residency
M.D.
B.S.

Duke University Medical Center, Infectious Disease
Wayne State University School of Medicine, Internal Medicine
George Washington University School of Medicine
Vanderbilt University, Biology

Current Appointments
Associate Professor, Department of Medicine (Infectious Disease)
Staff Physician, University Medical Center, Infectious Disease Division
Research Interests
• Hollow fiber culture system
• Mycobacterium tuberculosis
• Pharmacokinetics/pharmacodynamics of antitubercular therapy
Reference feedback
§ Required multiple reminders to up-date client database.
§ Skilled at acquiring and maintaining relationships with patients and students.
§ He has difficulty making deadlines on projects and grant proposals
§ He’s creative in his development of patient-oriented research
§ Often takes long breaks on a daily basis.
§ Keeps himself informed on current trends in research and funding opportunities.
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Applicant 2: Amir Nassar
Education
Fellowship
Residency
M.D.
B.S.

New York University School of Medicine, Infectious Disease
New York University School of Medicine, Internal Medicine
University of Tennessee College of Medicine
Stanford University, Human Biology

Current Appointments
Associate Professor, Department of Medicine (Infectious Disease)
Staff Physician, University Medical Center, Infectious Disease Division
Research Interests
• Clinical outcomes in musculoskeletal and diabetic foot infections
• Innovations in graduate medical education
• Prevention of surgical site infections
Reference feedback
§ Shows he is trustworthy by keeping clients’ personal information confidential.
§ Was unresponsive to supervisor suggestions on how to improve administrative
skills.
§ Researched changes in patient pharmacy plan benefit information to stay current.
§ Would not respond to student requests for information in a timely manner.
§ Maintained a professional relationship with medical technicians, resulting in
faster tests for his patients
§ Would sometimes complain about student requests for coverage information.

246
Applicant 3: Omar Saab
Education
Fellowship
Residency
M.D.
B.S.

Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center, Infectious Disease
Ohio State University College of Medicine, Infectious Disease
Northeast Ohio Medical University
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Chemistry

Current Appointments
Associate Professor, Department of Medicine (Infectious Disease)
Staff Physician, University Medical Center, Infectious Disease Division
Research Interests
• HIV and HPV co-infection
• LGBT Research with a Focus on Transgender Care
• STDs with a Focus on HPV and Anal Dysplasia
Reference feedback
§ He has a good work ethic, often staying late to complete projects.
§ Has a tendency to boast of his accomplishments to others when he believes his
supervisor is not within earshot.
§ Shows he is creative by designing brand new marketing campaigns.
§ Requires considerable time locating proposals because he keeps a cluttered
working environment.
§ Shows confidence when proposing new research initiatives.
§ Doesn’t like to work with others on projects.

Experimental Condition
Feedback
• Recently filed a complaint of national origin discrimination against his unit
supervisor.
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Appendix O
Task Description and Regulatory Focus Manipulation
Firing
Promotion Focused
Job Description
You currently work for the University Medical Center as the division supervisor of
Infectious Diseases. The Medical Center is an academic institution that specializes in
medical education for medical students, health professionals, and scientists. All staff
physicians and unit supervisors under your supervision are faculty members of the
University and mentor medical students. The Medical Center needs to cut the number of
staff physicians in your division and has asked that you dismiss one of the physicians.
You are to review three resumes of current employees and choose which one should be
let go. It is your job to achieve the satisfaction that comes from knowing you completed
your job and achieved the best possible outcome for the Medical Center. You should
serve eagerly as an enthusiastic manager to aid the hospital in reaching the optimal and
best decision given the doctors that you are reviewing. You should base this decision on
the resumes you have in front of you. Use the resumes appropriately to reach an outcome
that will promote the ideal of fairness in the workplace.
Prevention Focused
Job Description
You currently work for the University Medical Center as the division supervisor of
Infectious Diseases. The Medical Center is an academic institution that specializes in
medical education for medical students, health professionals, and scientists. All staff
physicians and unit supervisors under your supervision are faculty members of the
University and mentor medical students. The Medical Center needs to cut the number of
staff physicians in your division and has asked that you dismiss one of the physicians.
You are to review three resumes of current employees and choose which one to let go. It
is your job to avoid the dissatisfaction that comes from knowing you improperly
completed your job and contributed to dismissing the wrong person. You should serve
vigilantly as a careful manager to aid the hospital in avoiding the incorrect decision and a
miscarriage of justice given the doctors that you are reviewing. You should base this
decision on the resumes you have in front of you. Use the resumes appropriately to reach
an outcome that will prevent the loss of the ideal of fairness in the workplace.
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Promotion Decision
Promotion focused
Job Description
You currently work for the University Medical Center as the division supervisor of
Infectious Diseases. The Medical Center is an academic institution that specializes in
medical education for medical students, health professionals, and scientists. All staff
physicians and unit supervisors under your supervision are faculty members of the
University and mentor medical students. The Medical Center wants to add a second
supervisor in the research unit and has asked that you promote one of the staff physicians.
You are to review three resumes of current employees and choose which one should be
promoted. It is your job to achieve the satisfaction that comes from knowing you
completed your job and achieved the best possible outcome for the Medical Center. You
should serve eagerly as an enthusiastic manager to aid the hospital in reaching the
optimal and best decision given the doctors that you are reviewing. You should base this
decision on the resumes you have in front of you. Use the resumes appropriately to reach
an outcome that will promote the ideal of fairness in the workplace.
Prevention Focused
Job Description
You currently work for the University Medical Center as the division supervisor of
Infectious Diseases. The Medical Center is an academic institution that specializes in
medical education for medical students, health professionals, and scientists. All staff
physicians and unit supervisors under your supervision are faculty members of the
University and mentor medical students. The Medical Center wants to add a second
supervisor in the research unit and has asked that you promote one of the staff physicians.
You are to review three resumes of current employees and choose which one to promote.
It is your job to avoid the dissatisfaction that comes from knowing you improperly
completed your job and contributed to promoting the wrong person. You should serve
vigilantly as a careful manager to aid the hospital in avoiding the incorrect decision and a
miscarriage of justice given the doctors that you are reviewing. You should base this
decision on the resumes you have in front of you. Use the resumes appropriately to reach
an outcome that will prevent the loss of the ideal of fairness in the workplace.
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Appendix P
HR Policy and Causal Manipulation
Number: HR 2.05
Policy Title: Employment Decisions
Purpose
Guidance in policy considerations in employment decisions.
Employment Decision Details
A. Recruitment processes should result in the most diverse and qualified applicant pool
possible.
B. Selection practices should emphasize hiring the best-qualified individuals with due
consideration for persons from underrepresented groups.
a. Underrepresented groups include racial/ethnic minorities, women, sexual
orientation, religious groups etc.
C. The Office of Human Resources must approve any reductions in work force.
a. Decisions to make reductions in staff who are represented by labor unions
must not violate collective bargaining agreements.
b. Managers should approach reduction in workforce situations with sensitivity.
They must balance organizational needs with human resource considerations
such as affirmative action objectives, compliance with university policies,
and applicable collective bargaining agreements.
D. Managers should give rewards and promotions for significant outstanding
performance that they advances unit goals that they are tied to specific
accomplishments.
a. Managers should take care to communicate and distribute rewards and
promotions so that employees do not view them as entitlements
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But-For
Number: HR 2.05a
Policy Title: Legal Considerations in Employment Decisions
Purpose
Guidance in policy considerations in employment decisions.
Legal Considerations Details
A. Management practices should emphasize prevention of discrimination and
harassment.
a. Discrimination and harassment is prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin), American with Disabilities
Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act.
b. All of these federal laws prohibit retaliating against someone who files a
charge of discrimination, participates in a discrimination proceeding, or
otherwise opposes an unlawful employment practice.
a. Under federal law, retaliation occurs only if the discrimination complaint is
the determinative factor for an adverse action. A determinative factor
means that the adverse action would not have taken place but for the
employee making a discrimination complaint. It is not illegal for the
organization to consider the impact of a disgruntled employee’s complaint,
but it is illegal for the decision maker to base the decision on the fact that an
employee made a discrimination complaint. If the defendant made an adverse
decision against an employee because the worker made a discrimination
complaint against the employer, than that constitutes illegal retaliation.
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Mixed Motive
Number: HR 2.05a
Policy Title: Legal Considerations in Employment Decisions
Purpose
Guidance in policy considerations in employment decisions.
B. Legal Considerations Details
C. Management practices should emphasize prevention of discrimination and
harassment.
a. Discrimination and harassment is prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin), American with Disabilities
Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act.
b. All of these federal laws prohibit retaliating against someone who files a
charge of discrimination, participates in a discrimination proceeding, or
otherwise opposes an unlawful employment practice.
c. Under federal law, retaliation occurs if a decision maker considers an
employee’s discrimination complaint when making an adverse decision
against the employee even if the decision making also considers legitimate
reasons along with the discrimination complaint. That means the
discrimination complaint may not be a motivating factor in the adverse
decision. A motivating factor is a factor that played some role in the decision.
If the defendant relied on the information that an employee made a
discrimination complaint to take an adverse action against the employee, than
that constitutes illegal retaliation.
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Appendix Q
Decision Measure
Please answer the following questions.
1. Which of the three applicants that you have reviewed would you promote (let
go)?
a. Daren Ahmad
b. Amir Nassar
c. Omar Saab
2. How confident are you in your promotion decision?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at all
Somewhat
confident
confident

8

9
Very
confident

3. Please rank the applicants in the order in which you would promote (let them go)
with 1 being most likely to promote (let go) and 3 being least likely to promote
(let go).
4. To what extent did you consider application qualification in your decision?
0
Not
at
All

1

2
Very
Little

3

4

5

6
Somewhat

7

8

9
Quite
a bit

10

11
Extremely

5. To what extent did you consider applicant education in your decision?
0
Not
at
All

1

2
Very
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3

4

5

6
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7

8

9
Quite
a bit

10

11
Extremely

6. To what extent did you consider the favorable qualities of the applicants in your
decision?
0
Not
at
All

1

2
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3

4
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9
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a bit
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11
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7. To what extent did you consider the unfavorable qualities of the applicants in
your decision?
0
Not

1

2
Very

3

4

5

6
Somewhat

7

8

9
Quite

10

11
Extremely
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Appendix R
Manipulation Checks
The following questions are about the policy that you read earlier. Answer each
question to the best of your ability based upon only the policy guide. These questions
are NOT opinion questions. We are not interested in your views about retaliation.
We are interested in your correct understanding of the policy.
1. Retaliation occurs only if the discrimination complaint was the determinative factor in
an adverse decision. That is, but for the making of the discrimination complaint the
adverse action would not have occurred.
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify
2. Retaliation occurs even if the discrimination complaint played only a role in the
adverse decision along with other legitimate factors. That is the discrimination complaint
was a motivating factor.
a. True
b. False
c. The instruction did not specify

